

THE
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Art. 1.—RECENT SHAKESPEAREAN RESEARCH.—II.

1. *The Poems of Shakespeare*. By George Wyndham. Methuen, 1898.
2. *Shakespeare Bibliography*. By William Jaggard. Shakespeare Press, 1901.
3. *The Shakespeare Apocrypha*. By C. F. Tucker Brooke. Clarendon Press, 1908.
4. *University Studies, Nebraska, U.S.A.* Also *New Shakespeare Discoveries* in 'Harper's Magazine,' March 1910; in the 'Century Magazine,' August and September 1910. By C. W. Wallace.
5. *Some Supposed Shakespeare Forgeries*. By Ernest Low. Bell, 1911.
6. *Giovanni Florio*. By Madame de Chambrun. Paris: Payot, 1921.
7. *Shakespeare and the Rival Poet* (Lane, 1904); and *The Dark Lady of the Sonnets*. By Arthur Acheson. Quaritch, 1913.

TURNING now to æsthetic questions, we find that many of the difficult problems in this field are still unsolved and seem insoluble. The Sonnets, like the body of the slain Patroclus, held of one by the heel, and of another by the head and shoulders, are like to be torn in pieces by the contending factions. Zeus, in the person of Sir Sidney Lee, has given his powerful support now to one, now to another of the opposing forces. But the W. H. of the dedication, the 'Alien Pens,' the 'Better Angel,' and the 'Worser Spirit' still keep their mysterious secret. No one has yet decided whether 'Begetter' means 'procurer' or 'inspirer'; or whether W. H. stands

for William Herbert, which seems more than improbable, or for William Hall, as the word 'all' which follows might be intended to indicate, or William Hammond (as Carew Hazlitt), or William Harvey (as Mrs Stopes), or William Hughes, as indicated by the 'Hews' of Sonnet 20. If the last is a correct amplification, could he have been the son of Will. Hews, musician to Walter Devereux, father of the ill-fated Essex, who played before his master on the virginals the night before he died? 'Play,' said he, 'my song, Will Hews, and I will sing it myself.' If W. H. cannot stand for William Herbert, still less can it do duty for Henry Wriothesley, as the Southamptonites suppose. If the initials were reversed, they might with more probability refer to Henry Willolie, the author of the curious work 'Avisa, in which Shakespeare is undoubtedly alluded to. It also has been supposed by some to have a connexion with Southampton.

In this connexion valuable research work has been done by Mr Acheson in his books on the Sonnets, and on 'Willolie his Avisa' and the Davenants; as well as by the Comtesse de Chambrun in her 'Giovanni Florio,' where she brings out the intimate connexion that subsisted between Florio, Southampton, and Shakespeare, showing that much of Shakespeare's learning could have been derived from Florio.

The old and at one time favourite theory that the friend of the Sonnets was the Earl of Pembroke, and the dark lady, Mistress Fitton, Maid of Honour to the Queen, has recently been revived by Dr Creighton, who lays stress upon certain satirical verses which till lately lay hidden in the series of State Papers (Domestic).* One stanza runs :

'Parti-beard was afeared
When they ran at the herd;
The Raine dear was imbos't,
The White Doe, she was lost;
Pembroke strook her down,
And took her from the Clown.'

Here Partibeard is Sir W. Knollys, Controller of the Household, who, though married, was Mistress Fitton's

* Elizabeth, Vol. 278, No. 23.

avowed lover. She is the Doe, and the Reindeer is of course the Queen. Mary Fitton's bastard child by Pembroke was born on March 25, 1602; and the Earl, while not denying the paternity, yet 'did utterly renounce marriage.' But the identity of the player meant by the Clown is not certain. Possibly it was Kempe, who dedicated his 'Nine Days' Wonder' in somewhat familiar terms to Mistress Fitton, whom, however, he could scarcely have known very well, as he calls her Anne, which was not her name. As for the Earl, he was born in 1580, was a great frequenter of plays, averse from marriage, a writer of amorous poems, and, according to the editors of the First Folio, 'prosecuted the Author when living with much favour.'

Southampton, the second candidate for the honour of being Shakespeare's sonnet-friend, was, however, only nine years his junior. Though he too had an intrigue with a maid of honour, Elizabeth Vernon, yet his intentions were always honourable. The Queen's opposition for a long time prevented the marriage, but he finally married Bess Vernon secretly, when her condition rendered such a step, as in Shakespeare's own case, imperative. The Earl, who had a very fine character, is known to have been Shakespeare's friend and patron from the dedications of 'Venus' and 'Lucrece,' to the latter of which Sonnet 26 bears a remarkable resemblance. He even, as a trustworthy tradition tells us, gave Shakespeare, in return no doubt for his dedications, 1000*l.* to complete some purchase to which he had a mind. He was a great lover of the stage, and, soon after his release from prison (supposed to be referred to in Sonnet 107) on the accession of King James, he had the revived play of 'Love's Labour's Lost' acted at his house in Holborn before the new Queen.*

The impersonal theory of the Sonnets is now the refuge of puzzled students; and Sir Sidney Lee, after holding the other two theories successively, has now become protagonist for this view. The Sonnets, it seems, are to be looked upon as almost entirely exercises in poetical mystification, Shakespeare's contribution to a sort of sonnet-game or competition played by all the

* See Sir Walter Cope to Viscount Cranbourne in 1604.

leading poets of the time, much of the inspiration being drawn from French or Italian forerunners, while the persons addressed are purely ideal. But any one who reads the Sonnets without any bias or eye on a theory must realise that a deep personal feeling and experience runs through the majority of them. Current events—if we could only identify them—are certainly mentioned: the 'eclipse' endured by the 'mortal Moon' must refer to Elizabeth, and glance at her death or the Armada or some other notable occurrence. Shakespeare seems to have had an admiration for Essex, which he showed in 'Henry V' and in the 'Phoenix and Turtle';* and there can be little doubt that he is meant in the touching lines :

'The painful warrior famoused for worth,
After a thousand victories once foiled,
Is from the book of honour razed forth
And all the rest forgot for which he toil'd.'

A definite allusion there must be to Chapman or another in the 'Alien pens' (78), 'A worthier pen' (79), 'Both your poets' (83), 'Proud full sail of his great verse' (86), 'That affable familiar ghost' (*ibid.*), 'Better spirit' (80). Then there is the time-scheme that can be traced through the main sequences; and there are references to the actual conditions of the writer's life, his travelling on horseback (27, 50), his gift of a book (77, cp. 122), and his acting: 'I have gone here and there And made myself a motley to the view, Gored mine own thoughts, sold cheap what is most dear.' (110, 111, cp. 23). Here surely Shakespeare unlocked his own heart, no less than in the poignant verses, 'When in disgrace with fortune and men's eyes' (29). Did Shakespeare invent 'the woman coloured ill,' 'the worser spirit,' or merely affect to feel what it is expressed in that heart-searching Sonnet on Lust—'The expense of spirit in a waste of shame'?

William Drummond of Hawthornden, about 1614, referring to the authors he had read on the subject of love, remarks 'the last we have are Sir William

* 'Henry V,' Prol. v, 32. In 'Henry VIII' the speech of Buckingham on his way to execution is closely copied from the address of Essex on the scaffold.

Alexander and Shakespear, who have *lately* published their works.' He appears to allude to the Sonnets, but can hardly be taken to mean that the publication was authorised by Shakespeare. For one thing, the poet does not seem to have spelt his name Shake-speare (with the hyphen), as is done in Thorpe's book. The date when the Sonnets were composed is not known. They must have been mostly written between 1590 and 1600, and chiefly in the earlier years of the decade. One or two seem to be so late as 1603 or 1604. Shakespeare's sonnet period is synchronous with his earlier dramas; and parallels in 'Love's Labour's Lost,' 'Two Gentlemen,' 'Romeo and Juliet,' and other plays of that period are numerous and striking. External references are all previous to 1600; the Meres allusion in 1598, the publication of two of the Sonnets, from the end sequences, in the 'Passionate Pilgrim' (1599), and the use of the 'Fair, Kind, and True' Sonnet (105) by Breton in his 'Melancholy Humours' of 1600, as first noticed by the present writer, all point to a 16th-century date. A book called 'Amours by J. D. with certein other Sonnets by W. S.,' licensed for publication in 1600, but not brought out, may refer to Shakespearean sonnets. But there was a William Smith who produced a collection of sonnets called 'Chloris' in 1596.

Now that a satisfactory Life of Shakespeare, fully up to modern requirements, and written with skill, moderation, and common sense, has been provided for the lovers and students of Shakespeare, there remains yet one necessary thing, which would form the most suitable of all tercentenary memorials of his death. There is at present in existence no adequate edition of Shakespeare in a single handy volume. When the publishers of the *Globe* edition, which was excellent at that date and deserved its immense success, decided in 1900 to bring out a new edition, they were content merely to produce the old faulty book, now quite out of date, with all its glaring imperfections, in practically the same form as before. The Clarendon Press followed suit almost immediately, though their edition is undated. Its text indeed is far better than that of the '*Globe*,' but in many important respects the book is quite as unsatisfactory.

For instance, it keeps the absurd order of the plays found in the first folio, and makes no attempt to eject the un-Shakespearean parts of the 'Passionate Pilgrim.'

Can no publisher be found—an editor would soon be forthcoming—to bring out an edition on the following lines? A single handy volume; the plays as far as possible in their chronological order; marginal references as in the Bible; non-Shakespearean parts of the plays in different type; 'Edward III,' 'Sir Thomas More,' and 'Two Noble Kinsmen' to be included and treated similarly; passages in Quartos not found in the Folios to be marked; concise headings to each play, giving approximate dates, sources and other necessary information; revised lists of *dramatis personæ*, with aliases inserted; modern equivalents of obsolete words at the foot of the page; 'The Passionate Pilgrim' critically revised and the non-Shakespearean items thrown out; other occasional poems, some of which, such as the two epitaphs, are certainly, and others such as the Florio sonnets, are most probably, by Shakespeare, to be inserted; all the minor poems to be in proper order; a short life, or at least a chronological table at the beginning, and a glossary at the end. An edition such as the one here sketched out, on thin light paper—the old Globe edition was excellent in this respect—would command instant acceptance and chase every rival from the field.

A canon of Shakespeare is imperatively needed. Until it is at least approximately known what parts of 'Titus Andronicus' (if any), 'Henry VI,' Parts 1, 2, 3, 'Pericles,' 'Timon,' 'Henry VIII,' and the three so-called apocryphal plays, are by Shakespeare, it will be impossible to settle the question (for instance) of his classical knowledge. Interpolated passages or scenes have also crept into 'Cymbeline' and other plays. These must be discriminated. The establishment of a true canon will not be easy, but it need not be considered impossible. 'Titus Andronicus' will undoubtedly be a bone of contention. Because the well-informed Meres mentions it, and it finds a place in the first Folio, some will not hear of its not being wholly Shakespeare's. Yet internal evidence is decisive against it. In general style, phraseology, diction, plot, and moral it is unlike his

work. Apart from this, it was probably written before 1590; and how can we attribute this play and 'Love's Labour's Lost,' the 'Comedy of Errors,' and 'Romeo and Juliet' to the same hand at about the same time? Moreover, it was acted by Lord Pembroke's players in the first instance. No doubt the tradition recorded by Ravenscroft in 1678 is correct. The play was by another hand (most probably Kyd's), and Shakespeare only shredded in a few passages, such as:

'What, hast not thou full often struck a doe,
And borne her cleanly by the keeper's nose?' (II, 1, 90).

'What stern ungentle hands
Have lopp'd and hew'd and made thy body bare
Of her two branches, those sweet ornaments,
Whose circling shadows kings have sought to sleep in
And might not gain so great a happiness?' (II, 5, 17).

With regard to 'Pericles,' all now agree that Shakespeare had a considerable hand in it, in spite of its exclusion from the Folio. The inferior parts are attributed to George Wilkins, who wrote the novel based on the play. But the famous-infamous brothel scenes, which are quite beyond the reach of Wilkins, sorely disturb the equanimity of the Shakespeare idealisers. Had Jonson or any other been the writer of the finer parts of 'Pericles,' no one would have hesitated to ascribe the brothel scenes to the author of these parts. Those who will not hear of their being by Shakespeare are obliged to introduce a third author for them alone, an expedient which stands self-condemned. Certainly Shakespeare was never, and he is not here, 'a procurer to the Lords of hell'; and his outspoken and mostly humorous grossness is far less offensive and pernicious than the corrupt and suggestive prurience of a Tourneur, a Fletcher, or a Ford. The brothel scenes in truth are so skilfully and vigorously handled, and are so similar in manner to passages in 'Measure for Measure,' that we are almost forced, on reading them, to cry, 'Aut Shakespeare aut diabolus,' possibly 'et Shakespeare et diabolus.' The play was published first in 1609, and probably written within the two previous years, as the words 'gazed on like a

comet** may refer to Halley's comet, which appeared in 1607.

Fletcher, perhaps the most brilliant dramatist next to Shakespeare, and his coadjutor, surpassed himself in his share of 'Henry VIII,' but does not show to quite such advantage in the other joint play, 'The Two Noble Kinsmen.' The best parts of this are by a greater than he, and who but Shakespeare could be called so? Take the splendid apostrophe to Mars in the third scene of the fourth act, or these lines:

'By th' helm of Mars I saw them in the war,
Like to a pair of lions smeared with prey,
Make lines in troops aghast. I fixed my note
Constantly on them, for they were a mark
Worth a god's view' (i, 4, 20).

If this is not by Shakespeare, then had Fletcher learnt to write with his 'victorious pen'! Surely too, the Shakespeare touch is seen in such words as

'That we should things desire that do cost us
The loss of our desire!' (v, 4, 127).

Some parts of the play, especially the vulgar and indecent love episode of the jailer's daughter, are a sort of ignoble travesty of Shakespeare's work; but in the song,

'Roses, their sharp spines being gone,
Not royal in their smells alone
But in their hue;
Maiden pinks, of odour faint,
Daisies smell-less yet most quaint,
And sweet thyme true,'

we find something, if not entirely beyond Fletcher's skill in his happiest moments, yet quite worthy of Shakespeare. In the Quarto of 1634 this play is ascribed to Fletcher and Shakespeare, the order of the names being noticeable, as if Fletcher had worked up Shakespeare material and been responsible for the play.

But there are plays, for Shakespeare's joint authorship of which we have no external evidence whatever, yet seem forced to ascribe to him a share in them. Chief among these comes 'Edward III,' first published in 1596. In the first two acts the love episode between

the King and the Countess of Salisbury shows a splendour and opulence of thought and diction scarcely to be found but in Shakespeare's admitted work.* The incident and its dénouement are both characteristic of him. Many lines recall Shakespeare's style :

'And from the fragrant garden of her womb
Your gracious self, the flower of Europe's hope,
Derived is inheritor to France' (I, 1, 14).

'Upon the bare report and name of arms' (I, 2, 80).

'It wakened Cæsar from his Roman grave' (II, 1, 38).

'Better than beautiful thou must begin,
Devise for fair a fairer word than fair,
And every ornament that thou wouldst praise,
Fly it a pitch above the soar of praise' (II, 1, 84).

The style in some places reminds us of the Sonnets, one line, 'Lilies that fester smell far worse than weeds' (II, 1, 451), being taken from Sonnet 94, where it seems more in place than here, and the expression 'scarlet ornaments' recalls a phrase in Sonnet 142. Compare also

'I kill my poor soul and my poor soul me' (II, 1, 242),
and

'Now in the sun it doth not lie
With light to take light from a mortal eye;
For here two day-stars that mine eyes would see
More than the sun steals mine own light from me'
(I, 2, 131).

Tennyson affirmed that he could trace Shakespeare's hand through the last three acts. These lines seem the most prominent instance :

'To die is all as common as to live . . .
For from the instant we begin to live
We do pursue and hunt the time to die:
First bud we, then we blow, and after seed,
Then presently we fall, and as a shade
Follows the body, so we follow death . . .
Since for to live is but to seek to die,
And dying but beginning of new life' (IV, 4, 133).

* This incident is taken from Bandello in Painter's 'Palace of Pleasure,' a book which we know Shakespeare to have used.

'Sir Thomas More,' the third apocryphal play that has some claim to be regarded as partly by Shakespeare, has been reprinted three times in modern days, viz. by Dyce (1844), Hopkinson (1902), Tucker Brooke (1908), and in facsimile by Farmer (1910).* While exceptionally free from Shakespeare 'tags' or echoes of his work, yet in characterisation and sustained level of thought and diction parts at least of this play do not fall below the standard we expect to find in all that Shakespeare wrote. The date of the play is not later than 1596, and ours is a draft copy, revised and corrected by several hands. It seems just possible that the corrections and additions by one of these are in Shakespeare's own writing.† All the critics assign the first 170 lines of Act II, Sc. 4, to this hand, though other passages may also be his work. The passage alluded to is a scene where Sir Thomas More pacifies a mob of 'prentices and other rioters against the alien Lombards, who like the Germans of the present day had established themselves in a privileged position in London, and to a great extent controlled English finance and industry. The scene opens on the Jack Cade note, Lincoln being the leader:

Linc. Peace, hear me! He that will not see a red herring at a Harry groat, butter at elevenpence a pound, meal at nine shillings a bushel, and beef at four nobles a stone, list to me!

Betts. It will come to that pass, if strangers be suffered. Mark him!

Linc. Our country is a great eating country: argo, they eat more in our country than they do in their own.

Betts. By a halfpenny loaf a day, troy weight.

Then the Lord Mayor, Sir Thomas More, and other Lords come on the scene, and attempts are made by various speakers to get a hearing. Finally More speaks:

More. While's they are o'er the bank of their obedience thus will they bear down all things.

Linc. Shrieve More speaks! Shall we hear Shrieve More speak?

* Harleian MSS., 7368.

† Dr W. W. Greg has recently pronounced against this belief, but Sir E. Maunde Thompson has still more recently championed Shakespeare's authorship.

More gradually calms the mob by his eloquence and ends with this fine speech :

'For to the King hath God his office lent
 Of dread, of justice, power, and command ;
 Hath bid him rule and will'd you to obey ;
 And to add ampler majesty to this,
 He hath not only lent the King his figure,
 His throne and sword, but given him his own name,
 Calls him a god on earth. What do you then,
 Rising 'gainst him, that God himself installs,
 But rise 'gainst God? . . . O desperate as you are
 Wash your foul minds with tears,* and those same hands
 That you, like rebels, lift against the peace,
 Lift up for peace, and your unreverent knees,
 Make them your feet to kneel to be forgiven !
 Tell me but this: what rebel captain,
 As mutinies are incident, by his name
 Can still the rout? Who will obey a traitor?
 Or how can well that proclamation sound
 When there is no addition but a rebel
 To qualify a rebel? You'll put down strangers,
 Kill them, cut their throats, possess their houses,
 And lead the majesty of law in liom,†
 To slip him like a hound.
Luc. We'll be ruled by you, Master More, if you'll stand
 our friend to procure our pardon . . .'

In its restrained power, its knowledge of the humours of a mob, its reverence for authority, this passage is entirely Shakespearean. It is most interesting, moreover, to see how by deletions, corrections, and additions in the MS. the first ideas and expressions of the poet were modified *currante calamo*. Mr Tucker Brooke in his useful edition points out how, after the words 'Make them your feet,' there was in the first draft a pause. Subsequently the writer added :

'To kneel to be forgiven
 Is safer wars than ever you can make,
 Whose discipline is riot. Why even your wars
 Cannot proceed but by obedience. What rebel captain . . .'

He then deleted the second 'wars,' substituting 'hurly'

* Cf. 'Much Ado,' iv, 1, 155.

† Leash.

for it, and again for the half-line he wrote tentatively above, 'In, in to your obedience!' Not being able to complete this to his satisfaction, he finally cancelled the whole from the word 'forgiven,' and put instead 'Tell me but this.'

This whole scene is topical at the present day. It reveals the bitter feeling against the interpenetration of England by aliens in the 16th century. We have seen the same in our time. It serves to illustrate the account lately given by Mr Ian Colvin in his 'Hanseatic League' of a most ominous and instructive chapter in our history. Though the style of 'Sir Thomas More' is less superficially brilliant and much more severe in cast, than we see in the splendid and masterful rhetoric of 'Edward III,' or the lyric grace and opulent eloquence of the 'Two Noble Kinsmen,' yet it is nearer the heart of the Shakespearean mystery.

A few words will suffice for the other apocryphal plays. Swinburne's advocacy of 'Arden of Faversham' has predisposed many to attribute this play to Shakespeare. Its merit might indeed justify the supposition, but a domestic tragedy, such as this is, based on an incident scarcely more than a generation old, stands outside the self-chosen range of Shakespeare's dramatic activity. Moreover, the early date (1592) of the play makes the Shakespeare authorship more than unlikely. Taking the metrical and other tests into consideration—and in spite of American and native scoffers they cannot be ignored—it is impossible to suppose that a play, exhibiting the dramatic manner and versification of 'Arden,' could have been composed contemporaneously with 'Love's Labour's Lost' and 'Romeo and Juliet.' The facts, indeed, on which the play is based are from Holinshed, to whom Shakespeare often had recourse. Arden, too, is a name which might have caught his attention; and this Arden had property in Warwickshire. It has been generally admitted, however, since Mr Crawford's monograph on the play, that the author was Kyd, who in virtue of this performance must take a high place among contemporary dramatists. But though Shakespeare did not write the play, he must have been influenced by it, more than we should have expected, for we seem to see his style in

'Intreat her fair; sweet words are fittest engines
To raze the flint walls of a woman's breast' (I, 1, 46).
'It is not love that loves to anger love' (III, 4, 58).
'What pity-moving words, what deep-fetcht sighs,
What grievous groans, what overloading woes
Accompanies this gentle gentleman!
Now will he shake his care-oppressed head,
Now fix his sad eyes on the sullen earth,*
Ashamed to gaze upon the open world;
Now will he cast his eyes up towards the heavens
Looking that ways for redress of wrong,
Sometime he seeketh to beguile his grief,
And tells a story with his careful tongue;
Then comes his wife's dishonour in his thoughts
And in the middle cutteth off his tale,
Pouring fresh sorrow on his weary limbs.
So woe-begone, so inly charg'd with woe
Was never any liv'd and bare it so' (III, 1, 41).

The dream of Arden (III, 3, especially line 30) strongly recalls Clarence's dream; † and there are some Shakespearean phrases such as 'killed my heart,' found in 'The Contention,' 'Edward IV,' and 'Henry V'; 'tis but early days'; 'taunting letter'; 'clean out of her books'; 'pricked-ear'd cur'; 'raven for a dove'; while the pun, bite . . . bitterly, appears in 'As you like it.' †

The 'Yorkshire Tragedy,' which is on a theme similar to that of 'Arden,' has been shown by the late Mr Dobell and others to be by Wilkins. Though ascribed to Shakespeare in the Quarto of 1608, it hardly contains ten lines which he could have written: such as are

'That Heaven should say we must not sin, and yet made woman!' (Sc. iv, 65).
'I see how Ruin with a palsy hand
Begins to shake the ancient seat to dust' (Sc. III, 99).
'That mortgage sits like a snaffle on my inheritance, and makes me chaw upon iron' (Sc. II, 50).
'Unkindness strikes a deeper wound than steel' (Sc. x, 18).
'O beggary, beggary, to what base uses dost thou put a man!' (Sc. II, 55).

* Cf. 'Sonnets,' 29, and '2 Henry VI,' I, 2, 5.

† 'Richard III,' I, 4, 63.

† II, 7, 185.

In 'Loerine' (1595), which is almost certainly by Greene, in 'Mucedorus' (1598), a most successful but wretched play, in 'Sir John Oldcastle' (1600) (now known to be by Munday, Drayton, Wilson, and Hathaway *), which was written as a protest against the original use of Oldcastle's name for Falstaff's, and in 'Lord Cromwell' (1602), not a word of Shakespeare is to be found, though the first, second, and fourth were fathered on Shakespeare when published. 'The London Prodigal'† (1605), a Jonsonian play of 'humours,' has more merit, but, except for some Shakespearean tags, has no pretension to the name on its title-page. It contains not a line of real poetry. 'The Puritan Widow' (1607), of similar type, has a Shakespearean phrase or two and a reference to the ghost in Macbeth. The absurd and tedious play 'Fair Em' (1590), quoted by Greene twice in his 'Farewell to Folly,' is too early for Shakespeare, as well as too poor. The last two plays of the Apocrypha to be considered, 'The Merry Devil of Edmonton' (1604) and the 'Birth of Merlin' (of unknown date), stand on a different footing. 'The Merry Devil,' an excellent piece of work and full of humour, on the chivalry of love and friendship, must be pronounced not wholly unworthy of the high parentage ascribed to it. The best scene, the first of Act iv, describing a hunt in Enfield Chase, is the most like Shakespeare's work, but there are fine passages elsewhere, e.g.

'The silent sable-visaged night
Casts her black curtain over all the world'

(Prologue 24),

and,

'Oh that this soul, that cost so great a price
As the dear precious blood of her Redeemer,
Inspir'd with knowledge, should by that alone
Which makes a man so unto the Powers
Even lead him down into the depth of hell,
When men in their own pride strive to know more
Than man should know!' (Induction 42).

Kirkman, the first publisher of the 'Birth of Merlin' in 1662 attributed it, possibly from a lost quarto, to

* Yet in this play Schlegel saw Shakespeare's best and maturest work!

† Madame de Chambrun rather rashly pronounces in favour of the genuineness of this apocryphal play.

Shakespeare and Rowley. Mr Tucker Brooke summarily disposes of the claims of this play with these words :

'The disjointed nature of the plot, moreover, the foolish and immature morality of the *Modestia* scenes, and the repeated appeals to the cheap make-shifts of sorcery and divination stamp it as distinctly unshakespearean.'

Quite so ; but Rowley may be saddled with all this and more, and yet Shakespeare's hand, as in '*Titus Andronicus*,' may show itself in a few touches. Madden, in his admirable '*Diary of Master William Silence*,' quotes some passages relating to sport ; and there are also lines which have a touch of Shakespeare, like

'A wife is a dish soon cloys ;
What's mine in her speaks yours' (I, 1, 38-45).

'I see he will marry her, he speaks so like a husband'
(II, 1, 141).

'Till the great Sessions come, when death the crier
Will surely summons us and all t' appear
To plead us guilty and our bail to clear' (III, 2, 43).

'Bright Victory herself fights on our part,
And buckled in a golden beaver rides
Triumphantly before us' (IV, 4, 1).

There is much wit too in the clown of the play. One thing is certain—the doubtful plays of Shakespeare merit more attention than they have hitherto received. But, apart from these, can we trace any other plays likely to be Shakespeare's, which have not come down to us ? Vulcan has undoubtedly been a deity inimical not only to Jonson but to his greater contemporary. The fire at the Globe Theatre on June 29, 1613, when '*Henry VIII*,' under the name '*All is True*,' was being acted, may or may not have destroyed some playhouse copies.* On July 9, in the following year, there was a disastrous fire at Stratford. In 1620, Ben Jonson's house, with its library—and he must have had letters and papers of Shakespeare's—was burnt. The Fire of London must have consumed innumerable MSS. and papers ; and the Cottonian library, collected in Shakespeare's lifetime, was devastated by fire in 1731. Two years later

* Sir Henry Wotton says nothing of this sort perished.

Theobald refers to a tradition lately recorded in print, that two large chests of loose papers and MSS. relating to Shakespeare, being in the hands of an ignorant baker of Warwick, who married one of the descendants of the Shakespeare family, were carelessly scattered about as garret litter and lumber, to the particular knowledge of the late Sir William Bishop, till they were all consumed in the general fire and destruction of the town (in 1694).

Samuel Ireland, a more suspicious witness, tells a similar tale of MSS. at Clopton House about 1805, burnt by a tenant named Williams, who, on inquiry for such relics being made, said, 'I wish you had arrived sooner; it isn't a fortnight since I destroyed several baskets full of letters and papers to clear a small chamber for some partridges I want to bring up; and as for Shakespeare, there were many bundles with his name wrote on them. Why, it was in this very fire-place I made a roaring bonfire of them.' His wife being called in told the same tale, adding, 'There now! I told you not to burn them, as they might be of consequence.' But we naturally ask why these papers were left in the hands of a tenant, and how he had a right to make away with them? Nor could they well have escaped the notice of Malone, Wheler, and other searchers.

However, we do know that by the gross carelessness of an antiquary, John Warburton (1683-1759), who unfortunately had a hobby for collecting MS. copies of Elizabethan and Jacobean plays, some priceless MSS. were allowed to be burnt about 1730 by his still more careless and ignorant cook. The owner of these treasures seems to have left not even any account of them beyond a bare list. He appears to have had in MS. besides the 'Maiden's Holiday' by Marlowe and Day, a drama by Greene, a tragedy of Chapman's, several plays by Rowley, many by Massinger, one or two anonymous, and three Shakespeare plays, viz. one unnamed, 'Duke Humphrey' and 'Henry I,' which is attributed to him in conjunction with Robert Davenport.

There is still another play attributed to Shakespeare conjointly with Fletcher. It was twice produced at Court in 1613, just when we know that the same two poets collaborated on 'Henry VIII.' Moseley in 1653 obtained a licence for its publication. No doubt the

disturbed state of the country during the Civil War, and the subsequent ascendancy of the Puritans, lost us this and other plays. The plot of the play was taken from the 'Cardenio' in *Don Quixote*, first introduced to English readers by *Shelton* in 1612. *Theobald* in 1727 claimed, but falsely, to have published this play under the title of 'The Distrest Lovers,' or 'The Double Falsehood.' It is on the same subject, but bears no trace of *Shakespeare's* or *Fletcher's* hand. *Theobald* affirmed that he had three MS. copies of it, one more than sixty years old, formerly belonging to *Betterton* the actor, and in the handwriting of *Downes* the stage prompter. A play still exists in a German version under the title of 'Cardenio und Celinde.'*

Manuscript copies of *Shakespeare's* existing plays are very rare. *Joseph Strutt* the antiquary, who died in 1803, had at one time in his possession a MS. copy of 'Timon' dated 1600; but this appears to be the one which is now in the South Kensington Museum, and is not *Shakespeare's* play of the same name. A copy of the two parts of 'Henry IV,' written about 1610 by *Sir Edward Dering* of Surrenden in Kent, came to light in 1844; and a late MS. of the 'Merry Wives' was purchased by *Halliwell-Phillipps* from the poet *Procter* in 1842. It dates from about 1660. Both have important variations from the received text, and the former was apparently from a playhouse copy.

A little note-book of Old English Poetry, dated between 1585 and 1590, with the autograph of *Anne Cornwallis*, contains the verses, 'When as thine eye,' which stand nineteenth in the 'Passionate Pilgrim.' This is the earliest MS. of any portion (if this be one) of *Shakespeare's* works now extant. There is said also to be in existence a MS. contemporary copy of the music to the 'Willow, willow' song in 'Othello.' All these, except the first and the last mentioned, were in the unique collection at Warwick Castle. But this, like too many invaluable Shakespeareana, is now practically beyond our reach.

C. R. HAINES.

* See *Carew Hazlitt*, p. 126. But it has no Shakespearean characteristics whatever.

Art. 2.—LONDON LIFE IN THE TIME OF ADDISON.

JOSEPH ADDISON was born on May 1, 1672, and died on June 17, 1719. Thus he lived through the last thirteen years of Charles the Second, the whole of the reigns of James the Second, William the Third, and Anne, and the first five years of George the First. But his memory is chiefly associated with the age of Queen Anne, because that period coincided with the maturity of his genius and witnessed the production of the writings on which his fame securely rests. These writings comprise above all the papers contributed by him to the 'Tatler' and the 'Spectator,' which ran successively, with breaks of about twenty months, from April 12, 1709, to Dec. 20, 1714.

While the whole of the 'Tatler' and the greater part of the 'Spectator' were appearing, the war with France was still dragging out its weary length to a somewhat indecisive and inglorious close; and Addison makes frequent references to it. He says that news of the war were cried through London with the same precipitation as a fire; that a bloody battle alarmed the town from one end to another in an instant; and that every motion of the French was published in so great a hurry that you might think the enemy were at the gates. News of a great victory were proclaimed to the whole city by the roar of guns from the Tower. In one of his papers Addison professes to have been appropriately wakened from a dream of Fame by the noise of the cannon fired for the taking of Mons. As the ports of France were closed to English traffic during the war, news of military operations in Flanders and Germany reached England only by the mail from Holland; hence the conspicuous place which the Dutch mail takes in the periodical literature of that age. And as the packet-boat came from the east, and it was long before the invention of steamers, the mail could not arrive so long as the wind sat in the west; accordingly we read that a westerly wind kept the whole town in suspense.

The places where, in Addison's time, people met to discuss the news were the clubs and especially the coffee-houses. Never was the drinking of coffee more fashionable than in his day. The custom was then of comparatively recent origin. When John Evelyn was a

fellow-commoner of Balliol College, Oxford, where he was admitted on May 10, 1637, he saw coffee drunk for the first time by a certain Greek named Nathaniel Conopios, who had been sent on a mission from Greece by Cyril, the Patriarch of Constantinople.

Many coffee-houses are mentioned in the 'Tatler' and the 'Spectator.' They differed not only in situation but in the class of persons who frequented them, some being the favourite haunts of politicians, others of authors, others of men of fashion, and so forth. The most famous of all was Will's, which took its name from Will Urwin, who kept it. It was the corner house on the north side of Russell Street, at the end of Bow Street, in Covent Garden. The coffee-house owed its reputation to Dryden, who frequented it habitually, gathering the wits of London about him and holding forth on literary topics in his later years with the authority of an acknowledged master. In Addison's day Will's was still pre-eminently the resort of authors. When false news of the death of Louis XIV arrived in London and set all the coffee-house politicians agog, Addison professes to have called in at Will's and to have found that the discourse of the critics had wandered from the death of the French king to those of Monsieur Boileau, Monsieur Racine, and Monsieur Corneille, and several other poets whom they regretted as persons who, if only they had been alive, would have obliged the world with very noble elegies on the death of so great a prince and so eminent a patron of learning.

The coffee-house most frequented by politicians in those days seems to have been the St James's. It was the last house but one on the south-west corner of St James's Street, where it stood down to 1806. When the rumour of the French king's death was afloat, and the 'Spectator' desired to ascertain the truth of it, he began, he says, as near the fountain-head as possible by looking in at the St James's, where he found the whole outer room in a buzz of politics. The speculations were very indifferent towards the door, but improved in quality as you approached the steam of the coffee-pot in the inner room, where he heard the whole Spanish monarchy disposed of, and all the line of the Bourbons provided for in less than a quarter of an hour. Pursuing

his inquiries towards the city he came to Jenny Man's coffee-house, which appears to have been situated somewhere between St James's Street and Charing Cross. There he saw a brisk young fellow, who cocked his hat on a friend and addressed him as follows: 'Well, Jack, the old prig is dead at last. Sharp's the word. Now or never, boy! Up to the walls of Paris directly'—with other deep reflexions of the same nature.

By the time that the *Spectator*, still following up the scent, had penetrated into the heart of the city, he discovered that the views of coffee-house politicians were to some extent coloured by their professional occupations. In Fish Street, where the coffee-houses seem to have chiefly depended on the patronage of fishmongers, he heard a leading politician discoursing on the plentiful supply of mackerel which might be expected to flow as a natural consequence from the French king's death; since English fishermen would not have to fear the raids of French privateers on their boats and nets. The orator then considered the death of Louis XIV in its bearing on the catch of pilchards, and by his remarks on that subject infused a general joy into the whole audience.

Proceeding still eastward the *Spectator* came to Cheapside, where he heard a haberdasher haranguing a circle of admirers in a coffee-house of which he was the most shining ornament. The speaker called several of his hearers to witness that he had given up the king of France for dead more than a week ago, indeed that the thing was so certain that it was impossible it could be otherwise. He was in the act of deducing the political lessons to be drawn from the monarch's decease, when his speech was interrupted, and his reputation as a political oracle was dashed to the ground, by the arrival of a gentleman from Garraway's, who informed the audience that, according to the latest letters from France, the French king was in good health and had gone out hunting the very morning the post came away. On hearing this intelligence the crestfallen haberdasher stole his hat from the peg beside him and retired to his shop in great confusion.

Next to the coffee-houses, if not on an equality with them, as places of popular resort in the reign of Queen Anne, were the clubs. Many clubs are described or

alluded to in the pages of the 'Tatler' and 'Spectator,' but only some of these were real, while others, to all appearance, were purely imaginary. Among the real clubs mentioned by Addison are the Kit-Cat and the October. The Kit-Cat Club met at a famous mutton-pie house in Shire Lane, by Temple Bar. It took its name, not, as might naturally be supposed, from the contents of the pies, but from a pastry-cook named Christopher Katt, who kept the house; and the pies were called Kit-cats after him, and not after the noble animals which were baked in them. In summer the club sometimes met at the Upper Flask on Hampstead Heath. The principles of the club were staunch Whig. At it the great Whig chiefs, such as Somers and Halifax, met the foremost Whig writers, such as Congreve, Addison, Garth, and Steele. Pope and Gay sometimes visited the club, and on one occasion drank the health of Swift, who had set up a rival club called the Society of Brothers as an antidote to the poisonous Whig principles of the Kit-Cat. But the regular Tory rival of the Kit-Cat was the October Club, which met at the Bell Tavern in King Street, Westminster, and drank confusion to the Whigs in October ale, which gave its name to the club.

Among the clubs mentioned by Addison, which are hardly less illustrative of the manners of the age because their historical existence is more than doubtful, we may note the Club of Duellists, which, he says, was founded in the reign of King Charles the Second. None might be admitted to the club who had not fought his man. The president was said to have killed half-a-dozen in single combat; and as for the other members, they took their seats according to the number of their slain. There was likewise a side-table for such as had only drawn blood and shown a laudable ambition to qualify themselves for sitting among the homicides at the principal table. This club, consisting only of men of honour, came to an untimely end, most of the members being put to the sword, or hanged, soon after its institution.

Addison has also commemorated a remarkable club of widows, though we cannot be sure that all the particulars which he gives of it are strictly historical. The club consisted of nine experienced dames who met once a week round a large oval table. The president had

disposed of six husbands and was just about to grapple with a seventh. Another had married within a fortnight of the death of her last husband but one; her weeds had served her thrice, and were still as good as new. A third member had been a widow at eighteen, and had since buried a second husband and two coachmen. On the first institution of the club it was resolved that the members should give pictures of their deceased husbands to the club-room; but two of them bringing in their dead at full length, they covered all the walls; upon which the rule was amended so as to run, that each widow should give her own portrait set round with her husbands in miniature. The conversation of the ladies at the club turned largely on the question of how to manage a husband. Among the first principles, on which they were unanimously agreed, was not to give him his head at first, and never to be thoroughly convinced of his affection till he had made over to her all his goods; after which the sooner he went to his long home, the better for her, and perhaps for him.

The principal theatres of London in Addison's time were the Haymarket and Drury Lane; Covent Garden was not built till some years after his death. The Haymarket was designed and opened by Vanbrugh in 1705; but at first it was almost a complete failure, partly, it would seem, because it was too distant from the city for the ordinary playgoers, but still more because the convenience of the building for the representation of plays was sacrificed to the magnificence of the architecture. The huge columns, gilded cornices, and immoderately high roof struck the spectators with surprise and wonder, but the voices of the actors were so lost in the void overhead that scarcely one word in ten could be distinctly heard, while the rest was drowned in a sort of confused murmur, like the hum of voices rolling and reverberating along the vaults in the long-drawn aisles of a cathedral. But, if the stately building was ill-fitted for speech, it was much better adapted for music; the swelling blast of a trumpet and the high notes of a singer lingered lovingly in the hollows of that lofty roof, and struck home to the hearts of the rapt listeners with a power and a sweetness which they could hardly have attained in a less ample structure. Hence, when

the Italian opera was introduced into England in the reign of Queen Anne, it found its natural home in the Haymarket; and the foreign songs and foreign music saved the theatre from the utter ruin with which it had been threatened by the failure of the English pieces.

It was at the Haymarket that Handel, then a stranger lately arrived in England, produced his opera of 'Rinaldo' in February 1711. It was highly successful, and Addison bore unwilling witness to its popularity. He himself, apparently, could see nothing in it to admire, but much to ridicule. The only design of an opera, he says, 'is to gratify the senses, and keep up an indolent attention in the audience.' To do the critic justice, he seems to have conformed his own behaviour very closely to the design of the performance, as he conceived it. For any reference he makes to the music, he might have been deaf. While the rest of the audience sat entranced by the melting airs of *Cara sposa* and *Lascia ch'io pianga*, Addison was coolly sneering at the costumes and the scenery, and was thinking, as he says, how the wits of King Charles's time—those exquisite judges of scenic propriety—would have laughed to see Nicolini exposed to a tempest in robes of ermine and sailing in an open boat upon a sea of pasteboard. And what a field for raillery they would have found in painted dragons spitting wildfire, enchanted chariots drawn by Flanders mares, and real cascades in artificial landscapes! From all this agreeable raillery we may infer that the melodies of the great musician spoke to Addison with the accents of a language which he did not understand; he heard with his ears the sounds of the voices and the violins, but the soul of the music escaped him.

He was particularly sarcastic on stage thunder. He says in one place that last winter he had been at the first rehearsal of the new thunder, which was much more deep and sonorous than any that had been heard before. The lightning flashed more briskly than ever, and the clouds were better furbelowed and more voluminous. He was told that the theatre was provided with above a dozen showers of snow consisting of the plays of many unsuccessful poets cut and shredded for the purpose. These were to fall on the head of King Lear at his next appearance on the stage. As for the noise of drums,

trumpets, and huzzas, he says it was so loud that, when a battle was raging in the Haymarket theatre, the sound of it might be heard as far as Charing Cross. But while he ridiculed the ordinary devices for lending dignity to tragedy, such as the sweeping trains of stage queens and the towering plumes of stage heroes, he was not insensible to the effect of some artifices in moving the awe or pity of the spectators. He tells us that, in the parting scene between Jaffier and Belvidera in Otway's tragedy of 'Venice Preserved,' the sound of the passing bell, tolling for the execution of Jaffier's friend Pierre, then about to be broken on the wheel, caused the hearts of the whole audience to quake and made a deeper impression on the mind than mere words could convey.

Among the actors of his time Addison mentions Betterton, Bullock, and Norris. Of these, Betterton played Macbeth, while Bullock, Norris, and another actor named Bowen took the part of the witches in the tragedy. However, Bullock and Norris appeared also in lighter pieces; Bullock in a short coat and Norris in a long one sufficed to raise a laugh in the audience. But Bullock had a rival in a comic actor named Penkethman. The comparative merits of the two were appraised by Steele in the 'Tatler.' Mr Bullock, he says, had the more agreeable squall, and Mr Penkethman the more graceful shrug. Penkethman devoured a cold chick with great applause; Bullock's talent lay chiefly in asparagus. Penkethman was very dexterous at conveying himself under a table; Bullock was no less active at jumping over a stick. Mr Penkethman had a great deal of money; but Mr Bullock was the taller man.

The same graceful and tender wit falls into a graver strain when he speaks of the death of Betterton the tragedian, who had been his friend. Having received notice that the famous actor was to be interred that evening in the cloisters of Westminster Abbey, Steele resolved to walk thither and see the last offices paid to a man whom he had always very much admired, and from whose acting he had received stronger impressions of what is great and noble than from the arguments of the profoundest philosophers or the descriptions of the most charming poets. He could hardly conceive that Roscius himself or any actor of antiquity could ever

have surpassed the acting of Betterton in the parts which he had played on the English stage. The wonderful agony which he appeared in, when he examined the circumstances of the handkerchief in 'Othello,' the mixture of love and tenderness that intruded on his mind as he listened to the innocent answers of Desdemona, betrayed in his gestures such a variety and vicissitude of passions as would warn any man to keep watch over his own heart, lest he should stab it with that worst of daggers, jealousy. The charming passage in the same tragedy, where Othello tells how he won the love of Desdemona, was delivered by Betterton with so moving and graceful an energy, that, walking there in the cloisters, Steele thought of him with the same concern as if he waited for the funeral of one who had done in real life all that he had seen Betterton do in the shadowy representation of the stage. The gloom of the place and the faint lights glimmering through the evening shadows deepened the feeling of sadness which oppressed him. He began to sorrow that Brutus and Cassius had ever quarrelled; that Hotspur's gallantry was so hapless; and that all the mirth and good humour of Falstaff could not exempt him from the grave. Nay, habituated as he was to look upon the distinctions between men as merely scenical, he reflected on the emptiness of all human greatness, and could not but regret that the sacred heads which mouldered in that little parcel of earth, to which the mortal remains of his old friend were so soon to be consigned, were returned to dust as well as he, and that there is no difference in the grave between the real and the imaginary monarch.

In the theatre Addison kept a keen eye on the audience as well as on the stage; and from his pages we can gather many details as to the appearance and behaviour of the spectators. We learn that in those days some members of an audience used to express their disapprobation of bad plays and bad players by means of a cat-call. This was a simple musical instrument designed to imitate those melodious sounds with which, in neighbourhoods frequented by cats, the silence of night is often broken, and which are commonly known as caterwauling. Played in concert by a number of performers dispersed throughout the theatre, the instrument

exerted a powerful effect upon the actors; it struck a damp into generals, and frightened heroes off the stage; at the first sound of it a crowned head had been seen to tremble, and a princess to fall into fits. When Beaumont and Fletcher's play, 'The Humorous Lieutenant,' was revived on the stage in Addison's time, it was received with such a powerful chorus of caterwauls as effectually stopped the mirthful sallies of the lieutenant.

At the opera a cluster of ladies in gay hoods sometimes presented as pleasing a spectacle as any on the stage, and diverted the eyes of the audience from the performers. One evening Addison, seated in the back of a box, noticed such a bevy and compared it to a bed of tulips, the hoods varying in colour from blue to yellow and philomot and pink and pale green. By the unspeakable satisfaction which appeared on the faces of the wearers it was easy to see that their thoughts were more taken up with their pretty hoods than with the singers on the stage. Another time, sitting at an opera in the Haymarket theatre, he observed two parties of very fine women, who had placed themselves in opposite boxes and seemed drawn up in a kind of battle-array one against another. Those on the right were Whigs and those on the left were Tories; and, as the badges of their respective parties, they had disposed the fashionable black patches of the day on different parts of their faces. The intermediate boxes were occupied by ladies whose principles and patches were midway between these extremes, and who seemed to sit there, strangely enough, for no other purpose but to see the opera. In order to ascertain the state of political opinion among the ladies, Addison had the curiosity to count the patches on both sides, and he found that the Tories had it by about twenty; but the balance of opinion was turned the next morning at the puppet-show, where all the ladies were spotted in the Whig manner.

The taste for snuff-taking would seem to have been equally diffused among both sexes in the age of Queen Anne. Men and women alike carried snuff-boxes adorned with pictures on the lids. At the time when the infamous impostor and perjured scoundrel, Titus Oates, was in all his glory, posing as an idol of fashionable ladies, a saviour of the State, and a pillar of the Protestant faith, an

acquaintance of Will Honeycomb's exhibited a portrait of the so-called doctor on the lid of her snuff-box. And as a singular proof of the extent to which the habit of snuff-taking was carried in the other sex, it may be mentioned that, when the head of a beau was dissected after death, the cavities of the skull, which in ordinary people are filled with brains, were discovered to be stuffed with Spanish snuff. Yet in outward shape and appearance the beau had not differed from other men; he ate and drank like other people, dressed well, talked loud, laughed frequently, and on several occasions acquitted himself tolerably at a ball; some ladies even took him for a wit. He was cut off in the flower of his age by the blow of a paring shovel, having been surprised by an eminent citizen as he was tendering some civilities to his wife.

This unfortunate accident probably prevented the beau from having the pleasure of meeting the lady's husband in the fields at the back of Montague House, to which gentlemen frequently retired for the settlement of any little differences which might have arisen between them, the seclusion of the spot being eminently favourable to the calm consideration of the points in dispute. Even on their way to the fields some of the disputants thought better of it and came to an amicable arrangement to be both of them arrested by the police, which saved a needless expenditure of gunpowder and a possible effusion of blood. But it was not always so, nor did the meetings always take place in the fields at the back of Montague House. On Nov. 15, 1712, while the 'Spectator' was being read at many breakfast tables in London, Lord Mohun and the Duke of Hamilton met and fought in Hyde Park at seven o'clock in the morning. Lord Mohun was killed on the spot, and the duke was mortally wounded. They tried to help him to the cake-house by the ring in the park, but he died on the grass before he could reach the house.

In the reign of Queen Anne the streets of London must have presented a much more picturesque aspect than at the present day; for they were lined on both sides by an endless succession of gay sign-boards, which exhibited an almost infinite variety of Blue Boars, Black Swans, and Red Lions, not to mention Flying Pigs, Hogs

in Armour, and many other creatures more extraordinary than any in the deserts of Africa ; while the exuberant fancy of the sign painter ran riot in combinations like the Cat and the Fiddle, the Fox and the Goose, the Dog and the Gridiron, the Lamb and the Dolphin, the Bell and the Neat's Tongue, the Three Nuns and the Hare, the Bible and Three Crowns. The reason for this profusion of strange devices was that in those days the houses in the streets were not numbered ; hence it was necessary to hang out sign-boards for the guidance of passengers, if they were to find the places they wished to go to. Even with this clue it was often very difficult to discover the shop, tavern, or house of which you were in search ; for the signs were frequently so badly painted that it would have puzzled a naturalist to say whether the animal at which he gazed was intended to represent a boar or a buffalo, a cat or a crocodile, a mouse or an elephant ; and to make matters worse, their names were often misspelled. Many a man, we are told, lost his dinner through not being able to find his way to the tavern to which he had been directed. A cousin of Steele's, a Bachelor of Queen's College, who was to have dined at the sign of the Bear in Barbican, wandered a whole day through the mistake of a letter in the sign-board, which bore inscribed on it, 'This is the Beer,' instead of 'This is the Bear.' He was only set right at last by inquiring of a fellow who could not read, but who was well acquainted with the tavern in question because he had often been drunk there. When Steele in his boyhood attended the Merchant Taylors' School, he frequently stopped on the way to read the inscriptions on the sign-boards and was afterwards thrashed by his schoolmaster for his pains, because he spelled the words according to the orthography, or rather the caco-graphy, of the sign-boards instead of the books. Some people adapted the sign of their house to the sound of their name or the nature of their occupation. Thus Mrs Salmon, who kept a wax-work in Fleet Street, had for her sign a golden salmon ; and a French tavern-keeper near Charing Cross delicately hinted at the quality of the liquor which he served to his guests by a punch-bowl with a couple of angels hovering over it and squeezing a lemon into it.

Not only the sights but the sounds of the London streets were very different in Addison's day from what they are now. At night the sleepers were roused from their slumbers by the thump of the watchman on the door, and listened drowsily to the drone of his voice proclaiming the hour, and to the tinkle of his bell, as they receded together down the street. And by day there was nothing which more astonished a foreigner and frightened a country squire than the cries of London. When Sir Roger de Coverley quitted the silence of his park and the stillness of the green lanes and meadows of Worcestershire for the busy thoroughfares of London, he used to declare that he could not get the street cries out of his head, or go to sleep for them, the first week that he was in town. On the contrary, Will Honeycomb preferred them to the song of the lark and the warbling of the nightingale, and listened to them with more pleasure than to all the music of the hedges and groves.

The cries of London in those days fell into two classes, the vocal and instrumental. The instrumental included the twanking of a brass kettle or a frying-pan, with which any man was free to disturb a whole street and to drive the inhabitants to the verge of distraction for a whole hour together. The sow-gelder's horn had something musical in it, but it was seldom heard within the Liberties, the animals on which the musician operated not being common objects of the streets. But the vocal cries were far more numerous and varied. The sale of milk was announced in sounds so shrill that they set the teeth of sensitive people on edge. The chimney-sweeper commanded a diapason of much richer compass, his notes sometimes rising into the sharpest treble and sometimes sinking into the deepest bass. The same observation applied to the retailers of small coal, not to mention broken glass or brick dust. The cooper swelled his last note with a hollow voice that was not without its harmony; and it was impossible not to be affected with a most agreeable melancholy on listening to the sad and solemn air with which the public were very often asked, if they had any chairs to mend. The time of the year which is proper for the pickling of dill and cucumber was celebrated by strains which ravished the soul with an uncommon sweetness; but

alas ! like the song of the nightingale, they were only heard for two months out of twelve.

It is true that the words of the cries were often pronounced so indistinctly that it was not possible to distinguish them, nor could a stranger guess the nature of the wares which the songsters vended ; insomuch that a country boy has been seen to run out to buy apples from a bellows-mender and ginger-bread from a grinder of knives and scissors. And even when the words of a cry could be clearly heard, they sometimes furnished no clue to the profession of the crier. Who, for example, could know that 'Work if I had it' was the signification of a corn-cutter ? However, in the reign of Queen Anne, as in our own time, there were many people who had no soul for the melody of street cries ; who refused to listen to the plaintive strains of the sow-gelder's horn ; who turned a deaf ear to the voice of the corn-cutter ; and in whose savage breast the musical request for chairs to mend awakened no response. We hear of such an one who paid a card-match-maker never to come into his street again. But what was the consequence ? Why, the whole tribe of card-match-makers passed by his door the very next morning, in hopes of being bought off after the same manner.

More pleasing to many ears than the street cries was the chime of the church bells, which might be heard ringing to prayers from morning to night in some part of the city or another. When Addison's friend, the Tory fox-hunter, came to town, obsessed with a fear of stumbling on meeting-houses and dissenters at every street corner, he was much reassured in his mind by listening to the music of the bells from many steeples ; and his satisfaction was increased when he looked in at St Paul's in the middle of sermon-time and saw the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and City Sword all sitting in the congregation, and not more than two of them fast asleep.

In Addison's time the gay world drove in Hyde Park, sometimes with six horses to a carriage. Military reviews were also held there ; we hear of a lady who fell in love with the Duke of Monmouth, when she saw him, in all the splendour of scarlet and gold, at the head of his troop of Guards in the park. Kensington Palace had been built and Kensington Gardens laid out by William

the Third. Addison speaks with admiration of the upper gardens at Kensington, which, from being merely a gravel-pit, had been wrought by the gardener's art into a beautiful hollow, planted with shrubs and trees that rose into the semblance of a circular mount.

Among Addison's favourite haunts we may perhaps reckon Gray's Inn walks and the garden of Lincoln's Inn. For he lays the scene of one of the *Spectator*'s talks with Sir Roger de Coverley in the verdure and seclusion of Gray's Inn walks, which to this day remain a sort of green oasis in the brick wilderness of London. There on the terrace, waiting for the *Spectator*, the old knight hemmed with great vigour to clear his pipes, as he said, in the good air of the place; and there he discoursed with his friend on country matters, on the last sermon of his domestic chaplain, on the tobacco-stoppers which Will Wimble had been busy turning all the winter, on the death of the witch, Moll White, on the open house he had kept for his tenants in the hall last Christmas, and other topics of equal interest and importance. In another paper Addison tells us that by the favour of the benchers he was allowed to walk by himself in the garden of Lincoln's Inn; and he describes how, pacing there alone on a winter evening, he was overtaken by the dusk and drawn into an agreeable contemplation by the sight of the starry heaven, where in the clear air of a freezing night every constellation shone with a brilliance such as he had never witnessed before.

But there was no place in the town which Addison so much loved to frequent as the Royal Exchange. It gave him a secret satisfaction and in some measure gratified his vanity, as he was an Englishman, to see so rich an assembly of fellow-countrymen and foreigners consulting together upon the private business of mankind and making London a kind of emporium for the whole earth. Here he was pleased to hear disputes adjusted between an alderman and a native of Japan, or to see a subject of the Great Mogul bargaining with a subject of the Czar of Muscovy. He was infinitely delighted to mix among these motley groups, to observe their different costumes, and to listen to their different tongues. Sometimes he made one of a group of Dutchmen; sometimes he was lost in a crowd of Jews; and sometimes he was

jostled by a body of Armenians. Now he fancied himself a Dane, now a Swede, and now a Frenchman ; or rather, like the old philosopher, he felt himself to be a citizen of the world. Moving there, a silent spectator in the busy throng, he often imagined one of the old kings, whose effigies adorned the edifice, standing in person and looking down on the wealthy concourse of people with which the place was every day filled ; and he said to himself how the monarch, come to life again, would wonder to hear all the languages of Europe spoken in this little spot of his former dominions, and to see so many private men negotiating like princes for greater sums than were formerly paid into the royal treasury.

The last place in London to which I will ask the reader to accompany me with Addison is one which has changed but little since his time, and has been of late very much in all our thoughts—I mean Westminster Abbey. He tells us that in his serious and pensive moods he very often walked there by himself, where the gloominess of the place, with the solemnity of the building, and the condition of the people who lie in it, filled his mind with a melancholy, or rather a thoughtfulness, that was not unpleasing. Pacing these hallowed precincts he observed that the great war, then still raging with France, had crowded the church with many empty tombs and uninhabited monuments erected to the memory of men whose bones were perhaps mouldering in the plains of Blenheim or weltering in the depths of the ocean. Since he wrote thus, two hundred years have passed away, years not the least memorable nor the least glorious in the long roll of English history. In these centuries how many sons of England, illustrious in arts, in letters, in eloquence, in arms, their race of glory run, have been borne, amid a nation's mourning, to their last resting-place in these solemn aisles ! Addison himself sleeps there, not far from the dust of Elizabeth. There we will leave him, lying with his peers. They rest from their labours, and their works do follow them.

JAMES G. FRAZER.

Art. 3.—ABYSSINIA UNDER MENELIK AND AFTER.

1. *Abyssinia. A handbook prepared under the direction of the Historical Section of the Foreign Office.* No. 129. H.M.S.O., 1920.
2. *Menelik.* By R. de Caix. *Revue des Deux Mondes*, June 1, 1911.
3. *Nelle Terre del Negus.* By Lincoln de Castro. 2 vols. Milan : Treves, 1915.
4. *Bulletins du Comité de l'Afrique Française.* Paris.
5. *Le Partage de l'Afrique.* By G. Hanotaux. Paris : Flammarion, 1909.
6. *Histoire de L'Éthiopie.* By L. J. Morié. 2 vols. Paris : Challamel, 1904.

THE death of Menelik II, the victor of Adowa and the creator of the vast Abyssinian or Ethiopian Empire, on Dec. 16, 1913, passed almost unnoticed in the public press. True, he had been smitten with paralysis in 1907; and repeated strokes in the following years had reduced him to such a moribund condition that for a long time he had ceased to play any part in public affairs. Now that time has placed us at a greater distance from the events, it is possible from such sources as the local newspapers and the statements of foreign ministers, supplemented by sundry official documents and a few French and Italian books on Ethiopia—English publications have been conspicuous only by their absence—to gain a clearer insight into the course of affairs in this backwater of the world's history, and a juster estimate of the part that Menelik himself played in shaping them.

Little is known of the Emperor's early years. Sehala Mariam—such was his original name—was born in 1844, the son of Haile Malicot, King of Shoa. His father died in 1855 on the eve of meeting in battle the newly-proclaimed Emperor Theodore, who had advanced at the head of a large army into Shoa to bring that province, which had for several decades asserted its independence, within the limits of his empire. The conquest was easily effected, and the young Sehala was carried off as a hostage. After ten years of captivity Theodore tried to win over the heir to the Shoan throne by offering him his daughter in marriage. Sehala

expressed himself pleased and flattered, but made use of the preparations for his wedding to effect his own escape to Shoa. There he soon found means (1866) to kill Theodore's governor and to proclaim himself king of Shoa under the ambitious title of Menelik II, thereby claiming descent from the legendary Menelik, son of King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba, and declaring his own pretensions to the imperial throne, which the career not only of Theodore himself but of many predecessors had shown to belong to the strongest sword.

Menelik had, however, still twenty-three years to wait before he reached the summit of his ambition. Though Theodore in 1868 committed suicide on the eve of the capture of Magdala by the British army under Napier, military strength still lay with the rulers of northern Abyssinia; and, after four years' struggle with his rivals, Goldja Kassa of Tigre successfully emerged (1872) as Emperor of all Abyssinia under the title of John IV. The troublous times of John's seventeen years' reign were astutely used by Menelik to strengthen his own position and to enlarge his territories. First the Egyptian, then the Dervish and Italian aggressions kept the Emperor fully occupied in the north; only on two occasions did he find time to deal with his disloyal dependent, the King of Shoa, in the south. In 1878 he invaded Shoa to punish Menelik for his alliance with the Egyptian Khedive; the king submitted without fighting and consented to receive his crown from the Emperor's hands. Again, in 1882, John attempted further to ensure the fidelity of his powerful vassal, whose extensive conquests in the south and west he now acknowledged, by promoting a marriage between his own son Area Selassye and Menelik's daughter Zauditu. At the same time he recognised Menelik as his immediate successor, but bargained that Area should be the future heir to the imperial throne. Meanwhile Menelik had succeeded in vastly improving the Shoan army and in more than doubling his ancestral territories.

The geographical position of Shoa was highly favourable to Menelik's ambitious plans. It formed the southern excrescence of old Abyssinia from which it was practically isolated; but, commanding the head of the valley of the Hawash, the mouth of which had since

1862 been in the possession of the French, it was thereby connected with the external world. In 1843 Menelik's grandfather had signed a commercial treaty with Louis Philippe; and Menelik, continuing his policy, had in 1876 and in 1881 opened official relations with the French Republic, asking for arms and locomotives.

When Menelik first ascended the throne, the southern half of the great plateau of which old Abyssinia forms the northern half, was inhabited by independent tribes of Galla, who surrounded Shoa on the east, south, and west, extending from Harrar on the east to Wallega on the west and as far as Lake Rudolf on the south. They were a prosperous and industrious people engaged in agriculture and cattle raising; but, though individually good fighters, they possessed no powers of political cohesion, and their tribes never united for self-defence. For centuries they had been regarded as fair game by their warlike Abyssinian neighbours, who, when the Galla crops had been harvested, were accustomed to make raids upon these peaceful farmers, carrying off not only their corn and cattle, but also their women and children. The Galla, too, formed the bulk of the Shoan population, but the Abyssinian minority had for more than a century reduced them to the position of serfs, who cultivated the lands of their idle warrior lords and served as reliable soldiers in their armies.

The youthful Menelik, with his troops armed with European rifles, was highly successful in these raids, but very soon, whether guided by his own intelligence or by the advice of his European counsellors, he replaced such occasional forays by a regular system of conquest. Convinced that much more was to be made out of the helpless Galla by their permanent exploitation, he began in the early seventies to occupy the districts that he overran with permanent garrisons of his own troops, providing at the same time for their administration under a hierarchy of his own officials. In most cases he reduced the unfortunate natives to the position of *gabars*, little better than serfs, who in return for exemption from massacre were forced to pay tithes, to provision his troops, and to render many heavy personal services, such as forced labour for sixty or seventy days in the year or in war-time acting as baggage carriers.

All his new acquisitions and revenues Menelik steadily used for one object only—to increase his military power and prestige. With Galla money he rewarded his generals, paid his soldiers, and bought, first from the French and then from the Italians, huge supplies of arms and ammunition wherewith to equip his ever-growing armies. The details of his early conquests are unknown, but they certainly included the districts of Gurage, Kaffa, and Jimma; and in 1887, shortly after its evacuation by the Egyptians, he annexed the vast district of Harrar. The general result was that, when on the death of John in March 1889, Menelik proclaimed himself Emperor, no rivals dared to contest his claims. His supremacy was recognised by Tekla Haimanot, King of Gojjam, and the other great chieftains. Only Ras Mangasha, the natural son of the late Emperor, whom John on his death-bed had, in defiance of the agreement of 1882, nominated as his successor (Area Selassye having died in 1888), refused to submit, supported by Ras Alula, his father's famous general; the two retired together to Tigre to organise resistance. Menelik, however, though he had not yet overcome their opposition, by November 1889 felt himself sufficiently secure to have himself crowned Negus Nagasti (King of Kings) by the Abun Matewos at Entotto, the then capital of Shoa, instead of at Axum in Tigre, the traditional place for the coronation of the Emperors. Henceforward Menelik's politics, from being local, became not only national but international.

Since 1883 Menelik had been on friendly terms with the Italians, and on May 2, 1889, he signed the famous Treaty of Ucciali, whereby the limits of Italian and Abyssinian territory were accurately defined, and (under clause xvii) the Negus consented to 'avail himself of the Italian Government for any negotiations which he might have with other powers.' A further convention followed, on Oct. 1, whereby Menelik was definitely recognised by Italy as 'Emperor of Ethiopia,' and the boundaries were changed on the basis of *de facto* possession, which had since May been considerably altered by Italian advances in the north. A few days later Italy, relying on clause xvii, notified to the European Powers that she had by the Treaty of Ucciali been given a protectorate over Abyssinia.

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Early in 1890 Menelik reduced Ras Mangasha to submission; but a squabble between Menelik's nominee, Ras Seyum, and Ras Sebhat, the ally of Italy, over their claims to Agame, the northern district of Tigre, brought the Italians on the scene. In March the Italian general occupied Adowa in violation of the terms of the Treaty. A terrible famine for several months put an end to all military operations; but in September, at French instigation, Menelik addressed two letters to the King of Italy, in the first of which he complained that article xvii in the Treaty differed in the Italian and Abyssinian texts, the latter merely stating in permissive form 'may avail himself' as against the Italian version 'consents to avail himself'; and in the second he complained of the violation of the frontier agreement.

At this time the European Powers were busy partitioning Africa into spheres of influence. Undeterred by Menelik's remonstrances, which were never communicated to the British Government, the Italian Government, in March and April 1891, made two agreements with Great Britain, whereby Eritrea and the whole of Abyssinia, assumed by both parties to be an Italian protectorate, were recognised as within the Italian 'sphere of influence.' In reply to the first of these agreements Menelik, again acting on French advice, addressed, on April 10, a circular letter to the European Powers, which at the time seems to have travelled no further than the Italian Foreign Office. Herein, after stating that he had no intention of remaining an idle spectator while far-distant Powers were partitioning Africa, he set forth in exact terms what he claimed to be the boundaries of his Empire, and ended with the words :

'En indiquant aujourd'hui les limites actuelles de mon empire, je tâcherai, si Dieu veut bien m'accorder la vie et la force, de rétablir les anciennes frontières d'Ethiopie jusqu'à Khartoum et jusqu'au lac Nyanza avec les pays Gallas.'

The Italian alliance with Ras Mangasha in December, made with the view to detach Tigre from the Abyssinian Empire, still further aroused Menelik's suspicions, though at the same time—to pacify him—a promise was made to hand over to him 2,000,000 cartridges in accordance with the Treaty of Uccialli. Before taking further

action Menelik waited patiently for the fulfilment of the promise; but immediately after the arrival of the cartridges in February 1893, he solemnly denounced the Treaty to all the Powers.

'Sous des apparences d'amitié,' he wrote, *'on n'a en fait cherché qu'à s'emparer de mon pays. . . . Je n'ai pas l'intention de porter, en quoi que ce soit, atteinte à notre amitié avec l'Italie, mais mon empire a une importance suffisante pour ne rechercher aucun protectorat et vivre indépendant. Je tiens donc à porter à votre connaissance mon intention de ne renouveler en aucune façon ce traité.'*

In the following year, while the Italians were busy fighting the Dervishes, Menelik once more made terms with Ras Mangasha, and further strengthened his military position by large importations of arms from the French. In 1895 the Italians invaded Tigre and occupied Adowa and Axum, advancing in October so far south as Makalle. Meanwhile Menelik, in an inspiring proclamation, summoned his governors to collect their forces for a great and united effort against the foreign invaders, and at the end of the year appeared in Tigre at the head of some 100,000 to 200,000 men, against whom the Italians could oppose only 20,000.

It is needless here to reproduce the details of the campaign which culminated in the disastrous defeat of the Italians at Adowa on March 1, 1896, and thus put an end to Crispi's dream of an Italian Empire in Africa reaching from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean. On Oct. 26 Italy signed a Treaty of Peace at Addis Abbaba, whereby the Treaty of Ucciali was annulled, the independence of Abyssinia was affirmed, and a new delimitation of frontiers was to be made within a year.

The victory of Adowa had clearly shown to all the European Powers interested in East Africa and the Nile valley that the Abyssinian Empire, freed henceforward from all pretence of Italian protection, was a force to be seriously reckoned with and to be dealt with by direct negotiations. Menelik's court at Addis Abbaba at once became a hotbed of European intrigue. The French were the first in the field. The Italo-Abyssinian war had coincided in time with the vast French scheme to join the Congo to the Nile by gaining an effective footing

along the Bahr-el-Ghazal so far as the left bank of the White Nile, and thus to bar for ever the Anglo-Egyptian reconquest of the Sudan, which the British Government had recently decided to undertake—partly to create a diversion in favour of Italy. Accordingly, in 1896, the French Government planned to reinforce their own policy by inducing Menelik to use his newly-demonstrated military power to make effective his earlier claims to the negro country on the west as far as the White Nile. This mission was entrusted to M. Lagarde, Governor of French Somaliland, and resulted in the conclusion, on March 20, 1897, of what M. Hanotaux, who was Foreign Minister at the time, has called * 'un véritable traité d'alliance,' though the only document ever published (1908) was a very innocent convention regulating the Franco-Abyssinian frontier of Somaliland.

A month later a British Mission arrived under Mr (now Sir) Rennell Rodd, Lord Cromer's second-in-command at Cairo, who was successful, it is said, in convincing Menelik that the British advance then proceeding up the Nile against the Mahdists concealed no designs against himself, and in securing from him a pledge of neutrality during the operations against the Dervishes with whom he had recently been in correspondence. But the only outward result was a treaty of amity and commerce signed on May 14, 1897, and supplemented on June 4 by an agreement which accepted as the frontier between Abyssinia and British Somaliland the line laid down in Menelik's letter of April 10, 1891, thus recognising both Harrar and the Ogaden country as within the Emperor's dominions. The more burning question of the Sudan frontier was left untouched. On June 24 the Italians signed a new commercial treaty on the ordinary lines, but a few weeks later found themselves forced to accept a new frontier between Eritrea and Abyssinia in accordance with the claims of Menelik's letter of 1891, which involved considerable sacrifice of territory.

Meanwhile, apparently in conformity with the veritable *traité d'alliance*, but really in furtherance of long-cherished schemes of conquest, the armies of

* 'Le Partage de l'Afrique,' pp. 133-135.

Menelik had been set in motion. The long and dangerous dispute with Italy had not prevented considerable acquisitions of territory; for in 1892-4 the Emperor had possessed himself of the extensive district north of Lake Abaia inhabited by the Wallamu tribe. Now, in the autumn of 1897, four distinct expeditions were dispatched. The first expedition, according to French ideas,* had for its object the occupation of the Sudanese provinces, Gedaref, Gallabat, and Fazogli, but as a matter of fact contented itself with the capture of Metemma (Gallabat town) and the subjugation of the Beni Shangul, a negroid tribe on the western edge of Abyssinian plateau overlooking the valley of the White Nile. The second, after ruthlessly suppressing a revolt in Kaffa, subjugated the Gimirra and other neighbouring tribes. Then turning southwards, this army reached the river Kibish, flowing into Lake Rudolf, and annexed the territory to the north and north-east of the lake so far as the Boran Galla. The third expedition extended Menelik's dominions in a south-easterly direction towards the desert of the Ogaden.

French hopes, however, mainly centred on the success of the fourth expedition, whereby the French advisers of the Emperor intended to anticipate the British operations in the valley of the Upper Nile. Late in the autumn of 1897 Dejazmach Tesamma, accompanied by M. Fèvre, a Frenchman, and M. Potter, a Swiss, led out an army of 5000 men towards the White Nile, and by May 1898 had advanced as far as the junction of the Pibor with the Baro. There he detached a flying column of 1500 men, which with MM. Fèvre and Potter actually succeeded in reaching the White Nile at the point where it joins the Sobat. On an island in the middle of the river M. Fèvre hoisted the French flag on June 22, while the Abyssinians hoisted the Abyssinian flag on the right bank. The approach of the deadly rainy season and want of food forced them to retire, before Captain Marchand, who had started from the French Congo on his long march across Africa in June 1896, arrived at Fashoda (Kodok) (July 10, 1898). A steamer, sent upstream to reconnoitre, found the flags still flying on Sept. 1.

* Cp. Hanotaux, *I.c.*

Though, from a French point of view, these extensive military operations were a failure—owing to the enforced withdrawal of Marchand from Fashoda after General Kitchener's victory at Omdurman (Sept. 2, 1898)—yet they enabled Menelik substantially to realise the scheme of conquest proposed to him by his French advisers in 1891, and thereby to include within his Empire the whole of the great Ethiopian plateau, of which his predecessors on the imperial throne had at most held only the northern half. His new boundaries were formally recognised in a series of treaties (1900-1908) with Italy, Great Britain, and the Sudanese Government. From being the southernmost town of the isolated and semi-independent kingdom of Shoa, Menelik had made Addis Abbaba into the centrally situated capital of a vast and united Abyssinian Empire with an area of 350,000 square miles—more than three times the size of the British Isles.

~ In 1897 France, Italy, and Russia appointed permanent ministers to represent their respective interests—an example followed next year by Great Britain. Henceforth Menelik's task was not to extend his already overgrown territory, but to prevent revolts and to consolidate the Empire that he had won; and at the same time to secure it against further European aggressions by carefully defining its frontiers—hence the series of conventions already alluded to—and by skilfully fomenting the jealousies of the rival European Powers represented at his court.

Menelik's government has been well described as 'a military despotism tempered by distance.' The foundation of his power was the Shoan army, which he took care to keep, in numbers, arms, and equipment, far superior to the armies of any of his provinces. He himself directed the administration of Shoa and Ifat, and governed the newly-conquered Galla country and his other acquisitions through the military officers in charge of the garrisons of his own troops, whom he could appoint and dismiss at his pleasure. His faithful nephew, Ras Makonnen, he made governor of Harrar.

The old kingdoms of the north presented greater difficulties, though even here his predecessor John had already paved the way by crushing the turbulent

aristocracy. Menelik had merely to give the finishing blow by abolishing, as opportunity offered, the hereditary governorships, and by appointing his own nominees—generally his kinsmen or connexions by marriage—in their place, often at the same time subdividing or otherwise altering the boundaries of the ancient provinces. The old chiefs had often assumed the title of Negus, as being next in rank to the Emperor, the Negus Nagasti ; but Menelik, though he was obliged to tolerate his old and powerful rival, Tekla Haimanot, as Negus of Gojam till the latter's death in 1901, never conferred on any governor of his own appointment a title so near to his own. His nominees bore the titles of *Ras* (commander-in-chief of a provincial army) or *Dejazmach* (general) or *Fitaurari* (commander of an advanced guard)—the title being personal to the holder and bearing no relation to the importance of his province or of the military force placed under his command. His son-in-law, Ras Mikael, was governor of the Wollo country, including the district of Magdala. The Semyen province belonged to his Empress Taitu and was administered by her representative. His brother-in-law, Ras Wolie, was in charge of Yeju and half of Lasta—the other half and the province of Waag being under Wagshum Gwangul, who had proved his fidelity by many years' devoted service.

The old kingdom of Tigre, steeped in imperial traditions and jealous of upstart Shoa, was, though never dangerous, always a nest of rebellion and intrigue throughout Menelik's reign. For the first ten years Ras Mangasha, the late Emperor's natural son, was allowed, after he had been made to divorce his wife in favour of a niece of the Empress Taitu, to retain the government. But when, in 1898, he ventured openly to revolt, he was soon forced to surrender and deported to Ankober—his province being assigned first to Ras Makonnen and then to Ras Wolie, the Empress' brother. In later years the native chiefs indulged in frequent outbreaks, but caused no serious trouble.

Thus, by 1900, Menelik had secured that the administration of all the provinces in his Empire should be in the hands of newly-appointed governors entirely dependent upon his pleasure and possessed of no local influence to

tempt them to revolt. They were, moreover, surrounded with minor officials, each anxious to step into the governor's shoes and always ready to report any indiscretion on his part to headquarters. One of the most effective checks was the annual visit which the governors were expected to pay to Addis Abbaba, leaving the administration of their provinces in the hands of their deputies or *azajs*. If a governor was at all suspect, it was Menelik's custom to detain him at his court for an indefinite period on various honourable pretexts, sometimes sending a reliable minor official to administer the province instead of the *azaj*.

What, however, robbed Menelik's system of administration of any possibility of efficiency was the fact that, though he had absolute power over his governors, he had no control over their subordinates. Each province was divided into districts and each district into groups of villages—every unit, from the district to the village, being under its appropriate official, who was only responsible to his immediate superior and no one else. The Emperor's orders, therefore—in order to be actually executed—had to filter down from the governor at the top to the village headman at the bottom, and in the process would be, more often than not, hopelessly blocked. The practical result is pithily expressed in the Abyssinian proverb: 'No dog knows his master's master.'

Inefficient though his system of administration undoubtedly was, yet substantially it fulfilled its purpose. Not only was his supremacy never seriously challenged during his lifetime, but the unity which he gave to his Empire, half of which consisted of recent annexations, was firmly enough rooted to withstand the shocks which so often threatened it during his illness and since his death. His foreign policy was consistently based on two principles—unswerving insistence upon his independent sovereignty, and the legal demarcation of all his territories, whether inherited or acquired. After his victory at Adowa in 1896, his sovereignty was never again called in question, though fears of European aggression, open or covert, made him slow and suspicious in dealing with the various foreign representatives resident at his court. In his negotiations with them he was indeed at a serious disadvantage; for, though on

two or three occasions he sent missions to Europe, he had no corresponding representatives of his own, accredited to the Governments concerned, from whom to get first-hand information wherewith to check the *ex parte* statements of the Foreign Ministers at Addis Abbaba. On two occasions especially his suspicions were aroused. In 1902 he flatly refused to sign one of his many railway conventions with the French Government, because he thought that it involved a surrender of Abyssinian territory; and again, in 1906, when in July the Tripartite Treaty between Great Britain, France, and Italy—one of the first-fruits of the *Entente Cordiale* of 1904—was communicated to him for signature, for nearly six months he hesitated what to do, because, although ostensibly it guaranteed the maintenance of the political and territorial *status quo* of Ethiopia and of the sovereign rights of the Emperor, yet he feared that some of its clauses, more especially those dealing with the construction of railways, threatened interference with his rights, and might even foreshadow a partition of his country into spheres of influence. Not till December did he return the evasive reply :

‘ We have received the arrangement made by the three Powers. We thank them for their communication and their desire to keep and maintain the independence of our Government. But let it be understood that this arrangement in no way limits what we consider our sovereign rights.’

In his frontier policy, though equally suspicious, he was on the whole eminently reasonable. He began by clearly stating his claims in 1891; by 1898 he had more or less effectively occupied the whole of the Abyssinian plateau except a small portion on the north, which was recognised as Italian in 1900. Otherwise his pretensions underwent but little modification except on the side of the Sudan, where, by the treaty of 1902 with Great Britain, he was content to have his frontier drawn along the Abyssinian foothills except for the excrescence into the plain between the rivers Baro and Akobo. This far-sighted policy went a long way towards freeing Menelik from that frequent source of trouble to semi-civilised sovereigns whose territories march with those of more civilised governments—the occurrence of frontier-raids

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by the wild tribes on either side. Such raids did indeed occur, and only too frequently. But, so long as his health permitted him to administer his own affairs, Menelik always showed his willingness either to check them himself or to co-operate with his neighbours in checking them, as well as to negotiate with regard to any matters in dispute. Indeed in the British operations (1900-4) against the troublesome Mohammed Abdullah, known as the 'Mad Mullah,' Menelik's troops inflicted several severe defeats upon the enemy, and finally drove him out of Abyssinian territory altogether.

From his youth, Menelik had been keenly alive to the advantages which he and his country might gain from European commerce and material civilisation. So early as 1880, he had granted a concession to a French explorer to make a railway from Tajura Bay to Shoa, though nothing came of it. Again in 1893-4, he granted to M. Ilg, his favourite Swiss Councillor of State, authority to form a company for the construction of a line from Jibuti to Harrar and Addis Abbaba and thence westwards to the banks of the White Nile. Out of this original concession grew the prolonged and tortuous 'affair' of the Jibuti railway, over which for more than ten years the French, British, and Italian Ministers fought fierce diplomatic battles. These were only ended—and then *de jure* rather than *de facto*—by special clauses in the Tripartite Treaty of 1906, dealing not only with the points in dispute, but also with the future construction of railways in Abyssinia by the three Powers respectively. Meanwhile the construction of the Jibuti railway itself, undertaken by the French and begun in 1897, was hindered by all kinds of obstacles—financial difficulties, foreign obstruction, and native intrigues; and it did not reach Addis Abbaba until 1918, five years after Menelik's death.

In road-making Menelik was even less successful. For a few months in 1896 his Italian prisoners were employed in cutting roads near Addis Abbaba, but none of these ever reached completion. Other efforts were equally futile, so that the only means of communication continued to be beaten tracks, following the water-sheds so far as possible, and utterly impassable during the heavy rains from June to September. In this season,

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too, the rivers running at the bottom of the deep cañons are unfordable, and the upland districts are like islands entirely cut off from one another. Wheeled traffic, therefore, is at all times impracticable; and all merchandise has to be conveyed on pack-animals.

✓ In 1899, Menelik began a new policy of trying to open up his country by granting commercial concessions to Europeans. The earliest was the concession of a large and recently conquered district north-west of Lake Rudolf to Leontieff, a Russian adventurer, who was recalled in disgrace after two years of plunder and misgovernment. Shortly afterwards concessions to search for gold were granted to an English company in the Beni Shangul country and to Councillor Ilg in Wallega. In 1903, an Italian company was authorised to search for minerals in general in the whole of Tigre and a large part of Amhara; and a Sennar syndicate received the same privilege for Gojjam. Ydlibi, a cosmopolitan financier of doubtful extraction, was suffered for some years to exploit—with the help of British capital—a monopoly in rubber over a vast territory in the south-west lowlands. Similar concessions and monopolies for coffee, skins, wax, and salt were assigned to companies of different nations.

These spasmodic efforts of the Emperor to develop the rich resources of his country met with but little success, for various reasons. First and foremost, he completely failed to carry his people with him; for the native Abyssinians pride themselves on being a ruling race and leave all trade and industry—even agriculture except in the north—to the Galla and other conquered races. Secondly, the official class is hopelessly lazy, venal, and corrupt, and looks upon all traders as fair game. After payment of imperial or local dues at innumerable points on the trade routes, or of *backsheesh* to greedy officers, the luckless merchant, whether a subject or a foreigner, would find even the heaviest profits completely swallowed up. The only commercial institution of his reign that has survived is the Bank of Abyssinia, founded in 1905 by the National Bank of Egypt, with the right of minting money and issuing notes. All public finance passes through its hands, and it also transacts insurance and mortgage business. After

some early struggles it has proved financially successful. At a comparatively early date a telegraph line was constructed by the Italians from Addis Abbaba to Eritrea, and more recently another line along the French railway has connected Addis Abbaba with Jibuti. When the telephone was introduced, Menelik was quick to see its advantages for administrative purposes, and linked up his capital with his principal administrative centres.

Nor was the Emperor more successful in his policy of social reform. In 1889, like his predecessor John, he decreed the abolition of slavery except for captives taken in war. But, except that slaves were no longer sold in open market and the export trade was stopped, the decree remained a dead letter. Even now every Abyssinian, who can afford it, owns one or more slaves for his household work. Similarly, Menelik decreed a reform of the Fatha Nagast, the ancient code of law, based, according to one theory, on the Mosaic law and the code of Justinian or, according to another, on a 13th-century amalgamation of the Mosaic law, the Canon Law of the early Eastern Church, and Moslem Law; but after the decree justice continued to be administered in the courts according to the varying local customary law exactly as before. Again, in 1900, he forbade the importation of absinth and other spirits, but the Abyssinians remained as drunken a nation as ever. In 1907, Menelik decreed a compulsory system of education for all boys over 12; but twenty miles outside Addis Abbaba, where alone any schools were built, no one ever heard of the decree. In the same year he set up a Council of Ministers on the European model; but so long as he kept his health, he continued to do all the work of administration himself.

The first sign that all was not well with the aged Emperor was a rumour, in May 1906, that he had had an apoplectic stroke. In the same spring death removed both Ras Makonnen and Ras Mangasha, the two possible and most obvious successors to the throne—facts which, coupled with German intrigues which began with the appearance of the first German Minister at Addis Abbaba about the same time, undoubtedly hastened the conclusion of the Tripartite Convention in July of that

year. For the next eighteen months, notwithstanding that he was in August 1907 smitten with partial paralysis, Menelik was still able to take a more or less active part in transacting business, his last public act being the signature on May 16, 1908, of a final frontier treaty with Italy. In June it was officially announced that Menelik had appointed Lij Yasu, the son of Ras Mikael and his own daughter Shoaraga, then a boy of twelve, to be his successor.

For the next five and a half years the old Emperor lingered on in a comatose state till his death on Dec. 16, 1913. His capital became the centre of intrigues among rival claimants to the throne, though the fear of Menelik's recovery was sufficient to prevent any decisive action being taken. Foremost among the intriguers was the Empress Taitu, who, childless herself, aimed to get Princess Zauditu, the Emperor's daughter by a former wife and now the wife of her nephew, Ras Gugsa, recognised as heiress to the throne in place of Yasu. In October 1909, however, the Council of Ministers announced that Menelik had again solemnly designated Yasu as his successor and Ras Tesamma as regent. For the next few months a quarrel between the new regent and Ras Woldo Giorgis, the two most powerful of the Shoan chiefs, once more favoured Taitu's designs, till matters came to a crisis in March 1910. Then the leading Rases of Shoa united to crush her ascendancy and insisted on a restoration of the state of things as decreed by Menelik. Tesamma was allowed to continue as regent; but, on his death in April 1911, the Council decided that Yasu, now fifteen years of age, was old enough to act himself under its guidance.

Things now went from bad to worse, notwithstanding the efforts of Ras Mikael to win over all parties to support his son. Yasu soon tired of his Councillors' leading-strings, and for several months left Addis Abbaba and roamed about his Empire, spending much of his time in the Moslem province of Jimma. Here he first showed signs of reverting to the faith of his forefathers—Ras Mikael had been a recent and fanatical convert to Christianity—and betrothed himself to the daughter of Aba Jifar, its hereditary Sultan. Early in 1913 Yasu returned to Addis Abbaba, where he found that his

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Moslem proclivities had highly incensed the Shoan chiefs against him. He now seems to have conceived the design of forming a Wollo-Moslem party to overthrow the Christian Government of the Empire, and with this end in view paid frequent visits to the chiefs of the Wollo and Danakil countries. Menelik's death in December 1913 made little difference to the general state of affairs; indeed the event was for nearly three years concealed from the knowledge of the people. In 1914 Yasu made his father Negus of Wollo Galla and Tigre, and after the outbreak of the European war was encouraged by his Turkish and German advisers to lay plans for uniting all the Moslems of the Empire into a single all-powerful body. He proceeded to form alliances with the Moslem and Danakil chiefs, both of Abyssinia and the neighbouring countries, supplying the 'Mad Mullah' with a large stock of arms.

In 1916 his designs came to a head. In April he officially placed Abyssinia in religious dependence upon the Sultan of Turkey, and sent to the Turkish Consul at Addis Abbaba a confession of his Moslem faith and an Abyssinian flag bearing the crescent, promising his Moslem allies to lead them against the Entente Powers so soon as a great German victory should be announced; for it was commonly believed that the Central European Powers had already embraced Islam and imposed their new faith on Belgium, Poland, Serbia, and France. This outrageous conduct, however, was too much for the long-suffering Shoan chiefs. While Yasu was at Harrar, they assembled (September 1916) at Addis Abbaba and drew up a bill of indictment, accusing him of apostasy, dissolute conduct, and misgovernment. The Abun Matewos, with great reluctance, pronounced his excommunication and absolved the Rases from their oath of fealty. The Princess Zauditu, Menelik's daughter, was proclaimed Empress; and Dejazmach Taffari, son of Makonnen, was declared regent and heir to the throne. At Addis Abbaba the revolution was carried through practically without a blow. A few days later Yasu's forces at Harrar were defeated, and the renegade prince fled to his Danakil friends. On Oct. 27 his father, at the head of his Wollo army, was overwhelmed and made prisoner near Ankober. The new Government

failed, however, to follow up its military successes ; and, though the new Empress was duly crowned by the Abun at Addis Abbaba, Yasu was enabled to collect a new force, which after sundry defeats took refuge at Magdala. But Yasu was no warrior ; in August his courage failed him ; he deserted his army and fled (August 1917) with a few followers to the Danakil country, where he remained, plotting and waiting upon events till the winter of 1920-1. Then, relying on the support of the Ras of Tigre, Seyum Mangasha, the grandson of the Emperor John IV, he ventured to appear in that always turbulent district, but was within a few weeks arrested by the local governor of Makalle. Soon afterwards, when Ras Taffari marched northwards at the head of a formidable army meant to overawe the rebels, Yasu was handed over to the Regent, and is now in confinement.

Otherwise, since 1917, nothing startling seems to have happened. The new Government soon showed that it was no better than the old ; in fact personal quarrels between the Empress, her regent, and the Council—when there was one ; for it was suspended between March 1918 and July 1919—have practically rendered all government impossible. The ill-paid soldiers of the Palace Guard and of the Shoan army, kept in the neighbourhood of the capital, have been a constant menace to any orderly administration. In Menelik's time they were paid and fed first by long wars of conquest and then by heavy exactions from the newly-conquered provinces. But now, for more than twenty years, there have been no more lucrative wars ; and continual misgovernment has so impoverished the subject races that the old tribute in kind and money has dwindled to small dimensions. Nevertheless a long series of disorders, outbreaks, and mutinies has not been sufficient to overthrow Menelik's great work of unification, chiefly because no prince of royal blood has shown himself a warrior, much less strong enough to assert his supremacy over his fellow-princes, Rases, and generals, or to shake off the dominance of the European Powers, whose interest it is to maintain the *status quo*.

What remedy is to be found for this melancholy state of affairs, it is not easy to discover. At one time, under cover of the Treaty of London (1915), Italy seemed

inclined to claim annexation of the whole country, or at least a protectorate such as she had tried to assert 1889-1896. But, when Great Britain and France made it plain that clause xiii of the Treaty only promised rectifications of her frontiers at the expense of the British and French territories bordering upon them, and

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that they meant to adhere to the terms of the Tripartite Convention of 1906, Italy abated her pretensions—so much so that on Sept. 27, 1919, Signor Tittoni, speaking in the Italian Chamber, declared not only that the integrity of the Ethiopian Empire formed the basis of the Allied policy, but that any diminution of Ethiopian territory or independence would be contrary to Italian interests.

Despairing of any radical reforms in internal administration, the three European neighbours of Abyssinia

seem now to be relying on a policy of peaceful penetration through trade and commerce, for which the Jibuti railway gives an opportunity never before offered. Hitherto trade on any large scale has been impossible; the native Abyssinian still despises work and trade of every kind as much as ever, and not unnaturally is hostile to foreign interference. The old evils of Menelik's time—bad communications, arbitrary taxation, corrupt dealings, robbery, and general insecurity of life and property—are just as rife, and have consistently ruined all commercial and industrial enterprises, whether attempted by members of the subject races or by foreigners. Such internal trade as there is has been wholly in the hands of foreign firms (mostly French), centred at Addis Abbaba for the sake of imperial protection. British trade has been chiefly represented by our Indian fellow-subjects, whose interests our resident Minister has found it somewhat difficult to safeguard. Meanwhile, the conditions of trading all the world over have grown worse; violent fluctuations of the rates of exchange and of prices, difficulties both of freight and tonnage, have brought commercial enterprise everywhere to a standstill; with the result in Abyssinia, as elsewhere, that schemes started at the time of the Armistice with good prospects of success have so far yielded but little profit to their promoters.

G. E. UNDERHILL.

Art. 4.—AUSTIN DOBSON.

1. *Collected Poems.* By Austin Dobson. Kegan Paul, 1897.
2. *Eighteenth-Century Vignettes.* Three Series. Chatto & Windus, 1892-96.
3. *Side-Walk Studies.* Chatto & Windus, 1902.
4. *William Hogarth.* Kegan Paul, 1891.
5. *Horace Walpole.* Macmillan, 1910.

And other works.

No writer of equal distinction can ever have exceeded Austin Dobson in the absence of any kind of saliency in the personal details of his life. There was absolutely nothing in his career of over eighty years upon which biography can seize, no glimmer of adventure or faintest tincture of romance. When it has been said that he was born, in 1840, into a professional family; that, after a brief education in England and at Strasbourg, he entered the Board of Trade at the age of sixteen; and that he remained there,

‘Calme et paisible,
Comme un poteau
Inamovible,
Dans son bureau,’

till he retired from it at the age of sixty, there is nothing exterior that can be added. His married existence, which was untroubled by a single bereavement, enjoyed the same happy uniformity. He did not travel; he made no public appearances; he found no pleasure in political or social distractions. Every weekday morning he proceeded to his office, and every afternoon he returned to his suburban home; on Sundays he went to church. Ealing possessed no citizen more regular in his habits or more blameless in his conduct.

He preserved this noiseless regularity, this resignation to what seemed an excess of bourgeois conventionality, partly in obedience to temperament, partly because it enabled him to devote himself, with no disturbing element, to the workings of his imagination. We should make the gravest of mistakes if we supposed this outward quietude to respond to an inward insensibility. Austin Dobson, so hushed and unexhilarating as his exterior envelope appeared, lived a life of ceaseless mental

activity. His intellectual interests absorbed him, and he cultivated a curious power of resuming them, day after day, without any disturbance from domestic or official duties. These he accepted in their proper season, and then passed out of them into what was for him the only real existence, the domain of literature and art. The task of appraising him, therefore, although difficult because it demands observation of secret phenomena, is so far simplified that it has to deal exclusively with mental processes. The critic has to penetrate, as well as he can, the poet's art and the historian's method. He is not distracted by any extraneous circumstance, as is the case in the biographies of most eminent men of letters. The development of Dobson's imagination, and the course it took, are our sole solicitude in contemplating his career.

He had no tradition of literature behind him and no acquaintance with literary people when he entered the Board of Trade, nor did it, I believe, occur to him to write until long afterwards. He was slow in mental development and without confidence in his own powers. For a long time he saw no path before him. But he felt an impetus towards aesthetic expression, and having some facility in drawing, he took to spending his evenings in an art-school at South Kensington. A few of his productions exist, and show a humoristic tendency, in the direction of Cruikshank and Charles Keane. He was, however, brought into contact with a clerk of his own age at the Board of Trade, William Cosmo Monkhouse, afterwards distinguished as an art-critic. Monkhouse, who was much more precocious than Dobson, had been writing verses for years past, and had already some experience of printer's ink. After Monkhouse's death, in 1901, Dobson recalled that his old companion, in those twilight days of their boyhood, 'had the happy faculty of conveying a well-considered and weighty opinion without suggesting superiority or patronage.' The words, very characteristic of Dobson, reveal the relation which long existed between the friends, and which gradually led to an attempt on the part of the elder to enter the lists where his friend seemed already so brilliant. But, for a long while, Dobson was content to read and to admire. He was in his twenty-fifth year

when he began to compete in verse with his sole literary associate. He composed the verses called 'A City Flower,' which he sent to 'Temple Bar' in 1865, and presently he had the ecstatic pleasure of seeing them in print. This poem, after long hesitation, Dobson reprinted thirty-four years later, and it has figured in his works ever since. It is a sentimental picture of a girl in a milliner's shop, a graceful and merry composition in the fashion of that day, without any particular characteristic of Austin Dobson's mature style.

But he was now started on his road, and during the next three years he wrote with increasing confidence. A periodical, which has long passed away, 'The English-woman's Domestic Magazine,' lay open to Monkhouse, and he introduced his friend to the editor. A series of poems by Austin Dobson was published here in 1865 and 1866, among them some that we know. Many others have never been reprinted; and it was the author's wish, strenuously repeated shortly before his death, that they should remain unknown. He had a horror of the 'conscientious' editor of 'complete' posthumous works, who sacrifices the reputation of his victim to a passion for bibliography. But several of these early pieces were retrieved by the author himself; and we turn to 'The Sun Dial,' to 'A Revolutionary Relic,' and in particular to 'Incognita,' with its steady advance in metrical skill, as evidence of the line which Austin Dobson took in starting. Sixty years ago a species of light verse was much in fashion; it was approved of by Mid-Victorian taste, and was exploited with remarkable neatness by Frederick Locker. There were elements in it of Tennyson, of Thackeray, and of Praed. It was rather irritatingly called *vers de société*, in a French of Stratford-atte-Bowe unknown to Paris. It was expected to be scrupulously 'nice.' In this category was included all verse of an easy and debonair character, from which gravity and passion were carefully excluded, but in which an easy note of superficial pathos, and above all of sentiment, was preserved. A better name for it than the silly phrase *vers de société* is 'occasional verse,' which comes near to the *Gelegenheitsdichtung* that Goethe defended.

In the youth of Austin Dobson, by far the most

skilful proficient in this airy and accidental class of writing was Frederick Locker, whose volume of 'London Lyrics,' originally published in 1857, had grown to be a sort of standard of perfection. We may recall Locker's own statement with regard to his aim as a poet :

'Occasional verse should be short, graceful, refined, and fanciful, not seldom distinguished by chastened sentiment and often playful. The tone should not be pitched high; it should be terse and idiomatic, and rather in the conversational key; the rhythm should be crisp and sparkling, and the rhyme frequent and never forced, while the entire poem should be marked by tasteful moderation, high finish, and completeness.'

These words express, with remarkable accuracy, the purpose which Austin Dobson put before him in starting on his poetical career. He desired to excel in the little field cultivated so richly by Prior in the 18th and by Praed in the 19th century; and it is important to observe that in his early experiments he made no attempt to extend the borders of this domain, but merely to extract from it the most refined and delicate results of which it was capable. Hence Dobson's earliest advances did not take the shape of any revolt against the sentimental verse of which the latest exponents had been Thackeray and Locker, but of a strenuous self-education in the direct art of expression. It is needful that this should be stated, because in later years, as I shall endeavour to explain, his ambition entirely changed. He used, indeed, to deplore, with as near an approach to bitterness as his sweet nature was capable of, that the critics persisted in seeing in him nothing but a writer of 'vers de société.' It is true that this injustice long pursued his maturer art, but it is not less true that in his original character he was not to be distinguished from those purveyors of 'light' verse who are hardly admitted into the kingdom of Apollo.

In Dobson's twenty-ninth year, in March 1868, Anthony Trollope published in his new periodical, 'St Paul's Magazine,' a poem which marks a sudden advance in the poet's career, and constitutes the earliest exhibition of his individual character as a writer. This was 'Une Marquise'; and to read

'As you sit there growing prouder,
 And your ringed hands glance and go,
 And your fan's *frou-frou* sounds louder,
 And your *beaux yeux* flash and glow ;—
 Ah ! you used them on the Painter,
 As you know,
 For the Sieur Larose spoke fainter,
 Bowing low,
 Thanked Madame and Heaven for mercy
 That each sitter was not Circe,
 Or at least he told you so ;
 Growing proud, I say, and prouder
 To the crowd that come and go,
 Dainty Deity of Powder,
 Fickle Queen of Fop and Beau '—

with the rich colour of its images and speed of movement, and with the bell-like recurrence of its rhymes, is to realise that a new mastery of art had arisen out of the thin grace of 'vers de société.' This dates the opening of Austin Dobson's first mature period, and 'Une Marquise' was quickly followed by 'Avice,' that little masterpiece of winged lightness which sacrificed nothing to poverty of sentiment; by 'A Dead Letter,' in which the narrative form borders for the first time on the dramatic; and by 'The Sick Man and the Birds,' in which the dramatic is successfully achieved. All these pieces belong to 1868 and 1869; and it is pleasant to record that the interest taken in them by Anthony Trollope, and the care he took in meticulous revision and criticism of them, found a delighted and grateful response in Austin Dobson's modest conscientiousness.

At this point an odd incident has to be recorded, since it raised a violent storm in the porcelain tea-cup of the poet's susceptibility. Hitherto the poems which he had published in periodicals—and they had now become rather numerous—had been uniformly signed with the initials 'A. D.' The full name had never yet appeared in print. In 1869 he wrote, and in February 1870 he published, in 'St Paul's Magazine' the poem now well known under the title of 'The Drama of the Doctor's Widow,' which has always been, and still is, a universal favourite with his readers. Dobson had formed the acquaintance of a young lawyer, Richard Webster,

who was nearly three years his junior, and who, as Lord Alverstone, was destined to reach the highest position in the legal profession. In 1870 Webster had not long been called to the Bar, but was beginning to be known. In September of the following year, Webster asked Austin Dobson, in an offhand way, whether he had *seen* a poem called 'The Drama of the Doctor's Widow,' to which Dobson answered, 'Yes—I wrote it!' Two days later, Webster sent a letter to Dobson, in which he said, 'an intimate friend of mine tells me she wrote, and has shown me a MS. of "The Drama of a Doctor's Widow," adding further particulars.' Only those who recollect the temperament of the poet will be able to conceive the tempest of agitation which swept over him at this aggression; the charge did indeed become somewhat serious when, in spite of all statements to the contrary, the lady persisted in claiming, not merely 'The Drama of the Doctor's Widow,' but all the other poems signed 'A. D.' although these were not her initials. Austin Dobson was put to the inconvenience of collecting evidence of his handwriting and of the recollection of common acquaintances, even of printers and press-correctors; and still—and this is perhaps the most amazing fact in the whole imbroglio—Webster could not be induced to withdraw his support of the lady, who died not long afterwards, firmly impenitent. All that Webster would ever concede was, after a delay of ten months, an acknowledgment that he had failed to prove a claim, which, however, he still favoured.

The painful little incident belongs to literary history because the distracted poet, who saw in it far more than its intrinsic importance, recorded the whole story in a pamphlet, now of excessive rarity, which he issued in 1872. This is the earliest of his voluminous writings in book-form, and here for the first time his name was printed in full. The brochure possesses particular value from the fact that, in his almost feverish determination to prove his right to the invention and conduct of the poem, he prints in it, besides several fragments, a complete first draft of what he originally called 'A Story of Pyramus and Thisbe,' diverging in many places from the finished text. The little story, which has elements of mild mystery, may be completed by saying that Dobson

and Webster had no further communication till they met accidentally in Edinburgh thirty years later, when Lord Alverstone greeted the poet civilly, but made no reference to the old charge of plagiarism.

A second period in the development of Austin Dobson was marked by his discovery in 1870 of the poets who were called Preraphaelite. It is characteristic of his cloistered habit of mind that the advent of Swinburne had left him almost untouched, while against 'Poems and Ballads' of 1866 he had felt a gentle but distinct repulsion. The publication of Rossetti's 'Poems,' on the other hand, deeply interested him; and he was thrown back upon a book which he now read for the first time, William Morris' 'Defence of Guinevere.' The result was to incite Dobson not exactly to a following of Morris, but to a treatment of romantic subjects in a manner wholly serious, and with a new refinement of language. The pieces which belong to this second period are dispersed through Dobson's collected editions, and their peculiar character has, I think, never been perceived. It is therefore worth while to consider them together, and to recognise a section of his poetical baggage which has been unduly ignored. The principal examples—all, I believe, composed in 1870 and 1871—are the 'Angiola' songs; 'André le Chapelain'; the elegy beginning :

‘Him best in all the dim Arthuriad
Of lovers of fair women, him I prize,—
The Pagan Palomydes’;

‘The Virgin with the Bells’; and above all, ‘The Death of Tanneguy du Bois,’ with its haunting refrain :

‘Ah! I had hoped, God wot,—had longed that she
Should watch me from the little-lit tourelle,
Me, coming riding by the windy lea—
Me, coming back again to her, Giselle;
Yea, I had hoped once more to hear him call,
The curly-pate, who, rushen lance in rest,
Stormed at the lilies by the orchard wall;—
There is no bird in any last year’s nest.’

Something of the same element is found in the slightly later 'Death of Procris' and the elaborate Spenserian study, 'The Prayer of the Swine to Circe.' These poems

mark a phase in the evolution of Austin Dobson's talent, a phase which was soon, and perhaps happily, abandoned. It was not encouraged by those whose judgment, in those early days, he respected, partly no doubt because they had grown to expect another class of poetry from him, but partly because what excited admiration of the Preraphaelites was an audacity, a fire, which Dobson had no wish to display. But his experiments in this direction, especially if extracted and put side by side, are interesting; and, now that the splendour and flame of the protagonists have subsided, perhaps there is more of the real pathetic romance of the 'Morte d'Arthur' about 'The Death of Tanneguy du Bois' than about the daring pastiche of Rossetti and Swinburne. However this may be, there can be no question that Dobson's brief excursion into Preraphaelitism was highly beneficial to his style. It freed him from 'vers de société.' It taught him the value of combining richness with simplicity, and the necessity of rejecting mere conventional verbiage. He marked his abandonment of it by a quaint burlesque, 'The Peacock on the Wall.'

He returned, with vigour refreshed, to his earlier manner, in which seriousness was invariably relieved by a smile or by a touch of gentle human indulgence. Some of the poems of this period will always be favourites with his readers. They include 'A Gentleman of the Old School' and 'A Gentlewoman of the Old School,' where the rivalry with Praed is patent, but where the challenge is as successful as it is deliberate :

' Patience or Prudence,—what you will,
Some prefix faintly fragrant still
As those old musky scents that fill
Our grandams' pillows ;
And for her youthful portrait take
Some long-waist child of Hudson's make,
Stiffly at ease beside a lake
With swans and willows.'

Here also is 'The Story of Rosina,' a poem of unusual length for Austin Dobson, founded on an incident in the life of the painter, François Boucher :

' The scene, a wood. A shepherd, tip-toe creeping,
Carries a basket, whence a billet peeps,

To lay beside a silk-clad Oread sleeping
 Under an urn ; yet not so sound she sleeps
 But that she plainly sees his graceful act ;
 " He thinks she thinks he thinks she sleeps," in fact.'

The references here to Hudson, in 'A Gentleman of the Old School' to Reynolds, in 'Rosina' to the famous 'Panier Mystérieux'—references not forced upon the reader, but realised by those who look carefully under the surface of the text—mark the development of an element in Austin Dobson's work which was henceforth to be dominant above all others, namely, his acute sympathy with the art and life and literature of England and France in the 18th century.

All this time, his name was unknown and his initials observed by only a handful of readers. But in 1873, being in his thirty-fifth year, he ventured on a wider appeal. He published his first book, 'Vignettes in Rhyme,' dedicated to Anthony Trollope. The collection was preceded by a little epigram which was presently dropped and has never, I think, been revived. It is too graceful to be lost, and I venture to reprint it here :

'Go, little Book, on this thy first emprise ;
 If that thou 'scape the critic Ogre-land,
 And come to where young Beauty, with bright eyes,
 Listless at noon, shall take thee in her hand,
 Tell her that nought in thy poor Master stirs
 Of art, or grace or song—that is not hers.'

The volume, in fact, was laid at the feet of the Maiden of the Period, as we saw her in the annual show of the Royal Academy, or as she stepped, 'shod with neat balmorals, on the seaweeds and the corals' through the pages of 'Punch.' This element in the verse of Austin Dobson was never again to be so prominent as it was in 'Vignettes in Rhyme,' but it was always to exist, and it is useless to attempt to ignore it. He did not wish to ignore it. He said, late in his career, when the reaction against Tennyson was beginning to be rampant, that he himself was a Victorian, and proud of being one. He was many other things, but he was the Laureate of the Nice Young Girl, tall, fair, and serious, in white muslin and innocently anticipating the Eligible young Man. In less than fifty years we have passed so

completely out of the Mid-Victorian atmosphere, into an interest in the picturesqueness of horror and squalor, and into violent topsy-turvy ideals of morality, that the innocent world of fancy, as it flourished in 1873, has become almost inconceivable to young persons of vigorous mental ambition. It was a rose-coloured world, suffused with a transparent radiance of ideality, and founded, no doubt, more on an illusion as to what things should be than on observation of what they were. But in the incessant oscillation of taste from one excess to the other, there is probably but seldom a close relation to that primal truth, that realism, that reality, which is always the *fata morgana* of every genuine artist. May we not admit that, if Austin Dobson's girlish heroines, with

‘still the sweet half-solemn look
Where some past thought is clinging,
As when one shuts a serious book
To hear the thrushes singing,’

imperfectly interpret the emancipated womanhood of to-day, the horrors of ‘Le Feu’ and ‘The Red Laughter’ exploit life from the opposite side with equal inexactitude? Andreyev, in one of his dreadful books, says, ‘I have seen many men, and all I saw bore the stamp of stupidity and madness.’ It is no more ‘realistic’ to paint all men and women as types of the abysmal brute than to present them all as athletic angels. The pendulum of taste swings to and fro, and it is only Shakespeare and Jane Austen who remain permanently in favour.

Austin Dobson was not unconscious that his temptation lay on the side of the angels. He felt that he must always retain that bias, but he determined to counteract its ill effects by a more and more intense preoccupation with perfection of form. There are pieces in ‘Vignettes in Rhyme’ which do not from a technical point of view coincide with the writer’s highest standard. Few poets have printed so few incorrect lines as Austin Dobson, but there are some bad verses in his first book, particularly in ‘An Autumn Idyl.’ He felt his tendency to sentimentality, and was conscious of the danger of a style which coquetted in a spirit of levity with the

tender passion. In order to preserve, what so many of his contemporaries missed, dignity in lightness and good manners in frivolity, he realised that he must preserve an impeccable correctness of form. He must write as Watteau painted, in the tenderest hues of rose-colour and grey.

At this juncture, I must ask pardon if I introduce a personal recollection. It was shortly after the publication of 'Vignettes in Rhyme' that I made Austin Dobson's acquaintance in circumstances which had some importance, perhaps, for us both. The late Radical politician, Mr Peter Taylor, for many years M.P. for Leicester, lived in a large house, surrounded by gardens on Campden Hill—Aubrey House, long ago destroyed. Here he and his gifted wife entertained on a considerable scale, and hither came many persons of romantic and exotic interest. Mazzini was among those who had haunted Aubrey House at an earlier time. He was a correspondent of a Pen and Pencil Club inaugurated by Mrs Peter Taylor, whose members met on stated occasions to read and exhibit to one another prose and verse, and drawings also, illustrating a theme suggested for each occasion by the amiable hostess. Mr and Mrs Taylor liked to encourage ingenuous youth, and I had the honour of being elected to the Pen and Pencil Club. I attended the meeting in April 1874, when I was gratified by seeing and hearing several persons more or less notorious in their day. I knew no one in the room, nor was the quality of the successive contributions of a very exciting character. But in due course a slim young man, with dark eyes beneath a fine Horatian forehead, rose and read a short piece, in a voice attractive in its modesty and distinction. This, a whisper told me, was Mr Austin Dobson, whose 'Vignettes in Rhyme' had recently attracted a good deal of attention and were believed to have been rewarded by an Olympian nod from the Laureate. As it happily chanced, I had just read that volume, with juvenile enthusiasm. But what greatly moved me was that I recognised (I alone, no doubt!) that the piece just read was a rondeau in the French form elaborately defined by Théodore de Banville in the 1874 reprint of his 'Petit Traité de la Poésie Française,' a book which—as we ultimately discovered—was exercising a remarkable

influence over several young English poets. The company presently dispersed, and I shyly ventured to address the author of the rondeau with the remark that I noticed he had kept to the rules of De Banville. He was extremely surprised, and I may dare to say extremely pleased. We wandered out into the night together, and, late as it was, we paced the streets in a kind of dream for hours, absorbed in our metrical discussions. As Dobson wrote twenty years later in what is one of the most perfect of his lyrics, already on that first evening,

'Much they talked of Measures, and more we talked of Style,
Of Form and "lucid Order," of "labour of the File."'

The association formed that night, and preserved unbroken for nearly eight and forty years, was so precious to me that I must dwell upon it a little longer. We met, of course, when we could; but in the very next year an accident threw us together in a wholly unanticipated way. I was appointed to the Board of Trade, and on my arrival who should be the first to welcome me but the poet of the rondeau? From this time forth, until Austin Dobson retired from the public service in 1901, he and I met practically on every weekday in the year when we were neither of us taking a holiday. I suppose it would be difficult to point to another literary association in the history of poetry more persistent or more unruffled. My only excuse, however, for mentioning it here is that it gives me a certain authority when I attempt to analyse the poet's intellectual character and to describe his imaginative habits. Almost at once I began to occupy towards him the attitude, and something much more than the attitude, of the famous old servant to Molière. From the first—and indeed in a measure this continued long after his retirement—he formed the practice of submitting to me all his compositions before he considered them as finished. Since, to continue the quotation began a moment ago,

'He who wrote the writing, as sheet by sheet was penned,
(This all was long ago, Sir !) would read it to his Friend.'

The statement is not an idle one. I believe that of all the innumerable verses composed by Austin Dobson from 1875 onwards there is not a single one now preserved

which was not recited or read to me, or submitted to me in its first draft. Of his prose the same cannot quite be said, perhaps, but I am at a loss to point to a single prose work, even, which was not read to me before it was sent to press. It must be expressly understood that I was not expected merely to admire, or in the first instance principally to admire, but to criticise textually with the utmost severity. 'Remember,' he once wrote to me, 'I depend on you to drive the harvest mice out of my standing corn!' I endeavoured, with the best of my ability, to act up to that responsibility, and I examined every line, weighed every adjective, shook my head over every inversion, with rhadamanthine severity. Dobson did not always, of course, accept my verbal censure, but he gave to every suggestion his patient attention; and sometimes three, or even four, drafts of a poem would be submitted to me before we were both completely satisfied. When I look back over nearly half a century, I am astonished to recall with what serenity, with what an absence of vanity or irritability, he received my verbal criticisms, which were sometimes, I am afraid, vivaciously expressed.

His next volume of poems, 'Proverbs in Porcelain,' which appeared in 1877, displays the result of the extreme solicitude for perfection which occupied him in these years. He now mixed a good deal in the society of those contemporaries whom he had not hitherto known, and in whose conversation he found stimulus and encouragement. He saw Andrew Lang, Robert Louis Stevenson, Frederick Locker, and Lord de Tabley (John Leicester Warren); it was with these rather than with the members of an elder generation, in whose company his temperamental timidity forbade him to expand, that Dobson most enjoyed companionship—with these, and with certain artists from whom he found that a personal sympathy radiated—Alfred Parsons, Edwin Abbey, George Boughton. In 'Proverbs in Porcelain,' which the careful reader has to examine in its original form, since the contents of it have long been dispersed in the numerous reprints of Dobson's poetical writings, in this 1877 volume will be found, I think, the quintessence of his genius. Nowhere else is he more completely himself, and this volume contained specimens

of every class of his finest production. It opened with a series of miniature dramas in rhyme, six groups in Sèvres, each as light as thistle-down and as subtle as a comedy by Marivaux. No one has excelled, in their own limited compass no one has equalled, these tiny masterpieces of sagacity and tenderness, enshrined in a form which is pure perfection, without a trace of effort or a whiff of the lamp. English literature, rich as it was, is permanently richer for 'Good Night, Babette!' and 'The Song out of Season.'

It is richer, too, for the studies in the humour and picturesqueness of the 18th century, which now began more and more to absorb the attention of the poet. His earliest important essay in this direction was 'The Ballad of Beau Brocade,' and I think that he never went further in the meticulous restoration of a forgotten social scene. This, however, recalls a portion of Austin Dobson's work to which I have not hitherto drawn attention, his prose, critical, historical, and biographical. This will be found to deal almost exclusively with the 18th century, that object of his incessant preoccupation. His activity as a prose writer is generally supposed to have been subsequent to his poetical successes, and so in the main it was; but it will probably come as a surprise to many readers of that universal favourite, the 'Four Frenchwomen' of 1890, to learn that the essays in this volume belong to Austin Dobson's youth, and were published successively in 'The Englishwoman's Domestic Magazine' so early as 1866. He had the habit of recurring, over and over again, to his main themes. For instance, his final biography of Hogarth was published in 1898, but his earliest work on that painter dates from 1879. In a similar way, he made Richardson, Steele, Horace Walpole, Goldsmith, and Fanny Burney his particular property by dint of investigations which never ended. It is instructive to compare the original edition of his 'Life of Fielding' (1883) with the latest reprint, with its careful corrections and important additions. He never considered his work finished or the portrait ready to leave the easel; and this is perhaps the reason why, from a purely aesthetic point of view, his prose is rarely so satisfactory as his verse. In his 'Fables of Literature and Art,' which are among his most finished poems,

nothing is superfluous and every word in its place; in analogous studies of the 18th century in prose, the author's excess of conscientiousness makes him overload the page, by clogging it with instances and parentheses with which the reader could well dispense. This was the result of an unflagging severity of scholarship; but it did not always add to the reader's satisfaction.

The closest parallel between Dobson's verse and prose is to be found between his tales in rhyme, such as 'The Noble Patron' and 'The Squire at Whitehall,' and the most graceful of the volumes of essays called 'Eighteenth-Century Vignettes.' In both the Horatian influence is strongly marked; at his best he possesses, in fuller measure, perhaps, than any other English writer, the *Horatii curiosa felicitas*. This was not the result of accident or instinct, for it may be interesting for an ear-witness to record that, when Austin Dobson, after the publication of 'Vignettes in Rhyme,' was presented to Tennyson, that alarming *vates* inquired, in sepulchral tones, 'Are you a classic? Then become one! Read Horace every day of your life!' Dobson did not carry out this counsel quite to the letter, but with his customary docility in adopting good advice, he forthwith made a searching and prolonged study of the 'Odes' and 'Epistles,' a study the result of which upon his subsequent verse must be patent to the most careless observer, and may be traced upon his meticulous prose as well.

Little concerned with the vain racket of the life about us, Austin Dobson moved in a delicate world of his own, a microcosm where everything was fragrant and harmonious, and where the past and the present were mingled in the clearness of a rose-coloured air. The charm of his wit and the lucidity of his fancy were controlled by the scruples of a fastidious artist; and, when much that is violent has sunken into oblivion for ever, his writings may still float towards posterity on the stream of their purity and perfection.

EDMUND GOSSE.


Art. 5.—RIVER CONTROL IN MESOPOTAMIA.

1. *The Irrigation of Mesopotamia.* By Sir W. Willcocks. Revised edition. Spon, 1917.
2. *Report on the Development of Mesopotamia, with Special Reference to the River Systems.* Simla : Government Press, 1917.
3. *The Euphrates as a Navigable Waterway, Samawah—Musaiyib.* Basrah : Government Press, 1918.
4. *Correspondence regarding Post-War Irrigation Policy in Mesopotamia.* Baghdad : Government Press, 1919.
5. *Brief Note on Irrigation Works in Mesopotamia up to November 1918.* Baghdad : Government Press, 1919.
6. *Report on the Administration of the Irrigation Directorate from February 1918 to March 1919.* Baghdad : Government Press, 1919.
7. *Note on Irrigation in Mesopotamia.* Baghdad : Government Press, 1919.

THEY that go down to the sea in ships, we are told, see the works of the Lord. Those whose navigation is confined to the waters of a river can scarcely expect admission to that privilege in the same degree. On the other hand, they see also the works of man and the interaction of human operations with the forces of nature. It is related, perhaps untruly, of General Townshend that, when beleaguered in Kut, his heart sick with hope deferred, he signalled to the commander of the relieving force, 'Are you sure that you are on the right river?' The intelligent traveller who sets out by river-steamer from Basrah for Baghdad will not have progressed far beyond Qurnah, where the Tigris and one arm of the Euphrates meet, before he is fain to ask himself the same question. For he finds the broad stately river rapidly dwindling to the dimensions of a ditch, and becoming even more tortuous as it does so, until, in the neighbourhood of Ezra's Tomb, about forty miles above Qurnah, it is no wider than the Ouse at Huntingdon, and certainly not so deep.

From a point a few miles below Ezra's Tomb to another, four miles below the little town of Qal'at Salih, a distance of forty odd miles, is the region known as the Narrows, which gave so much difficulty to our Expeditionary Force in the earlier stages of the campaign. It

is a series of constricted reaches, full of loops and bends, flanked on either hand by miles of impenetrable marsh. Above the Narrows, as far as the mouth of the Butairah



effluent, fifteen miles beyond 'Amarah town, the traveller in his progress notices the river once more expanding. Its course is rather more direct, and the marshes recede from sight. Above the Butairah they cease altogether

and give place to an arid plain, featureless as the open sea. From this point to Kut, 145 miles, there is a gradual enlargement in the size of the river-bed, though the stream, except in the flood season, does not perceptibly increase in volume. Sinuosity varies, but in places, such as the neighbourhood of Filaiflah, is very marked. Above Kut, from which the distance to Baghdad by water is no less than 220 miles, though at normal seasons the volume of the stream remains fairly constant, the channel grows steadily larger. The sinuosity is extraordinary, taking the form of series after series of extravagant loops, quite rhythmic in their alternation. In brief, the Tigris in its lower stages—the four hundred miles or so which it traverses between Baghdad and Ezra's Tomb—differs from all other rivers, except its twin-sister the Euphrates, in that—while it receives only two tributaries, one considerable stream, the Diyalah, just below Baghdad, the other the insignificant Wadi, below Kut—it throws off five huge effluents, besides innumerable minor channels, and the further it advances the smaller it becomes.

The Euphrates in the same portion of its length receives no tributary and reaches an even more pronounced state of degeneration. In two areas it breaks down altogether and ceases to be a river. The first of these is the tract known as Shamiyah, which lies between Kufa and Samawah. Here the Euphrates disintegrates into a thousand petty waterways, which are constantly shifting. They run between great marshes and huge stretches of open water, until near Samawah the remnants of the streams reunite, only to part again about 80 miles further down, in the Muntafik country below Nasiriyah, where they form the Hammar Lake. This lake is a waste of shallow water, even in the low-water season exceeding 1000 square miles in extent; and from it one arm comes to join the Tigris at Qurnah, while the other and far larger branch, known as the Qurmat 'Ali, enters the Shatt-al-Arab just above Basrah. In the reaches immediately above Qurnah both rivers are considerably fortified by return streams from the marshes. But the water which comes back returns clear, having dropped its silt in the marshes, where also it undergoes an enormous loss through evaporation.

The present courses of both rivers are no doubt

recent, but their degeneration is no new thing. Archaeological discovery, historical record, and Mesopotamian topography concur in testifying to the recurrence of similar conditions and to the uniformly capricious behaviour of the two rivers throughout the centuries since man first became a dweller in Mesopotamia. In more recent times we have glimpses of the same activities. It will suffice to quote two examples. In 1837 Colonel Chesney, of the Royal Engineers, searching for a mail-route between India and England, made a voyage of scientific exploration on the twin rivers. He took soundings wherever he went, and made accurate measurements of each day's run. In what are now the Narrows, Chesney records a depth of from 2 to 6 fathoms and a width of from 200 to 400 yards. He also speaks of 'high and well-wooded banks' in the same region. Moreover, the distance from Qurnah to Baghdad by water, as measured by Chesney, was less by 22 miles than it is now. This last difference, it may be noted, is chiefly in the reaches between Kut and Baghdad, and may no doubt in a large measure be ascribed to the action of Midhat Pasha, Wali of Baghdad, who in the early seventies dammed the Saklawiyah channel, which leads from the Euphrates above Fallujah to the Tigris opposite Baghdad and used to take off a large portion of the annual flood from the one river to the other. This well-intentioned act, designed to keep the capital from being flooded, caused incalculable damage lower down in the Euphrates, and by suddenly depriving the Tigris of supplies, to which its bed had adapted itself, caused the channel to shrink in capacity, rise in level, and increase in length.

To return to the Narrows—the late Mr J. G. Lorimer, I.C.S., for some years British Resident in Turkish Arabia, a singularly careful and accurate observer, writing in or about 1907, says of the Tigris :

'In the swampy tract from Qurnah up to 'Azair (Ezra's Tomb) there is a depth of not less than 12 feet, but some of the turns are so sharp that a vessel more than 220 feet in length could not negotiate them. In the marshes proper, from 'Azair to Qal'at Salih, the river is at its narrowest with a navigable channel of only 25 to 50 yards; in this section there is no place where a steamer of 220 feet could go about,

and two steamers cannot pass one another without one tying up to the bank. The channel here is shallow in a low river. The unsatisfactory character of this reach is due to the numerous canals—some of them 20 to 30 yards across at the head—between Qal'at Salih and 'Amarah town, which, after the river has lost nearly half its water above 'Amarah, absorb perhaps one-third of the remainder; conversely the improvement below the marshes is due, as already indicated, to the return of part of the water by circuitous courses to the parent stream. The channel through the marshes is deteriorating and has lost about one-fourth of its breadth during the last ten years. Above the marshes the depth and width of the channel are both as a rule satisfactory, and from 'Amarah town to 'Ali-ash-Sharqi there is always 8 feet of water even with a low river.'

The mention of eight feet of water as constituting a satisfactory river above 'Amarah proves that the shallow river, below Qal'at Salih, had a less depth; indeed, in 1915 our boats had to contend with depths of four feet and less in many parts of the Narrows. The measurements of our engineers, too, taken in 1915 and subsequent years, showed that the effluents were then taking considerably larger fractions of the total supply than those named by Mr Lorimer. In other words, the process of deterioration had continued after he wrote.

The contrast between this and the conditions depicted by Chesney as obtaining in the same region cannot fail to strike the imagination. As for the well-wooded banks of which Chesney speaks, we know how they became denuded. The wood went into the maw of Lynch's steamers, the pioneers of British trade. But Chesney also calls the banks high. How did they become low, as they now are, almost awash with the waters of the river at all seasons? There can have been no general subsidence of the country. The only alternative is that the river has silted up, and in so doing has raised its bed-level until its waters, even in the low season, are always lipping over the banks. Indeed, in this region the flood makes little difference to the size of the stream, though it affects enormously the area of the adjacent marsh. All the extra water that the flood brings, or nearly all, has already slipped out into the marshes before the river reaches Qal'at Salih, and the

residue remaining in the shrunken bed is in volume, though not in rate of flow, nearly constant.

The phenomenon above described is, I believe, unique. For we have here no ordinary delta such as many rivers, for example the Nile in Egypt, the Po and the Adige in Italy, have made for themselves in their last lap to the sea. On the contrary, the rivers of Mesopotamia, after disintegrating and reuniting many miles inland, pour the remnant of their waters into the Persian Gulf by a single mouth. The explanation of this peculiarity, though possibly not the whole explanation, is, doubtless, that given by Mr Lorimer. It is the effluents which have caused and are causing the disintegration of the rivers. But how come they to have this effect? For it is obvious that unless there were something peculiar in Mesopotamian conditions, the mere digging of side-channels out of the river bed would have no more serious consequences in the valley of the Tigris than it would have in the valley of the Thames. This peculiarity, as contrasted with the Egyptian Nile, is vigorously described by Sir William Willcocks in his book on the 'Irrigation of Mesopotamia,' though his *obiter dictum* on the growing of cotton has been falsified by subsequent experiment.

'The problems,' writes Sir William Willcocks, 'whose successful solution will restore Babylonia to its ancient prosperity are far more difficult of solution than those which faced the irrigation engineers in the Nile Valley. Of all the rivers in the world the Nile is the most gentlemanly. It gives ample warning of its rise and fall; is never abrupt; carries enough of sediment in flood to enrich the land without choking the canals; is itself free of salt; has its annual flood in August, September, and October, securing both summer and winter crops; traverses a valley with a climate mild enough to allow of Egyptian clover in winter and Egyptian cotton in summer; and flows between sandstone and limestone hills, which provide an abundance of building materials.

'The Tigris and Euphrates rise without warning; are always abrupt; carry five times the sediment of the Nile; have their annual flood in March, April, and May, too late for the winter and too soon for the summer crops; traverse a country where the temperature rises to 120 degrees in summer and falls to 20 degrees in winter, and where both Egyptian cotton and Egyptian clover are out of the question;

have a considerable quantity of salt in solution; and flow between degraded deserts of gypsum and salted marl. . . .

'The Tigris-Euphrates delta is strangely flat. Baghdad, removed 500 miles from the sea, is only 120 feet above sea-level. Opposite Baghdad the Euphrates is 25 feet higher than the Tigris. Between the two rivers runs a regular valley, across which are carried the giant banks of the ancient canals. Though the slope of the country longitudinally is very slight, the traverse slopes away from the rivers are one in a thousand, or five times as steep as those of the Nile Valley. If the Nile breaches its banks in flood, it can be brought back after the flood to its old channel without serious difficulty; while a very serious breach on the Tigris or Euphrates has been followed by the river completely leaving its channel and forming a new one miles away, after inundating the whole country. Such was Noah's flood in the early days of the world's history.'

'In the Tigris-Euphrates delta we must never forget that we are in the country of Noah's flood; and as in antiquity, so to-day, the foundation on which will be laid the structure of Babylonian prosperity will be the protection of the country from floods; and the more thorough the protection, the more substantial will be the prosperity.'

The Mesopotamian rivers in fact, with their gentle longitudinal and steep transverse slopes, run upon causeways of their own making, as any one who takes his stand upon their banks may see for himself with the unaided eye. Other rivers, no doubt, do this in their deltas. But is the whole vast expanse of Mesopotamia south of Hit and Samarra correctly described as a delta? And if not, why and how have the rivers behaved in so strange a fashion? Among the irrigation engineers who worked in the country during the British military occupation another explanation has been put forward. The following extracts are taken from a report by Major Walton, of the Indian Public Works Department, who was employed in Mesopotamia from 1915 to 1918 :

'For the last six thousand years—or maybe more,' he writes, 'since irrigation of any sort was first practised in the country, the hand of man has been applied, not scientifically, but very unscientifically, to the rivers. It has been the continuous application of effort and not necessarily any sudden concentration that has brought about the present

state of things. . . . The instant the activities of man are suggested and his methods studied, there is not a phase in the rivers' behaviour that is not capable of a sound and reasonable explanation; but without this the caprices of the river[s] are inexplicable.'

Another officer of the Indian Public Works Department, Major Mackintosh, who was also employed for several years in Mesopotamia, gives in his report on the Hammar Lake area an admirable study of some of the methods employed in this 'very unscientific irrigation' and of the disastrous consequences. His facts are taken from close personal observation on the spot and extensive inquiries amongst the Arabs of the Muntafik confederacy. It is noteworthy that, though nearly a hundred years have passed since the Hammar Lake was first formed, the members of those tribes who were then flooded out still mark exactly where ran the boundaries of their now submerged tribal lands. To these they still refer as their *dirah* (tribal home), and they lead a semi-amphibious life in as close proximity to them as possible, all ready to pounce down on their ancient heritages (and as much more as they can get), should the act of God or man cause the waters to recede.

'In 1830,' writes Major Mackintosh, 'the Euphrates river flowed as a navigable stream from Nasiriyah to Qurnah. In the low-water season the contrary current at high tide was felt to just below Nasiriyah, and the tide swelled the river as far as Darraji, 40 miles further up-stream. In those days the river was doubtless of the character of the Shatt-al-'Arab of to-day; broad, deep, and slow-moving. Not much silt would be found in the water, as the supplies, then mainly coming down the Hillah branch, would drop their silt in the marshes between Rumaiyah, Erech, and Nasiriyah; the balance, or Hindiyah supplies, being similarly strained clear in the Shinafiyah lake and the marshes between Shinafiyah and Samawah. Irrigation would be easy by cuts made anywhere through the banks into the low-lying basins on either side. As the Turks had apparently no settled policy with regard to the rivers, Arabs were allowed to encroach on its (sic) flood bed, fortifying these increases to their holdings with bunds [earthen banks] and by the planting of willows. Subsequent floods could therefore only relieve themselves by scouring out and enlarging the existing irrigation channels,

which had a relatively steep slope, so raising the water-level in the basins on either side as to flood valuable land.'

'The inundation difficulty was settled for the time by the Sa'dun, Nasir Pasha, builder of Nasiriyah and Wali of Basrah under the Turks, who built a bund (*circa* 1870) along the right bank of the river from Qurnah to Suq. He wisely confined his building to the right bank; growing on the left bank only rice, which, planted as the floods went down, threw on lands soaked by their overspill. His bund was successful in protecting a large area of land sloping down to a salty lake in the centre which evaporated surplus drainage. On this land barley, wheat, and rice were grown for the ten years or so for which the bund lasted. . . . While Nasir Pasha's bund finally failed, partly through Turkish neglect of maintenance after he had been exiled to Constantinople, and partly by excessive reduction of the Euphrates bed by "reclamation," there can be no doubt that a contributing factor was flood-spill from the Tigris also caused by "reclamation" at 'Amarah and the Narrows.

'In Chesney's time the Butairah was only a small canal, and that much of the flood now pouring out into the marshes . . . then passed down the Tigris is obvious from his description of the river at Ezra's Tomb as 300 to 400 *yards* wide and 6 to 10 *fathoms* deep . . . now 400 *feet* wide and 12 *feet* deep. Arab opinion indeed insists not only that the Butairah was responsible for the failure of Nasir Pasha's bund, but that its increased draw has dried up several old canal systems between Kut and 'Amarah, and materially reduced supplies down the Hai. Whatever the cause, the effect is to-day a sheet of open water some 60 miles long by 10 to 15 miles wide, fringed on either side by miles of swamps expanding and contracting with the seasons and the intensity of the year's floods.

'The bank of the old Euphrates can still be traced across the lake in a series of islands, but almost the whole of the land cultivated in Nasir Pasha's time is now under water. Portions of his bund remain, a short length still in use protecting the date gardens at Medinah and other lengths near Bani Said. Running parallel to the latter can be traced the old bed of the Euphrates, 450 feet wide, now completely "reclaimed" by the victorious Arab with his spade and willows, a great river destroyed for the sake of a few acres of land.'

The practice of 'reclamation' which has called forth the irony of Major Mackintosh is, in reality, only

unregulated riparian cultivation, perfectly legitimate up to a certain point, and not difficult, given a little supervision, to render wholly innocuous. Let the reader imagine himself a squatter on the banks of the Tigris or Euphrates and dependent for his livelihood on the capricious bounties of the great river. We will suppose him to be animated by the true Semitic desire for riches and virtuously resolved to create wealth for himself, instead of following a short cut and plundering his neighbour. We will further assume that he is in no fear of dispossession and that it is worth his while to improve. He will naturally decide to plant a date garden. Without a constant water supply the young suckers, which he will set out in quincunx formation, will perish miserably without taking root, and his labour will be in vain. The river is at his very door, but it is only for a few weeks in the late spring that the water laps his holding and irrigation by flow is possible. For the rest of the year some means of lifting the water to the land must be found. The squatter may be content with the primeval *karad* (bucket lift), worked by an ox or horse or mule, under his own immediate and unremitting superintendence. But if he is enterprising, as most Arabs are, he will mortgage his credit to the hilt and instal a pump worked by an oil-engine. In either case his procedure, so far as its effect on the river is concerned, is the same. He sinks a shaft somewhere on the river-ward side of the flood-protection bank that guards his holding, and from it across the undulating silt and sand of the river bed he leads a channel along which the waters of the distant stream shall flow to his well-shaft. I say 'distant' advisedly; first, because the undertaking must be carried out in the low-water season, when the river bed is a world too wide for the shrunk stream; and second, because the squatter, if he has any choice at all, will be foolish if he does not select for the scene of his paradise a convex bend, where the risk of loss by erosion is small and the chance of accretion proportionately great. For on a bend—and both rivers consist mainly of bends—the deep-water channel hugs the concave, shore. The spoil thrown up in connecting the shaft with the stream is naturally left *in situ*, where it forms a double rampart of varying, but often of considerable,

height, athwart the trend of the river. The flood comes, and its waters, almost solid with suspended silt, run a bright copper red. The rampart is in places washed away, but where it stands it forms an efficacious silt-trap. When the flood recedes, the level of the bed upstream of it will often be found to have risen by several feet. Each year the process is repeated, till in time the squatter pegs out and fortifies his acquisition with a row of willows, and so *da capo*. This constant interference—for the squatter we have imagined is only one of many—interferes with the rhythm of the stream. What it gives to one bank it takes from the other. The opposite bank, *ex hypothesi*, is already concave; and on a concave bend the flood-protection bank, as is natural in a country where the population is sparse and distances are great, runs very near the edge of the river bed. With a little erosion it will be undercut, and the momentum of the stream, travelling in the direction of the last reach, will deepen and widen the gap with great celerity. A new door to calamity is opened on the opposite bank. But what of that? It is the affair of the people on that bank. Let them see to it! Our planter, with true oriental indifference, will quote piously from the Qur'an, *Allahu khairu 'l razikin* (God is the best of providers), and return to the watering of his plantation.

The question whether Mesopotamia from Hit and Samarrah southwards to the sea is correctly described as delta or not, is, therefore, no mere academic point of terminology. In so far as the rivers are in a true deltaic condition, any attempt to produce other conditions will have the forces of nature against it and will be prohibitively difficult and expensive. If, however, Major Walton and his supporters are right, Mesopotamian conditions, although they resemble deltaic conditions, are yet the outcome, not of natural causes, but of man's interference with nature acting through long ages and with the enormous leverage afforded by the difference in the rivers between low water and high flood. If this be so, the apparently deltaic conditions, not being due to natural causes, will disappear as soon as the interference ceases, or is scientifically regulated. In the one case, the scale is weighted against the engineer; in the other, in his favour.

Sir William Willcocks has rightly laid stress on the vital importance to Mesopotamia of protection against flood. But it is hard for any one without personal experience of the country to realise not only the importance but the immense magnitude of the task under present conditions. Some idea of it may be formed from the fact that, in the season 1918-19, more than two and a half million cubic metres of earth-work were put into flood-protection banks under Government supervision. Nevertheless, the floods of 1919 destroyed well over 100,000 acres of the spring harvest. To the toil of construction and the burden of vigilance during the flood season must be added the paralysing effect of uncertainty. A frail earthen bank is in many places all that stands between the harvest and ruin. On this bank, which may be many miles remote from the lands that it protects, wind and wave have full play. Rats burrow there and watchers sleep. Malice has to be reckoned with, as well as negligence. For by the furtive removal of a few clods an enemy can wreak irreparable mischief without serious risk of detection. Perhaps those who deey the Arab for a bad husbandman do not sufficiently take into account the conditions under which he labours.


One more quotation from the writings of Major Wilson, to bring home the difficulty, and we can then proceed to consider the remedy which that officer was, I believe, the first to suggest.

'Provided,' he writes, 'the Tigris channel were able to carry its floods at all places between Baghdad and Qurnah, the maintenance of the bunds along its margins would be greatly simplified, but unfortunately its flood capacity decreases as one descends from Baghdad. At 'Amarah its flood capacity is approximately 15 per cent. of that at Baghdad, whilst at Qal'at Salih it is only 3 per cent. This means that during a high flood 97 per cent. of the water passing Baghdad has to be turned out of the river, before Qal'at Salih is reached. Taking the high flood discharge at Baghdad as 250,000 cusecs (i.e. cubic feet of water per second), then the escapage amounts to 242,000 cusecs. In the provision of escapage from canals and rivers one expects and generally finds suitable works for controlling it, but in the case of the Tigris floods not 5 per cent. is under the effective control of suitable works; the remaining 99.5 per cent. is

under no other restraint than that afforded by small marginal bunds. It is not suggested here that masonry works should therefore be built with the object of gaining control; the matter is merely put forward in this light in order to drive home the fact that to attempt the control of such an enormous quantity as 242,000 cusecs by means of earthen bunds is not of itself a prudent undertaking nor one to be persisted in. At the most, they are in the nature of a temporary but inefficient expedient and are as undesirable as they are necessary.'

Now for the remedy. To understand the prescription the reader should examine the accompanying sketch, in which are represented diagrammatically the conditions above described. For the sake of clearness all minor details have been omitted. It will be seen that, besides many places where the annual breaching of banks by the flood provides a ruinous relief, between Baghdad and Qal'at Salih the Tigris throws off five huge effluents. Of these the uppermost, the Hai, which is well above the region of the marshes, has a large sandbank across its mouth, which prevents it from flowing except at high flood. The other four are perennial, and each one of them takes, or until it was brought under control was accustomed to take, approximately half the water left in the river at the point of effluence. It was in the summer of 1916 that shortage of water in the Narrows compelled the military authorities, who were then solely dependent on the river for their line of communications, to take the first step. In the autumn of that year, amid the lamentations of the local Arabs and the head-shakings of many cautious souls, they built a dam across the mouth of the Machariyah channel, with a bye-pass letting enough water down to give drinking water to the local Shaikh and his people and to make navigation by *mashhuf* (a light skiff used in navigating the marshes) possible. One result, generally expected, the raising of the surface level in the Narrows, did not follow, and therefore it was at first supposed by some that the experiment was a failure. Navigating officers, however, began to find that they could get through with more deeply laden barges, and soundings taken in cross-sections of the river bed confirmed their story. The surface level did not rise, because the river was scouring out its

DIAGRAM
SHEWING REDUCTION OF TIGRIS RIVER.



channel. In point of fact the surface level has since been gradually falling; and, if the policy advocated by Major Walton be steadily adhered to, those who live may yet see the high banks spoken of by Chesney standing where they ought and confining the waters of the river to their proper bed.

In 1917, beyond systematic repair and restoration of the existing flood banks, nothing was done. The omission was deliberate. For if this policy, which aims at the restoration of what are believed to be natural conditions, is to succeed, it must work as nature works, gradually. The river must be given time to accommodate itself to one change, before another is attempted. It may not be out of place here to mention that the lugubrious predictions of the Arabs have been wholly falsified. It is true that in many areas where, before the Machariyah was dammed, rice was grown, that crop can no longer be cultivated. But, with the contraction of the marsh, new lands of at least equal value have emerged, and the Chahalah, the next effluent above the Machariyah, in spite of what was done to it in subsequent years, has proved fully equal to providing them with ample water. In addition, the area of lands suitable for wheat and barley has considerably expanded. So, on the whole, the balance, even of immediate advantage, is in favour of the experiment; and the local cultivators have been rewarded for their loyal acceptance of a measure which was wholly unpalatable to them. One drawback they do feel—the restriction of navigation for boats of draught in the old waterways. But this can be arranged by the provision of more generous bye-passes, or rather by the construction of locks beside the regulators. For it will be many years before the closure of the barriers during the rising flood will be feasible; and till this can be done, although the marsh area will contract, there will still be enormous quantities of spill, and the face of the country will not be radically altered.

In 1918 again, great attention was paid to the flood banks, and temporary wooden barriers were erected across the mouths of the Majar Kabir and Chahalah effluents. These were not put into operation until late in September, and so did not affect the rice crop, which

does not require watering after that date. These barriers were very successful in improving navigation through the Narrows in the low-water season. In 1919, a permanent solid masonry regulator was built on the Majar Kabir, and a permanent timber-pile structure on the Chahalah. In 1920, the construction of a timber-pile regulator, similar to that on the Chahalah, had been planned for the mouth of the Butairah effluent. This huge water-way takes out on the right bank about 15 miles above 'Amarah and runs through little-known regions to the Hammar Lake, which, indeed, as we have seen, is largely fed by it. Of late years the Butairah has been gaining at the expense of the river, whose place it might at any time usurp. Owing, however, to the disturbed state of the country, the plan was deferred. Its necessity has, however, been recognised by the provisional administration, which in July last voted the sum required for its construction—two and a half lakhs of rupees. The cost of these works, except the original dam on the Machariyah, which was built entirely by military labour, has been defrayed out of Mesopotamian revenues, and they have not cost the British taxpayer anything. The results already secured are remarkable. Writing in 1919, the Director of Irrigation was able to say that the carrying capacity of the Narrows had already been increased by 200 per cent. and the river had sunk into its bed with a resultant lowering of surface-water levels.

Thus, on the Tigris at least, the heaviest part of the work is done, but no time should be lost in dealing with the Butairah. The problems offered by the Euphrates are certainly not less difficult; but the chances of success can be better gauged after the engineers have seen the effect of bringing under control the Butairah, which carries so much Tigris water into the Euphrates area. Unrelaxing vigilance on both rivers, together with sustained effort in the maintenance of flood-protection banks, will still be necessary until the lowering of surface levels shall render banks on their present scale superfluous. Besides this, the Government of the country must, in practice, as well as in theory, reserve to itself the sole control of the rivers. The promiscuous digging of effluents must not be allowed to begin again; and *pari passu*, as each existing effluent is brought under

control or stopped, arrangements must be made for the irrigation, under control, of the areas now dependent on it. Riparian cultivation cannot, of course, be checked. On the contrary, it should be encouraged; but encroachment below high-flood level must be sternly banned, and those who dig cross-channels in the river bed below that level must be compelled to scatter the spoil which they throw up in so doing. All this can be done without serious inconvenience to those concerned; but whether the autonomous administrators will have the foresight to take these measures and the power to enforce them, can scarcely be predicted at present.

These desiderata are pleasing to the soul of the irrigation engineer, but are not an end in themselves. For what tangible reward can the people of Mesopotamia look, if the precepts are duly observed? In the first place, until the rivers are brought to a stable regimen, no comprehensive scheme of irrigation can be worked out and no attempt made to conserve for the use of man the superfluity of water which the annual floods bring. On the policy of river control, therefore, hangs the future of irrigation; and so also, over a large area, does the improvement of agricultural methods. To this policy the Arab may look for relief from his present burden of work upon the flood banks, as well as for the maintenance of a navigable waterway in the Tigris, and perhaps for the restoration of one in the Euphrates. At the same time, this policy will give back to the plough millions of acres which are now covered by unprofitable marsh; and some future Amir at no very distant date may be able to rehearse, with truth, the boast of Lugal-Zaggisi, King of Erech, who records in an inscription, dated *circa* 2800 B.C., how 'he caused the lands to dwell in security, he watered the land with waters of joy.'

EVELYN HOWELL.

Art. 6.—POLITICAL DEMONOLOGY.

1. *World Revolution: The Plot against Civilization.* By Nesta H. Webster. Constable, 1921.
2. *Weltfreimauerei: Weltrevolution: Weltrepublik.* By Dr Friedrich Wichtl. Munich: Lehmann, 1920.

To track down the paternity of political or social schemes is a somewhat thankless task. As we advance hot-foot, the horizon inexorably recedes; and instead of finding ourselves at grips with Marx, Saint Simon, or Rousseau, we perceive the wraiths of Morelly, Campanella, More, or even Plato. If we wish to apportion an exact measure of originality to these planners of utopianism or socialism, we find it hard to fix responsibility. Mrs Webster, realising this difficulty, has in her new book, 'World Revolution,' solved it by assuming that most of the social and democratic ideas that are troubling the world to-day 'went into action,' as it were, at the French Revolution; and therefore she only attempts to deal with the social and democratic experiments of the last hundred and forty-five years. In a short preface she puts forward her point of view.

'For the last hundred and forty-five years the fire of revolution has smouldered steadily beneath the ancient structure of civilisation, and already at moments has burst out into flame, threatening to destroy to its very foundations that social edifice which eighteen centuries have been spent in constructing' (p. viii).

The doctrine the book seeks to establish is that a world conspiracy for bringing about the destruction of civilisation was conceived by one Adam Weishaupt, who founded a secret sect of 'Illuminates' in 1776, sent emissaries to France to indoctrinate the lodges of the Grand Orient, and finally, through their instrumentality, precipitated the Great Revolution. Further, the sect is said to have manifested its power in the activities of Babeuf and the founders of the 'Tugendbund,' and to number Saint Simon, Fourier, Robert Owen, the leaders of 1848, Lassalle, Marx, Bakunin, the Nihilists and Bolsheviks among its servants.

One of the defects of Mrs Webster's earlier book, 'The French Revolution,' was that she over-stressed and

exaggerated the part played by the *Duc d'Orléans* and *Choderlos de Laclos* in bringing about the catastrophe. In her new book she states that she has 'reconstructed' her view, and is now willing to 'attribute' to Illuminised Freemasonry the organisation she had formerly 'attributed to the genius of *Choderlos de Laclos*' (p. 30). In the use of this word 'attribution' we stumble on the great difficulty which attends the efforts of those who try to get at the back of events and to interpret their spiritual origin and significance. There are no proved tracks through this labyrinth. Certain pathfinders have ventured into the gloom and have brought back reports, sometimes confused, sometimes contradictory, always unverifiable, which adumbrate the theory that a secret conspiracy to overthrow Church and Throne was originated in the 18th century, or earlier, and still exists.

Mrs Webster, having steeped herself in the writing of *Barruel*, *Deschamps*, and *Robison*, has come to believe in the existence of an 'occult force, terrible, unchanging, relentless, and wholly destructive, which constitutes the greatest menace that has ever confronted the human race' (p. viii). With her it is a matter of faith rather than of proof; and it is in the spirit of the zealot that she blames both the 'official historian' whose business is 'not to inquire into causes, but to present the sequence of events in a manner unintelligible to the philosopher, and the 'interested historian anxious to suppress the truth about Illuminism.' The pages of accepted history, we are told, provide no clue; and it is 'only by recognition of the secret forces' that we can 'possibly hope to understand' the events with which she deals.

It is of course quite true that historians have chosen to deal with facts rather than with their psychological significance, but it is probably untrue that they have made this choice either through stupidity or self-interest. The fact is that the authorities on which any consistent and enduring theory of world conspiracy is founded are unreliable in the extreme. One could wish it otherwise, as the theory is a most plausible one; and, as Mrs Webster says, 'It is extraordinary how in the light of Illuminism many things that are happening to-day, which appear at first inexplicable, become clear as daylight' (p. 317).

The 'light of Illuminism' shows us, as Mrs Webster quotes with approval from a Catholic prelate, 'deadly Illuminated Freemasonry' as 'part of the system of revolutionary fraud invented and cast upon earth by Satan to compass the ruin of souls and the destruction of the reign of Jesus Christ' (p. 325). In the same light Christianity appears to her as 'a beleaguered citadel surrounded by the dark forces which have mustered for the supreme onslaught' (p. 325). The real protagonists, therefore, we must assume to be Christianity and Atheism, or Christianity and Satanism. Mrs Webster, however, encourages us to think that, 'if the people of our country will but realise the diabolical nature of the conspiracy at work amongst them, the powers of Hell cannot prevail against them.'

The theory supported by Mrs Webster makes of the world and of contemporary life an exciting battle-ground, but, before agreeing or disagreeing with her thesis, it is only proper to examine the authorities on which she mainly depends. Two of them, Barruel* and Deschamps,† are clerical writers, special pleaders against Masonry, which they regard as 'mother and nurse of all secret societies'; a third is Robison,‡ no less of a special pleader though a Protestant and a Mason. Barruel and Robison devote a good deal of attention to 'the most profound of all conspirators'—Weishaupt, the father of Illuminism; the one with the object of putting the Church on her guard, and the other with the design of warning English Freemasons of the recent dangerous developments in Continental Masonry. Barruel is careful to make Illuminism a graft on Masonry; Robison seems to believe it arises from Masonry. Robison's book appeared at the moment when Barruel was about to publish his third volume; he mentions Barruel's first two volumes in his appendix. Mrs Webster quotes impartially from Barruel, Robison, and Deschamps, and with their general views on the iniquitous character of secret societies she appears to be in agreement; but it is interesting, in view of the fact that she selects Robison's summary of Weishaupt's

* 'Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire du Jacobinisme,' 1797.

† 'Les Sociétés secrètes et la Société,' 1874.

‡ 'Proofs of a Conspiracy, etc.,' 1797.

doctrine to present to her readers, to see what Barruel's opinion of Robison's accuracy was :

'Sans nous connaître nous avons travaillé sur le même objet et pour la même cause ; mais le Public va voir mes citations et celles de M. Robison, et le Public y trouvera des différences remarquables. . . . Je crains qu'on ne nous mette en opposition ; je le crains, non pour moi mais pour la vérité, que ces oppositions pourraient décréditer' (III, 18).

In passages too long to quote, Barruel says he admires Robison's zeal more than his accuracy ; that he states things to be true that Illuminist correspondence shows to be false ; that he makes quotations from the writings of Illuminists which one could never find in their works, no matter how long one hunted. He adds that, in order to justify Robison's quotations, one would have to 'suppose a new book and new letters,' for he 'makes the Illuminists speak far more plainly and pointedly than they ever did in real life.' Heckethorn, in his 'History of Secret Societies' (vol. I, p. 316), deals harshly with both authors when he says that, owing to misquotation, 'their statements, in so far as they refer . . . to Weishaupt, are of very little value.'

In view of this destructive criticism of one authority on Illuminism by another, it is rather surprising that Mrs Webster should quote so rarely from Weishaupt himself and so frequently from Barruel and Robison's dubious summaries or translations of his *Original-schriften*. Deschamps' book, though for the most part founded on the labours of these two authors, is in a way more important than either, as in it he sums up the old Illuminist legends and—since the work was not published till 1874—is able to bring his narrative more or less up to that date. He tells us that, from 'a sense of duty,' he sets out to denounce Freemasonry as 'the fertile cause of crimes and calamities.' England he describes (p. 432) as 'cette source purulente de la Maçonnerie et de sa morale, foulant aux pieds la Catholique Irlande.' Although Mrs Webster is careful to discriminate (pp. 5, 6) in favour of British Masonry, her Continental authorities are not always—or should we say? are never—so particular, a fact which does not appear from any quotation in Mrs Webster's book. It

occurs to one to ask oneself this question: If English Masonry has been so grossly maligned by the clerical writers whose dicta upon it this author ignores, what grounds have we for believing them when they deal in similar terms with Illuminism, its doctrines or its votaries? It is possibly from Deschamps' book that Mrs Webster derives her conviction that Owen, Saint Simon, Fourier, the members of the German Union, and the later Tugendbund, were all Illuminates. Zaccone and other writers on Secret Societies hold the same belief. Viewing human society in the flickering 'light of Illuminism,' it is perhaps natural for Mrs Webster, after steeping herself in this literature, to believe that Lassalle, Marx, and Bakunin all belonged to the 'formidable sect,' and to recognise in Mr Hyndman and Mr Bernard Shaw their coadjutors or dupes.

Most people realise to-day that the French Revolution was no thunderbolt from the unknown, and agree that the lodges of the Grand Orient in France were in the 18th century working in a political sense. There were some seven hundred Lodges of various rites in existence before the Revolution, but it is impossible to form even an approximate estimate of the number of their members. It certainly was large, though the million adherents claimed by the Lodge 'Candour' alone would appear to be a great exaggeration of fact. Like the Encyclopædists, the Lodges probably played a large part in preparing men's minds and hearts for Revolution. Thousands of persons unable to form a political judgment for themselves were awakened to a sense of responsibility for the ordering of society through the agency of the Lodges. The Brotherhood of Man became a popular and living doctrine, and reconciled many to acquiesce in a subversion of society which otherwise they would have combated; for men, after all, are profoundly idealistic, and will endure and execute terrible things to bring about some imaged good.

The end of the 18th century saw the triumph of rationalism and the introduction of machinery and of industrialised life; even without the help of a 'world conspiracy,' great changes must of necessity have taken place, for feudalised institutions had somehow to be transformed into the modern State. Owing to the Revolution

of the 17th century and other causes, England had proceeded a long way in this direction, but in France no step had been made, for the government of the country was still an absolute monarchy; the nobility, clergy, and officials of the Third Estate were practically exempt from the burden of taxation, which fell on those least able to support it; and in one reign the expenses of government had risen from twenty millions to over a hundred millions.*

In spite of Mrs Webster's conviction that the French Revolution was an unnecessary catastrophe brought about by the Illuminati, no country is likely to remain quiet in which the ordinary farmer is mulcted of 82 per cent. of his income in taxes and dues.† Mere reforms in Mrs Webster's sense, 'concessions by the King' or by 'an aristocracy far from intractable,' could not meet the case, for the force of thought had already sapped the structure to which reform was to be applied. We must not be persuaded by Mrs Webster to forget that a great deal of idealism went to the making of the French Revolution. The democratic watchwords, Liberty, Fraternity, Equality, conjured up in men's minds a radiant Utopia, for the realisation of which any sacrifice was justified. As a matter of history, we know that these ideals were found to be mutually destructive in practice; the harmony that seemed to exist in the Lodges became the conflict of the Clubs. We ourselves live in a day of utter disillusion; and, if it is difficult to call up or even vividly to remind ourselves of the ideal aims for which the volunteers of 1914 offered themselves gladly to death, how much less can we realise the uplift of heart that inspired those architects of a new world in which privilege and injustice should be eradicate? We have to face the fact that it is the tendency of democracy to jump forward in sanguine onrushes, and then to fall back in dismal uninspired reactions, and to remind ourselves constantly and above all things that its only corrective is experience.

Secular experiments in Communism have shown Liberty and Equality to be incompatibles, and have resulted in failure mainly because men are what they

* Acton, 'Lectures on the French Revolution,' p. 1.

† G. L. Dickinson, 'Revolution and Reaction in Modern France,' p. 5.

are and not what they ought to be. Communistic schemes can only work when men are uniformly trained to be what they ought to be. Devotion to a religious ideal alone enables men so to subordinate individual caprice and passion as to live in harmony and equality with others. If religious motive is absent, any communistic authorities worthy of their creed must inevitably wish to put babies into official nurseries and girls of marriageable age into state harems, and allot them to men by rotation, since beauty must have no unfair advantage over ugliness. All the schemes which Plato, Weishaupt, Fourier, and others have fathered for breaking the link between mother and child and for the communisation of women are but recipes for rooting out individualism, which at the bottom is the source of inequality. No further proof is required of the absurdity of lay communism than this, that all that is best in human nature has to be frustrated and suppressed in order to call into existence that grim vacuum the Communist State.

There is nothing really to be afraid of in such schemes as these, provided they are put before a nation with a solid groundwork of education and civilisation behind it and practical experience of self-government. Russia fell an easy prey to the ideologist because it was in our Western sense uncivilised, uneducated, and without responsible self-government. Like France a hundred and forty years earlier, it was stationary under institutional government instead of progressive under constitutional government.

In a chapter entitled 'The Growth of Socialism,' under a sub-title headed 'The Philosophers,' Mrs Webster deals in true modern propagandist fashion with Owen, Saint Simon, Marx, and others. Lecky, in 'Democracy and Liberty,' covers the same ground as Mrs Webster, but does so from that dispassionate standpoint which gives to his historical work its element of permanent value as a contribution to human knowledge. It is difficult to think of Robert Owen, that champion of factory laws and promoter of Montessori methods, as an Illuminist; but Mrs Webster 'attributes' Owen's objections to Christianity to his being 'secretly' a disciple of Weishaupt. 'By no other means,' she says, 'can his campaign of militant atheism be explained. . . . It is

easy to see whence he derived his theories.' With the object, one supposes, of proving him a Communist, she goes out of her way to deny that he founded the co-operative system, and states that this was done by the Rochdale pioneers in 1844. Whether Owen founded the system which eventually proved workable or not, a London Co-operative Society was started in 1824, where 'Owenites' disputed with J. S. Mill and others. Owen took part in seven co-operative congresses between 1830 and 1834, and at the very least had a great effect in stimulating the movement in this country. Some seven hundred small co-operative societies were started in England before 1844, but they vanished, partly because they were run on the credit system, and partly because of the business ignorance of the men who ran them. As one reads Mrs Webster's account of these experimenters, a disagreeable feeling comes over one that she cannot bring herself to say anything good of any one she believes to be an Illuminiate. Here is an example. Saint Simon is described as a man of 'unbalanced brain,' who early 'threw himself into wild excesses,' led 'the life of an adventurer of gold and glory,' but after a while, 'weary of orgies,' turned his attention to the regeneration of the world. She states but half the case; for who would gather from this summary that Saint Simon had fought with distinction in five campaigns of the American War of Independence, or that he had commanded for a short time a French regiment, or, indeed, that he had conceived the brilliant idea of driving a canal through the isthmus of Panama? Mrs Webster 'attributes' Illuminism to Owen, because his atheism can be accounted for in no other way; and to Saint Simon because, 'faithful to the directions of Weishaupt,' he set out to prove in his book '*Le Nouveau Christianisme*' 'that his system was simply the fulfilment of Christ's teaching on the brotherhood of man' (p. 105).

As a matter of cold fact, Saint Simon clearly realised, in spite of his unbalanced brain, that the social organisation of the Middle Ages—the product of an authoritative Church and the Feudal System—was crumbling, as an outworn building crumbles, to decay, and that the prime task of thinkers was to rebuild society in the interests of the workers. He dreamt of a federated Europe, an

International Parliament, a League of Nations—some of us do so still; but Mrs Webster dismisses him and his dreams as merely 'a variation of our old friend Babouisme.' But was Saint Simonism merely this? Babeuf, too, was mad, far madder than Saint Simon, and was the first, in an age when privilege was the only enemy, to introduce Socialism proper into politics. He proposed to transfer all property to the State, which in itself made testamentary disposition impossible. He wished to prohibit foreign trade and so to organise domestic industry as to make it sufficient for the necessities of the nation. Dress, food, lodging were all to be regulated under his scheme, which was to be inaugurated by a massacre and the cancellation of all debts. Babouism, like Bolshevism, was Communism introduced by confiscation and maintained by despotism. Saint Simonism differs from Babouism in advocating peaceful methods of transition, progressive increase of death duties, the gradual conversion of private to public property; and it is this scheme that has influenced indirectly the current of modern thought.

Mrs Webster evidently does not hold with the dream that enthralled so many 18th-century idealists—the Perfectibility of Human Nature. People who base schemes on such an assumption may be mad, but they are not always bad; and that is where one joins issue with Mrs Webster. To drag Christ in (p. 105) to prove 'the fallacy' of such a 'delusion' as perfectibility, or the solidarity of labour, seems rather unnecessary and beside the point. It is surprising to learn that lessons of such far-reaching importance were embodied in the simple parable of the servant forgiven a debt by his master.

According to Mrs Webster, it is not only the social reformers who are mad or rather bad. The German patriots of the 18th and 19th centuries were also, it appears, Illuminates. 'The German Union,' says Mrs Webster, 'was only the Illuminati under another name.' Now Bahrdt, the founder of this nationalist and rationalist society, was also said by Barruel and Robison to be an Illuminiate; but Heckethorn (I, 316) says that these two authors 'not only mistranslated many passages taken from Bahrdt's works, but have, evidently intentionally, so twisted others to their own purpose—that of abusing

their author—that their statements as far as they refer to Bahrdt . . . are of very little value.' Mrs Webster goes on to say that the *Tugendbund* and the *Burschenschaft*, by means of which German patriots hoped to revive the national spirit and rebuild their country after the *débâcle* of Jena, 'were started on much the same lines as the *Illuminati*'; that the doctrines of the *Tugendbund* 'were those of Clootz and Marat'; and that they developed into a further order known as the German Association, Masonic, and therefore subversive in character. The question that occurs to one is: Did Mrs Webster merely take Deschamps' word for all this, or did she investigate the matter independently and come to the same conclusions? It is surely as sorry a travesty of truth to state that societies with such admittedly different aims are identical in inspiration, as to declare that 'the national sentiment latent in all German hearts' could (in 1809) be appropriated by Illuminists to overthrow all powers and nationalities? Surely Mrs Webster has lost all sense of relativity, and is projecting the future back into a past, transformed to meet her intuitive anticipation of the needs of the present day. Relentlessly, however, she goes on to draw a moral from her tale. 'It is here that for the first time we can clearly detect the connexion between Prussianism and the secret forces of World Revolution' (p. 83); and further, the 'connexion between Prussianism and Illuminism can therefore be detected from the beginning, but with the *Tugendbund* appears in the clear light of day' (p. 85).

But we are not at the end of the plot yet. Mrs Webster infers—and in this she is in agreement with her forerunners—that a German, or rather Illuminist, 'conspiracy of history' has existed to this day, which 'through the instrumentality of such agents as Carlyle' maintained 'the prestige of Frederick the Great in order to smooth the path for his successors' (p. 84). No great mental agility is required of us to draw an inference bearing on the war of 1914; but we are perhaps entitled to inquire whether, if that war had not taken place, we should have found that sentence in print to-day.

If one were a psycho-analyst one would be disposed to hazard that three leading complexes lie half-dormant in Mrs Webster's sub-conscious mind, which impel her in

her selection of facts and the interpretation she puts on them. The first idea is that social reformers are mostly as bad as they are mad ; the second idea is that they are the conscious or unconscious tools in a vast secular conspiracy organised by unseen beings or Illuminati ; the third idea is that these unseen ones are probably Germans, and possibly, though not always demonstrably, German Jews.

Mrs Webster in her 'French Revolution,' showed symptoms of a tendency to manufacture prejudice against Jews ; and in her new book this tendency is considerably developed. Our minds are prepared for the ingemination of anti-Semitic ideas by being told that 'the years 1781-2 were remarkable for the emancipation of the Jews' (p. 19) ; that 'eight years before the Revolution the programme in favour of Judaism was sent out by Prussia' ; that there was a 'wave of pro-Semitism' during those years. Mrs Webster says that it was decided to admit Jews to Masonic Lodges in 1782, and that the headquarters of 'Illuminised Masonry' after that date was fixed at Frankfort, 'the stronghold of Jewish finance.' So far as we know, there was no Jew behind the French Revolution ; but Mrs Webster, citing a passage from Prudhomme, dealing with their emancipation in 1790, says, 'What mysteries of iniquity would be revealed if the Jew, like the mole, did not make a point of working in the dark! . . . Jews have never been more Jews than when we tried to make of them men and citizens' (p. 92). Then, after quoting a sentence from Joseph de Maistre to the effect that the Jews were playing an active part in Illuminism in 1816, she writes, 'We have *seen* their mole-like working below ground during the first French Revolution *suspected* by Prudhomme' (p. 160). Barruel was not aware of these burrowings ; and, if we may presume to judge his views from a sentence in his book, even he would not appear to believe that the emancipation of the Jews constituted any real danger to society.

'Je crois presque moi-même que la doctrine secrète du Christ, ainsi que je l'explique, avait pour objet de rétablir la liberté parmi les Juifs. Je crois même que la Franc-maçonnerie n'est pas autre chose qu'un Christianisme de cette espèce' (III, 236).

It is untrue to say that 'the Jews have always formed a rebellious element in every state.' The Jews are individualists, no believers in the doctrine of the natural equality of man; they are conservative, law-abiding, acquirers of property; and it is irrational to assert that under any government by which they are equitably treated they should prove a subversive force. They are much more likely to prove a reactionary and tyrannical one. In England, where they have been firmly established for centuries, they have never proved subversive, unless the fact that they financed Cromwell may be taken as proof of their rebellious mind. Jews certainly had a great deal to do with the revolution of 1848 in Germany; but then in that country they were not emancipated, and after 1848 there was no talk of rebellious Jews in Germany. Even Lassalle, who took a leading part in the rising, became a loyal citizen of Prussia.

On the other hand, the persecuted Jew is a danger in any State, as Russia has shown us in the recent past. Before the war the Jews of Russia were subjected to the capricious despotism of the Tsar, his ministers, and the police. The restrictions placed on Jews in Russia were in themselves enough to make revolution there inevitable. By the way, Mrs Webster seems to be unaware of what happened to the Jews in China. The absence of resistance to them in that country led to their being merged in the population. China, in fact, absorbed the Jews by refusing to persecute them at any period.

Jews, it appears, are 'the *chiffoniers par excellence* of the world.' Marx's work in the British Museum is described as that of 'a veteran Jewish rag and bone-picker.' He 'was an impostor from the beginning.' 'Posing as the prophet of a new gospel, he was in reality nothing but a plagiarist . . .' pillaging freely 'from all the earlier Socialists' (p. 169). Marx, as every one knows, set out to discover what is the economic law that governs society. Mr Hyndman, who knew Marx very well, says in his 'Recollections,' 'It is a great mistake to imagine that Marx had any desire to belittle his obligations to his predecessors, or to deprive them of any credit that was their due.' His main object was so to synthesise the work of those predecessors as to discover the formula that reveals the economic law already alluded to.

Marx's fundamental ideas are simple, though his style is turgid and his detailed analyses hard to follow. Modern Capitalism, according to Marx, exploits the labourer by getting possession of the 'surplus value' of his services, i.e. the amount produced by him over and above his wages, which are regulated by 'the iron law.' Marx traces the historical development of Capitalism, and attributes to it a tendency to concentrate power in fewer and fewer hands. Thus he claims that the growth of Capitalism reduces the number of Capitalists, and indirectly makes the producing class or Proletariat self-conscious. His view is that the Proletariats of the world must organise in their own interest and seize the means of production in order to do away with the exploitation of Labour by Capital. In his scheme Mrs Webster detects Illuminism once again, this time in the form of Pan-Germanism; and it seems to resolve itself to this, that, if the Proletariats of the world submit to having their thinking done for them by Germans, they will contribute to the German domination of the world.

'Spying' Illuminates and 'spying' Masons is a game that two can play at; and, though Mrs Webster and some of the writers in the 'Morning Post' may discern in every German activity a move in a secret conspiracy for World-Revolution or World-Domination, Dr Wichtl, thinking on parallel lines in Central Europe, sees in every British activity a diabolically clever move in a plot of British World-Domination. His book, 'Weltfreimauerei : Weltrevolution : Weltrepublik,' deals with the revolutionary activities and ultimate objective of Continental Masonry. In England alone, he says, has Masonry become institutionalised in support of the State; but this, he points out, does not prevent England from promoting revolutionary activity in other States. Much of the greatness of Britain, he says, is admittedly the work of Freemasons. Edward VII derived all his power from Masonry. Masons worked unwearingly through Chamberlain to draw the Empire more closely together; the growth of the Colonial dominions during the last fifty years is their work; but England's goal is not achieved, for her aim, or rather 'the aim of the Highest Grand or World Lodge, is the Domination (*Vorherrschaft*) of the entire world.' In support of this

theory Dr Wichtl makes 'Brother Cecil Rhodes' responsible for a passage in a speech in which he prophesied 'that all Africa, the Holy Land, the Euphrates Valley, all South America, all the Islands of the Great Ocean, the Dutch East Indies, the coasts of China and Japan and the United States of America, shall become English.' 'Brother Lord Kitchener' is said to have declared in 1911 that 'the boundaries of the English realm in Europe should not be the Channel but the line of the Meuse' (p. 223). The author is careful to point out, as proof of these statements, that Mr Lloyd George has made good a part of the scheme by annexing the German Colonies, Mesopotamia, Armenia, and the Holy Land !

Germans profess to see as much danger in England as ever England saw in Germany. According to Dr Wichtl, English plots are world-wide ; England supported revolutions in the old days under Palmerston and Gladstone ; and she has continued doing so in Portugal, Brazil, China, Persia. 'What rôle the Brothers Buxton played in the Balkans is so well known that we need not examine it in detail here !'

According to Dr Wichtl (p. 174), it appears that there is a mysterious bureau in Southend, financed by the British Government to the tune of 5,000,000*l.* a year, and run by an officer with the improbable name of Major Susley. From this bureau, we are told, financial arrangements were made at various times for attempts on the life of Jaurès, Witte, the King of Bulgaria, Sir Roger Casement, and possibly, but only possibly, of the Serajevo victims. Dr Wichtl reminds us that a price of 30,000*l.* sterling was set on the head of Charles Edward Stuart by the British Government of that day ; and therefore it will not come as a shock to any one to know that Lord Kitchener, carrying on the British tradition, set a price of 20,000*l.* sterling on Talaat Bey's head (p. 175). In the same paragraph we are told that Lord Kitchener was fêted as a pattern Mason by the Grand Lodge of England, after he returned from the *Massenmorde* of women and children in the South African concentration camps. The paragraph ends by inquiring what difference can be discerned between the Serbian assassins (*Mordbuben*) and English Freemasons.

There are evidently people in Central Europe who

like reading this kind of book, as it has gone into at least five editions, just as there are people in England who like reading about the criminal conspiracies of Jews and Germans. It probably comforts Germans to be told that the European War was a Freemasons' war; that its point of departure—assassination—was the work of Masons; and to learn that

'in a weak moment General Townshend blurted out (p. 227) that he had attended secret war councils between English, French, Belgian, and Russian plenipotentiaries held with the object of destroying the German realm; that England had pledged herself to land 150,000 men in Belgium during the first week of the war, and to invade the Rhine Provinces with the Belgian army, . . . that the Boers had promised to seize German South West Africa . . . and that Maubeuge had been filled with English and French ammunition in 1913.'

Dr Wichtl, like Mrs Webster, holds no brief for the Jews, and points out, for what it is worth, that a fifth of the Masons of England are Jews, and that the 'Times' has the Freemasons' sign in mosaic over its front door. However ridiculous Dr Wichtl's stories and opinions may appear to us, no doubt there are people in Europe who believe every statement in his book, just as there were people in England who believed that the 'Protocols' of the Learned Elders of Zion were really what they purported to be, i.e. the minutes of the Secret Jewish Directory held in Paris at the end of the last century. Mrs Webster, in 'World Revolution,' recognised that they probably emanated from some secret society at the end of the 18th century; and some weeks after her book was published the 'Times' correspondent traced them back to a work published in 1867. But it is probable that they are far older in origin.

Every one who has a thesis to advance is inclined to weight the scales. As we have seen, Dr Wichtl does so to a preposterous extent; and, although Mrs Webster does so in a far less degree, one is astonished to find that, in order to support her statement that the German revolutionaries of to-day are the lineal descendants of Weishaupt, she refers her readers to the authority of Dr Wichtl (p. 311), as if to a serious writer on World-Freemasonry and World-Revolution and World-Republic! It

is an insult to the intelligence of any reader to ask him to accept a statement made on Dr Wichtl's authority.

'World Revolution' is a book of half-truths magnified into whole truths by 'attribution' and innuendo. The author's tendency in her 'French Revolution' was to make her case too complete; and the same tendency is observable in her second book. There certainly were societies working before the Great Revolution to bring about the Brotherhood of Man; there certainly has been a very long Republican tradition in Europe; and there certainly have been secret communistic societies in existence at all times. There have always been Jews working for the capitalist system in countries which befriended them, and working against the State in the countries that persecuted them; but it is very difficult, if not impossible, to build up a four-square edifice of world conspiracy out of these elements and by these methods. The edifice is vulnerable at a hundred points. There may be a secret German-Jewish organisation working for world control at Frankfort, with a G.H.Q. in Moscow; but Mrs Webster has not convinced us of its existence or of its efficiency.

It can do nothing but harm to try to prove that all social unrest is artificial in character, or that, if social grievances and evils exist, they have been deliberately brought about by the 'Hidden Hand' in order to stir up revolt against throne and altar. The best answer to these charges is that offered by Mrs Webster herself, when she says it never occurs to the foreign agitator that the fact of England being a free country might have something to do with the difficulty of rousing in it a spirit of rebellion; that in a country where reforms are in progress revolution can make little headway. In the words of Zenker: 'England possesses no anarchism native to the soil.'

UNA POPE-HENNESSY.

Art. 7.—WILLIAM ERNEST HENLEY.

The Works of William Ernest Henley. Five volumes
Macmillan, 1920-21.

SPEAKING of Byron, Henley says that he 'was not interested in words and phrases, but in the greater truths of destiny and emotion. His empire is over the imagination and the passions.' As a critical judgment this is far less shrewd than was common with Henley, but it is suggestive in relation to his own work as a poet. Henley was a remarkable figure in the literary world of his day, moving in no scholarly seclusion, but coming out into the open field of journalism, and bearing himself always with spirit and dignity. The best of his work is a durable contribution to the finest kind of popular criticism, vivid, far from unlearned, in close touch with the ordinary and confused affairs of life. On any given subject he might have to yield at points to the specialist, but few men have covered so wide a range with so warm an understanding and with a mind so well versed in the evidence of the case. It is as a critic that he will be remembered, and it is of his critical work that there is most to be said. But he produced a good deal of creative work, and, in common with most writers who work in both kinds, he no doubt hoped that it was in this that he came to his best achievement. So that, although on the whole it seems likely that this side of his expression will be the first to fade, it cannot be passed by without consideration.

'He was not interested in words and phrases, but in the greater truths of destiny and emotion.' This, in the last analysis, is true of Henley as a poet. He would have accepted the judgment with pride; and that he would have done so is indicative of his real weakness. When he adds that Byron's empire was over the imagination and the passions, he says more than justly can be put in for himself. Henley's poetic world was not that of passion and imagination, but that of clear-sighted morality, which was sometimes transfigured by indignation. It was in this world that he moved as a master in a great deal of his critical work. But it was a world that was, as it always must be, incomplete as an environment for rich poetic creation. In passing, it may be

remarked that it merely is not true to say of Byron that in his great poetic moods, of which for all his failures he had as many as most poets, he was not interested in words and phrases. Byron knew, as in practice Henley did not, that, while it is passion and imagination that must condition the poetic faculty, the only possible consummation of that faculty comes through the most exact and disciplined ordering of words and phrases.

Henley brought to his poetry many beautiful qualities. He had real courage, he had a great-hearted tenderness, he hated Pecksniffs and impure Puritans; he was, in short, a very chivalrous man, with rare intellectual gifts. But he did not perceive that merely to be these things, while it might do anything else for you, could not make you into a poet. Every now and again this fine moral impetus in his being would move with such force as to achieve something which remains memorable and beyond the reach of any but poets of the most indisputable magic. Such pieces as 'Matri Delectissimæ' and 'On the Way to Kew,' and the well-known 'Out of the night that covers me,' and 'Or ever the knightly years were gone,' are good things for any man to have written. Coming from the finer airs of Herrick or Marvell or Keats, our minds may not often go to Henley, but at other times we find ourselves recalling,

'Out of the night that covers me,
Black as the Pit from pole to pole,
I thank whatever gods may be
For my unconquerable soul . . .

or

'Or ever the knightly years were gone
With the old world to the grave,
I was a King in Babylon
And you were a Christian Slave . . .

and we do so with a pleasure that we do not question. But Henley very rarely came to this excellence in his verse. The great body of it suffers from the fatal defect of having been subjected to no emotional selection, a defect which Henley very thoroughly understood when considering the work of other men. The sequence of Hospital sketches, for example, is no more than brilliant journalism. Brilliant journalism in its place is all very

well; and, when a man aiming at it accomplishes it, all credit is due to him, but you cannot pass it off as poetry. These poems, one feels all the time as one reads them, are as much an accident as the occasion of Henley's being in the hospital at all. It is no case of carefully selected emotion being projected through an occasion that shall give it final form, as it seems to the poet; it is, rather, a vivid observation catching up this, that, and the other fragment of casual event and setting it down, not with imaginative but merely graphic power. The tranquillity which, as Wordsworth pointed out, is the condition in which emotion must be recollected for the creation of poetry, is precisely the condition in which the poet works with the utmost precision in that matter of words and phrases. And in most of Henley's verse there is unmistakable evidence that he was working, not in tranquillity, but in Fleet Street.

'We flash across the level,
We thunder thro' the bridges,
We bicker down the cuttings,
We sway along the ridges.'

This is a fair example of a prevalent quality in Henley's verse; and it does not begin to exist as poetry.

On the whole, the volume of Poems, running to nearly three hundred pages, is the one of the five forming the admirable collected edition now published that is least likely to serve Henley's memory. He was a skilled writer always and handled many verse forms with ease, but only very rarely in any of them does he come to that last continence which is style. It is interesting to note that he often writes in a manner which is to-day supposed to be very revolutionary, but he seems to have done it without theories, merely because it was easy.

'The stalwart Ships,
The beautiful and bold adventurers!
Stationed out yonder in the isle,
The tall Policeman,
Flashing his bull's-eye, as he peers
About him in the ancient vacancy,
Tells them this way is safety—this way home.'

That might pass without question in to-morrow morning's anthology, and be held to show how unnecessary

the great English metrical forms had become to progressive genius. The Henley of this kind, however, is already forgotten, but poetry will always have a secure, if modest, place for such forthright excellence as this:

‘Some starlit garden gray with dew,
Some chamber flushed with wine and fire,
What matters where, so I and you
Are worthy our desire?’

‘Behind, a past that scolds and jeers
For ungirt loins and lamps unlit;
In front, the unmanageable years,
The trap upon the Pit.

‘Think on the shame of dreams for deeds,
The scandal of unnatural strife,
The slur upon immortal needs,
The treason done to life.

‘Arise! no more a living lie,
And with me quicken and control
Some memory that shall magnify
The universal Soul.’

There is just a little sheaf of this quality to be garnered from Henley’s poems; and he is a fortunate man who can contribute even so much to so great an inheritance.

Before passing to the important Henley, the critic, a word must be said of the four plays that he wrote in collaboration with Stevenson. In these there are passages of patent merit. The Stevenson of ‘Treasure Island’ could not fail in the course of a long work to find moments of enchantment, flushed with the true broadside manner, and coloured of the best. And, given the situation right and the characters really agog, Henley had a gift of dramatic dialogue—if it was Henley’s, as I suspect—that could firmly hold the stage for five minutes at a stretch. But these things do not make drama; and, as dramas, these four plays are the merest exercises, and very poor ones at that. It is incredible that two writers of such outstanding ability could at times become so jejune. It is all very well for men of genius to have larks, but even in their larks there must be some conscience, and if there is any conscience in these plays I do not discover it. ‘Admiral

Guinea' has scenes of the true Stevensonian glamour, but it has nothing else of the smallest dramatic truth. 'Robert Macaire' is a very elaborate joke, which certainly does not come off in reading any more than I can believe it to come off on the stage. 'Beau Austin,' although it has perhaps the best three minutes to be found in any of the plays, is no more than Sheridan-Goldsmith pastiche. And 'Deacon Brodie' succeeds only in making villainy appear more imbecile than virtue. It is in this play, too, that we have the most hilarious examples of the abuse of soliloquy. Henley in his article on 'Othello' speaks of soliloquy as 'an expedient in dramatic art abominable to the play-going mind.' In that essay he is inclined to accept the device because of Shakespeare's use of it, not seeing that in its proper function it may be a magnificent element in great dramatic form. But that a critic who could raise the question at all should put his name to a play in which over and over again one of the characters speaks like this :

'Now for one of the Deacon's headaches! Rogues all, rogues all! (*Goes to clothes-press, and proceeds to change his coat.*) On with the new coat and into the new life! Down with the Deacon and up with the robber! . . . Only the stars to see me! (*Addressing the bed.*) Lie there, Deacon! sleep and be well to-morrow. As for me, I'm a man once more till morning. (*Gets out of the window.*)'

leaves one, as they say in the ring, guessing. They just won't do, and that is all there is to be said of the plays. But, to leave them with the mind on that short scene in 'Beau Austin,' which is perhaps the best thing to be found in them, let me quote. Austin, it may be remembered, first at Fenwick's persuasion but now from genuine impulse, is about to present his addresses to Barbara, who has been one of his conquests. The lady's young brother, Anthony, a cornet who has neither brains nor morals, conceives it to be his duty to shoot or beat the Beau.

Barbara. Mr. Austin. (*She shows Austin in, and retires.*)

Austin. You will do me the justice to acknowledge, Mr Fenwick, that I have been not long delayed by my devotion to the Graces.

Anthony. So, sir, I find you in my house——

Austin. And charmed to meet you again. It went against my conscience to separate so soon. Youth, Mr Musgrave, is to us older men a perpetual refreshment.

Anthony. You came here, sir, I suppose, upon some errand?

Austin. My errand, Mr Musgrave, is to your fair sister. Beauty, as you know, comes before valour.

Anthony. In my own house, and about my own sister, I presume I have the right to ask for something more explicit.

Austin. The right, my dear sir, is beyond question; but it is one, as you were going on to observe, on which no gentleman insists.

Fenwick. Anthony, my good fellow, I think we had better go.

Anthony. I have asked a question.

Austin. Which I was charmed to answer, but which, on repetition, might begin to grow distasteful.

Anthony. In my own house—

Fenwick. For God's sake, Anthony!

Austin. In your aunt's house, young gentleman, I shall be careful to refrain from criticism. I am come upon a visit to a lady: that visit I shall pay; when you desire (if it be possible that you desire it) to resume this singular conversation, select some fitter place. Mr Fenwick, this afternoon, may I present you to his Royal Highness?

Anthony. Why, sir, I believe you must have misconceived me. I have no wish to offend: at least at present.

Austin. Enough, sir. I was persuaded I had heard amiss. I trust we will be friends.

Fenwick. Come, Anthony, come: here is your sister.

Henley, the critic, is another matter altogether. It may sometimes be charged against him that he was superficial, and, in a way, justly. But it was a superficiality which Henley himself would have been at no pains to disown, since what is meant is not that he did not feel profoundly, but that his interests were chiefly along the highways of critical thought and creative effort, and that he was not much concerned with the remoter things of speculation nor with the rarer and more elusive kind of personality. The result is that a few readers will find Henley's pronouncement altogether shallow and ill-considered, in the case of a writer such as Landor, for example. That imperturbable spirit, casting the imagination and passion, of which Henley speaks,

into a form so austere, so little conscious of the world's judgment, so sufficient to itself, seemed to so plain and blunt a mind as Henley's to be 'not only inferior in kind but poverty-stricken in degree,' and its creative faculty to be 'limited by the reflexion that its one achievement is Landor.' This is to be superficial with a vengeance; and the fortunate thing is that Henley very rarely turned his attention at all to subjects of which he had so little understanding. It is in such studies as those of Fielding, Burns, and the motley that made up Byron's world, that Henley is at his best, not only as a critic but as a writer altogether.

The outstanding quality of all Henley's work in this his best kind is a moral courage of a particular strain which we to-day, taught by a generation of writers who in this at least have learnt wisdom, may find less unusual than it was, say in 1896, when the Burns essay was first published. Twenty-five years ago it was not difficult for a man to speak his mind about life; but, if he spoke with courage and independence, he was apt to find acceptance only among a small body of artists and thinkers. Thirty years had passed, it is true, since Swinburne sent the larger public into convulsions by 'Poems and Ballads'; but even after that lapse of time such a book would have been greeted with a considerable, if not an equal, storm of protest. To-day, however much it might flutter a few hearts, 'Poems and Ballads' would at least leave the moral sense of the public unshocked. And that this is so is largely due to writers, of whom Henley was by no means the least, who came out into the open and challenged, not a coterie but what is known as public opinion, with the declaration that nearly all moral judgments are immoral and that what really matters is not points of view but life.

In reading his essay on Burns, one is reminded of the teaching and practice of the truest worldly philosopher who ever lived, Christ. It is strange that so clear-sighted and lucid a moralist as the founder of Christianity should so often be advanced in support of a dulness of spirit that was the constant mark of his reproof. The people who said it against him that he consorted with publicans and sinners were at least intelligible, and stood for a definite, if bad, morality. There are a great many people

in the world who do not like publicans and sinners, who think that they themselves are better than publicans and sinners, and that some kind of outlawry is the desert of such as these. It is a most lamentable state of the human mind, but at least it asserts itself plainly, deceiving itself as to what is right but not as to what it thinks. The astonishing moralists are those who tell you that Christ consorted with publicans and sinners, as though it were a peculiar and crowning virtue in him; that so good a man should have stooped to the company of these forlorn people seems to them to be witness of the most exemplary holiness. The thing that this kind of mind always overlooks is that Christ himself never thought of these people as publicans and sinners at all; and that he would have rated in no uncertain terms the spiritual ignorance that supposes that he could have thought it any kind of virtue to foregather with people whom he merely saw as men and women a little more entangled by circumstance than others, and consequently needing an even tenderer understanding.

It is this Christlike spirit that informs such essays as these of Henley on Fielding and Burns. Here was a critic who not only had his fine sense of literary excellence, but brought a real ethical standard to his appraising of it, a standard that recognised first and last that self-righteousness and morality cannot live together. The result is that in the study of Burns, for example, we have the whole of the man quite fearlessly set down—unstable, betrayed by circumstance into all sorts of follies and even worse, often enough spiritually thriftless, descending at times to the level of a mean antagonist, and, with it all, magnificent. Henley sees these defects in his hero, and is no more afraid of them than Burns himself was at pains to conceal them. He passes no moral judgment on them, since moral judgment is not his business. He merely perceives them, vividly, as part of a character, moving in its other scale to a courage, a generosity, and a passionate charity such as have never been excelled in any human heart. And this complete Burns is, for Henley, life, something to contemplate with all one's understanding and humility, something so much more marvellous in itself than it can be in the testing by preconceived standards.

Henley was, in fact, a good man, and like most good men said much that is shocking to the respectable ones. Also his goodness, as usual, expressed itself often with a very natural gaiety, which nowhere shows itself to better advantage than in the brilliant character-sketches which make up the chapter called 'Byron's World.' Nothing could be more spirited in its kind than the little study of Gentleman Jackson, Byron's great prize-fighting friend, of whom the poet said, when some one suggested that this was no company for him to keep, 'Jackson's manners are infinitely superior to those of the fellows of my college whom I meet at the high table.' Jackson repaid the admiration in full, saying of Byron that nobody could be more fearless, and that he showed great courage always 'in coming up to the blows.' It is, again, the life that takes Henley's mood, the life of an age, as he says,

'dreadful no doubt; for all its solid foundations, of faith and dogma in the Church and of virtue and solvency in the State, a fierce, drunken, gambling, "keeping," adulterous, high-living, hard-drinking, hard-hitting, brutal age. But it was Byron's; and "Don Juan" and the "Giaour" are as naturally its outcomes as "Absalom and Achitophel" is an expression of the Restoration, and "In Memoriam" a product of Victorian England.'

Even when Henley makes his sympathy clear, as in the case of Byron against 'Pippin,' Lady Byron, he still sees all round his question.

'On Jan. 8, 1816, Pippin has asked Dr Baillie, "as a friend," to tell her whether Byron is or is not mad; a week after she leaves Piccadilly Terrace for Kirkby Mallory, her father's residence; next day, "by medical advice," she writes cheerfully and affectionately to her husband; and that is all. They never met again; and the next that Duck (Byron) knew of Pippin was that she had taken his child from him, and purposed—strongly purposed—that he should never more set eyes on either of them. He never did. Byron the poet, Byron the dandy, Byron the *homme à femmes*, Byron the lover, Byron the husband and father—the little country blue-stocking was more than a match for them. Against them all she set her unaided wits, and against them all she scored; and scored so heavily that in France, and places

where they know better, the name and fame of the British Female suffer for Pippin's achievement yet.'

This human quality in Henley's work would, it need hardly be said, not suffice in itself to make him the critic he is. It is, rather, that, when this nature in him is stirred, his critical faculty becomes alert also, and he discovers an authoritative sense of literary values. When, as in the case of Landor, the emotion of his subject escapes him, the expression of that emotion naturally enough seems to him to be in itself something inadequate. And all that can be said about it, as in every case of aesthetic appreciation, is that, so far as Henley's mind was concerned, the expression *was* inadequate. Landor remains, and Henley proves his worth elsewhere, and little harm is done. In the 'Fielding' and 'Burns,' on the other hand (one returns to these essays since, on the whole, they stand as the best of Henley's achievement), his personal sympathy with the life of his subject finds the nicest modulation in the analysis that he makes of the form in which that life found expression. And these papers are full not only of human understanding but of critical wisdom. We have not only warm-hearted persuasion, but a very rare insight into the processes of literary art. This, for example, of Fielding, is perfect in its discrimination and embodies a general principle that inferior criticism always overlooks:

'... he has ever a kindly, and at the same time a leisurely, half-laughing, half-reticent mastery of his creation, which he never permits to get out of hand; so that he is able, on occasion, to assert, and to make us assent to, such an outrageous familiarity as that of the boxing of Squire Western's ears, by a person unnamed, whose sole title to credence is that, being an officer and a gentleman, he is as well acquainted with Squire Western as Squire Western's creator. That is to say, a great deal better than Sir Walter Scott and Mr Saintsbury. Sir Walter thought that Mr Western ought to have retaliated; Mr Saintsbury (speaking, he says, as a Tory) agrees, and seems to think this inimitable and daring touch the Novelist's "one slip." For myself, I am, like Mr Dobson, of Mr Fielding's party; for the reason that he knew his Western, and that his Western, if we are to accept him at all, must be accepted on his terms.'

And so it is always when he is in touch with his subject. He may sometimes be deceived by a manner as to what lies behind. To the example of Landor might be added that of Philip Sidney, in whom Henley could see only affectation and conceit, and in whom he only permitted himself vaguely to suspect that there was a heart beating under 'the buckram and broidery and velvet,' so that the poet of 'Astrophel and Stella' remained for him but a 'brilliant amorist.' In that gallant and formal carriage, expressive of an age when with the grand manner went grand manners, Henley could see little more than a strut; and so he could make no acquaintance with one of the truest of the English love poets. But, when he does understand, he nearly always does it with great thoroughness; and in his best work he never fails to test even his warmest sympathy with a writer's temper by a clear apprehension of principles governing the creative energy.

On the whole, Henley stands for a quite definite thing in modern English letters. He was not a great imaginative writer; and, though he had a good style, it was not a notably distinguished one, such as, shall we say, that of Mr Edmund Gosse. Nor, on the other hand, was he a great and original moralist, moving in lonely ways of speculation. But he did perhaps as much as any writer of his time to enlighten the ever-vexed problem of the relation of morality to art. Nothing more justly provokes suspicion in the critical mind than the art which seems to include in its purpose what the Americans call 'moral uplift.' The first sign of the critical mind, indeed, is a very proper pride in the conviction that, for better or worse, it would like to solve its own spiritual problems for itself. Such minds go to art because in that atmosphere, more perhaps than in any other, they are braced precisely for these solutions; and they rightly resent any presumption on the part of the artist that he is being sought, not for this purpose, but as a sort of spiritual ready reckoner. The critical mind is, therefore, and properly, never so touchy as when it suspects that it is being got at by the artist; and, indeed, it is a perfectly sound æsthetic instinct, since, when the artist is thinking about instructing the world instead of understanding it, he is inevitably up Queer Street.

But to understand this is by no means the same thing as to suppose that the artist ought not to concern himself with moral issues, or that he is transgressing if he plainly shows himself to be impressed by—to call it by its simplest name—goodness; and the critical mind is continually getting itself confused about this issue. It is one thing for an artist to say, 'Be good, sweet maid,' and quite another thing for him to create a Cordelia, and make it perfectly clear to us that he thinks Cordelia admirable. Every acute critic sees the defect in 'Be good, sweet maid,' but a great many critics who should know better become defensive (or offensive, as the case may be), about the Cordelias of art.

Now, Henley, as has been said already, was a good man, and he loved goodness. He was under no illusions as to what goodness really was, and, as was shown by his acrimonious treatment of some of Stevenson's whitewashers, he neither hoped nor wanted to find paragons of virtue among men. He was perfectly aware, too, that in this world of expediency the values of vice and virtue are continually falsified; so that he knew, for example, that in the sum Burns was a much better man than any of his detractors. But, when all is said, the fact remains that Henley did immensely cherish the ordinary decent things of charity and tolerance and fortitude and devotion. And, while he was the last man in the world to tell his fellows that they ought to foster these things, he was eager in his praises whenever he found them. Had he been a great creative artist, his world would have been alive with this best kind of virtue, and it would have been his to survive the common charge of sentimentalising life. As he was not a great creative artist, this instinct in him found its fullest expression in criticism; and it does so in such a way as perhaps might persuade even the most intellectual critic that, in an artist, to be moral is not necessarily to be damned.

JOHN DRINKWATER.

Art. 8.—MONARCHISM IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

Two Emperors, five Kings, five Grand Dukes, six Dukes, and seven Princes, all of them reigning Sovereigns under the old régime in Germany and the former Austria-Hungary, have lost their thrones as a consequence of the war. The only German Sovereign left in Central Europe is Prince John II of Liechtenstein. Liechtenstein is one of those anomalous small States, like the Principality of Monaco and the Republics of Andorra and San Marino, which contrived to preserve their independence intact amid the national groupings and regroupings of the 19th century. It has an area of 65 square miles, and a population of a little under 11,000. It lies on the border between Switzerland and Austria; and until the collapse of the Hapsburgs it was in effect (though never in law) a dependency of the latter. It had no army, however; and at the outbreak of the war it declared its neutrality. Since the collapse it has negotiated a Customs Treaty with Switzerland, under which in effect it has become a Swiss dependency. The Principality has a Diet, in which there is a small party which professes Republican opinions; but its propagation of them amongst the population is considerably hampered by the circumstance that the Principality is mostly the private property of the Prince, who, as he draws almost all of the revenue, also defrays almost all of the expenditure. The victory of Republicanism would accordingly imply the introduction of taxes, from which this fortunate State is at present entirely immune; and also, if it were to join Germany or Switzerland, some form of military service. In these circumstances competent observers incline to the view that Prince John can continue to count on the dutiful allegiance of his subjects.

In Germany before the collapse there were numerous similar States, though none were quite so small as Liechtenstein. In two German States (Prussia and Baden) the Sovereigns abdicated in 1918. In two others (Bavaria and Brunswick) the Sovereigns were formally deposed. In the remainder the Sovereigns amicably handed over the administration, withdrawing for the most part either to their country estates or abroad. The Governments which succeeded them thereupon

adopted some Democratic State title, generally 'Free State' or 'People's State,' or in one case (Baden) 'Republic.' Some of the smaller ones united with one another. Eight of the Thuringian States (the Duchies of Saxe-Weimar, Saxe-Meiningen, Saxe-Altenburg and Gotha, the two Principalities of Reuss combined as one State, and the two Principalities of Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt and Schwarzburg-Sondershausen separately) combined to form the United State of Thuringia (Einheitsstaat Thüringen) with Weimar as its capital. Saxe-Coburg, from whose reigning house in the 19th century Belgium and Bulgaria drew their rulers and Queen Victoria her Consort, preferred to join Bavaria. Three other small Principalities (the two Lippes and Waldeck) are likely in the near future to join Prussia.

To interpret these political developments as the triumph of the People's Will in conflict with the monarchic, or the militarist, or any other reactionary principle, would be misleading. The struggle with Liberalism, which occupied the energies of most of the German Princes during the first half of the 19th century, had no counterpart in the second. All of these princes, with the exception of the three Grand Dukes of the North (the two Mecklenburgs and Oldenburg), had granted Constitutions in or after the Revolutions of 1848; and the founding of the Empire in 1870 in broadening the horizon of both Sovereigns and subjects had cut the ground from under these political conflicts. The issue of Republicanism versus Monarchy in the small States had not in fact been on the *tapis* of practical politics in Germany any time in the last fifty years. In many or most of them it would probably never have been raised after the collapse, had not the Allies, or rather President Wilson*—for, so far as is known, the Allies made no pronouncement on the subject—indicated their desire for the establishment of republican institutions in Germany as a preliminary to the negotiation of peace. The loyalty of the average non-Prussian German to his *Bundesfürst* in the latter years of the Empire was a mildly romantic, eminently harmless, sentiment, which he inherited, accepted, and displayed on appropriate

* In his Note of Oct. 23, 1918.

official occasions, but to which at other times he did not give much thought—very much like the average Englishman's attitude to the English Royal House. Bismarck (who certainly had no illusions about the German Princes of his day) says in a well-known passage of his 'Reflections and Reminiscences' that this 'particularist patriotism' was a psychological necessity to the German mind; and the late Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, himself a Badener, once told the writer he believed it would outlive the Empire. Perhaps it will.

When the time came for parting, most of the Sovereigns left on excellent terms with their subjects. There were exceptions. The Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha was very unpopular, partly for personal reasons, partly because he had recently enclosed, for game-preserving, large areas of Crown forest land which had previously been unfenced. The Duke of Brunswick, a member of the reactionary House of Hanover, has aroused indignation by claiming delivery of the contents of the court museums and libraries and of the ducal castles, or their value in cash, as his private property—which unfortunately, under the law governing the possessions of the Ducal House, they appear to be. He left Brunswick for Holland immediately after the collapse. So did the Grand Duke of Oldenburg; and the last-named has since contrived to remove large numbers of the pictures from his castles to Holland. He, too, would presumably not be welcomed back. On the other hand, the Duke of Anhalt has presented almost the whole of his rich collections, together with one of his castles, to the Anhalters. Of the rulers of the larger States (excluding Prussia) only the King of Saxony has left Germany. He and the King of Würtemburg and the Grand Duke of Baden were all popular with their subjects. But perhaps the most popular of all the German Princes at the present time is the Grand Duke of Hesse, who continues to live on one floor of the Grand Ducal Palace in Darmstadt, where he studies philosophy and indulges a well-known taste for the Arts.

In none of the small States are any efforts being made, apparently, either by the Princes or by their peoples, in the direction of Restoration. The Princes, it is said, are diffident of acting independently of the two

bigger States, Prussia and Bavaria. The peoples consider the ban of the Entente to be still binding. The question is more *actuelle* in Prussia and in Bavaria. In both of these States there still exist powerful political parties—the Conservatives (now called German Nationals) and the National Liberals (now called German People's Party) in Prussia, and the Clericals in Bavaria—who openly advocate the restoration of the Monarchy in principle, though both realise that at the moment nothing can be done in the matter. On the other hand, in both States, but especially in Prussia, to which most of the industrial districts of Germany belong, there is the solid republican phalanx of the Social Democratic Party. The Republicanism of the Social Democrats is no academic tenet of the party leaders. That it extends to the actual workers was shown by the success of the general strike, which was called at the time of the monarchist *Putsch* in 1920. It is not perhaps that the workers are so much enamoured of republican state forms in themselves, as that they identify Monarchy with the old régime, which they regard as responsible for their misfortunes.

For the moment the prestige of the Social Democrats is very high in Germany. The public feels that on the whole they have risen to the occasion in an hour of national disaster, and made the best of a bad situation. But the Social Democrats are not all-powerful. At the 1920 elections they polled (Majority and Independent Socialists together) 40.4 per cent. of the total votes; and they now govern by a coalition with certain of the bourgeois parties. The bourgeois parties all together, but without the Centre (Clericals) and without one or two Independents, polled 41.2 per cent. Bourgeois and Socialist accordingly are equally balanced; and the Centre holds, as it has always held since the founding of the Empire, the balance. The Centre is itself both bourgeois and Socialist. It represents the whole Catholic population in Germany, from the reactionary peasants of Bavaria to the radical artisans of Westphalia. For the present it is co-operating with the Social Democrats. It has accepted the Republic, and, as a party, does not include monarchical restoration amongst even the academic items of its programme.

It might be expected that the Centre would look with

favourable eyes on the restoration of such a good Catholic dynasty as the Wittelsbachs of Bavaria. A large majority of the Centre voters in Bavaria is undoubtedly in favour of an immediate restoration of the Wittelsbachs; and, though there is a strong minority of Socialists (the two Socialist Parties together hold 45 out of the 156 seats in the Bavarian National Assembly, the Clericals having 77 of the remainder), it is probably not strong enough to give the majority pause, if the leaders of the Centre were inclined for action in the matter. But the Centre leaders feel that the cause of Monarchy in Bavaria cannot be isolated from the same cause elsewhere. To restore the King of Bavaria would raise the question of restoring the King of Prussia; and to raise the question of the King of Prussia would *ipso facto* raise the question of the German Emperor. By which time, it is thought, the Senegalese would be in Berlin.

Meanwhile, for the Monarchists in Prussia, there are other difficulties besides the attitude of the Entente. If the Monarchy were to be restored, who would be the Monarch? The ex-Emperor William is not seriously considered. The Germans, it is true, do not regard him as the English do, or till lately did, as the evil genius of the war. Much sympathy is expressed with him; and there was even some attempt to interpret the striking scenes which occurred at the funeral of the Empress as a manifestation in his favour. But the Germans cannot forget how his dilettantist autocracy broke down under the stress of war. They know that he was the playing of the military chiefs, powerless where he alone was in a position to exercise power. His final exit was of a piece with his attitude throughout the war. Even if the Entente were to allow it, Germany would never take him back. Moreover, he has abdicated. The natural claimant would therefore be the ex-Crown Prince. The Crown Prince has been dragged down by his father's fall. The English picture of the Crown Prince is an absurd caricature. In his day he was not unpopular in Germany. But his political upbringing is suspect; and such indications as he has given of his political attitude have failed to impress the Liberal element in Germany while they have offended the Militarists. If the Empire is to be restored, the Germans

want either a very strong Emperor or a very stupid one, carefully trained on English lines in the duties of Constitutional Monarchy. The Crown Prince would be neither. His eldest son might be a possible candidate. In particular, the public have confidence in the training which he has received from his mother. The Crown Princess is not only a great lady in the best sense of those words, but a very clever and enlightened woman, and is respected and liked by all. But the Crown Prince has never renounced his rights to the crown ; and, until he was known to be prepared to do so, it would obviously be impossible to take any steps with a view to his son's succession. At every point, therefore, the Monarchist in Germany at present encounters obstacles. To say that a dynasty like the Hohenzollerns, to which Prussia owes its very existence and Germany the most prosperous fifty years in all its recorded history, has disappeared for ever from the history of Central Europe would be rash. But for the moment its chances appear exiguous in the extreme. And with its fate appear to be bound up for the present the fates of the other dynasties of the German tribes.

The case of the Hapsburgs is fundamentally different. It is a circumstance of first-rate political importance, which has been the chief factor in inducing three States containing 42 millions of people to enter into an offensive and defensive Alliance, that the Emperor Charles has never abdicated or renounced his rights to the Austrian Imperial Crown. The return of all the twenty-two dethroned German rulers would probably not alter appreciably the position in Germany, and could not in any case affect the settlement of Versailles. The return of a Hapsburg to Budapest or Vienna, on the other hand, would instantly throw into the melting-pot the two settlements of St Germain and Trianon, and its effects would most probably be felt throughout Central Europe. In Germany, as has been explained, whatever the future may have in store, restoration is not at present a question of practical politics. In the lands of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, on the other hand, the question is alive and burning.

One of these lands, Hungary, by an official act of

Government has declared itself to be still a Kingdom, with a Lord Protector* acting as Regent for the absent Monarch; and its Ministries and Legations have re-assumed the prefix of 'Royal' (under a Ministerial Order of March 23, 1920). The ex-King himself, in spite of his abdication of the Hungarian Crown (communicated by letter to Count Michael Karolyi on Nov. 13, 1918), has made one attempt (in March 1921), which in the opinion of some dispassionate observers very nearly succeeded, to reascend the throne. At the moment of writing (September 1921) there are rumours in certain circles in Pest and Vienna of an impending second attempt. Given certain changes in the existing international situation, a second attempt might conceivably be more successful. Louis Napoleon made, not one, but two unsuccessful attempts before he succeeded in restoring the Napoleonic Empire in France. And the return of King Constantine to Greece in the teeth of the ban of the Entente is a precedent not a year old.

To all appearances the old ruling class in Hungary, which the present régime has replaced in the saddle, is more or less uniformly monarchist. The peasants, who represent 65 per cent. of the population, probably agree with the politicians, or at any rate would follow their lead, as they have been accustomed to do for centuries. The industrial workers in the towns, who supported the Bolshevik experiment of Bela Kun, are doubtless republican. But Hungarian industry, in spite of its remarkable achievements during the past fifty years, does not account for a large percentage of the population, and is not well organised for making its voice heard. So far, therefore, as the Hungarian people as a whole are concerned, it is probable that, if the Monarchy were to be re-established, they would welcome it without any considerable dissent.

The position in Austria is very different. Monarchism in Hungary is a positive and active creed. In Austria it is negative and passive. The distinction lies partly in the character of the two peoples. The Austrian is

* This seems to be the best translation of Admiral Horthy's official title (*Kormányzó*). It is not the equivalent of 'Palatine' or 'Viceroy,' and it is a higher title than 'Governor' in the English or American use of that word. In writing he is addressed as 'His High Excellency' (*Fömeltsésgor*).

incapable of Counter-Revolution, as he is incapable of Revolution. The Hungarian does things for himself; the Austrian likes to have things done for him. The Monarchists about the Emperor Charles, who were responsible for the attempt in March last—Prince Windischgrätz, Count Erdödy, Baron Boroviczenyi—are all Hungarians. But there is also a decisive difference in the circumstances of the two peoples. Austria is dependent on outside help for its food-supply, and for nearly all the raw materials of its industry. Either the Big Entente or the Little Entente could starve Austria within a month by drawing a cordon round her frontiers. There can be no relief from this situation unless and until Austria joins Germany, or the Entente provides credits on a very large scale. There appears now to be little or no prospect of such credits being obtained; and many observers are beginning to doubt whether even with their aid Austria would be capable of independent existence. Hungary, on the other hand, is self-supporting in the matter of food-stuffs, and has even an exportable surplus with which she can negotiate the purchase of raw materials for her industry. The complete and unrelieved impotence of Austria makes any public feeling there may be for or against a monarchical restoration purely academic. It is doubtful if there is very much feeling on the subject, outside the ranks of ex-army officers and officials on the one hand and the professional leaders of Social Democracy on the other.

The existing republican régime, it is true, excites enthusiasm in no single quarter. The prestige of the Vienna Government is probably lower than that of any Government in Europe. Every political party (except the Pan-Germans) has had an attempt at wielding power; but the logic of the position is too strong for any ministerial changes to make a difference. On the whole, Ministries in which the Social Democrats have held office have been rather more successful, for the simple reason that, when they are out of power, the Social Democrats have no interest in preventing disorder. The history of 1848 has repeated itself in the three years since 1918, with the Social Democrats in the rôle of the Liberals of 1848. Now, as then, the Clerical provinces have turned their backs on infidel Vienna. This time

they have gone further than in 1848, and obliged the capital to accept a Constitution (in force since Nov. 10, 1920), which makes of Austria a Federal State on the model of Switzerland, with almost complete autonomy for the provincial administrations. The City of Vienna is detached from the province of Lower Austria, of which it previously formed part, and ranks as an independent province. Having thus secured themselves against the contagion of the capital, the provinces have sat down to await happier days. Two of them (Salzburg and Tirol) have held plébiscites, which resulted in overwhelming majorities for union with Germany. One (Vorarlberg) has voted for union with Switzerland. By pressure exerted in Berlin and Bern the Entente prevented any effect being given to these proceedings; and a fourth province (Styria) was induced, not without difficulty, to forgo the holding of yet another plébiscite. This end was attained by threatening not to grant the credits, which at this time the Austrians believed would be forthcoming. Such belief no longer prevails, and the manœuvre could hardly be repeated. Pressure exercised on Vienna is, of course, without effect in Styria. But, though the list of provincial plébiscites is not complete, there have been enough to demonstrate beyond the possibility of doubt that the provinces are overwhelmingly in favour of union with Germany. Any monarchist tendencies which they may have must be reconciled with this desire. The movement for union with Germany is in fact not based on racial or linguistic affinities. It has no kinship with the 'Grossdeutschland' movement of the 19th century. It is supported because it is regarded as an economic necessity; and on this issue at any rate all parties, Pan-Germans, Clericals, and Social Democrats, are agreed.

If union with Germany were to be combined with a restoration of the Hapsburgs, it would clearly involve delicate problems for the dynasty. It is not thinkable that the clock could be set back, and the Hapsburgs succeed the Hohenzollerns in the Imperial dignity. Indeed, if Charles of Hapsburg were to return to Vienna, it could hardly be with the title of 'Emperor of Austria.' In the purely Austrian lands of his house (the two Austrias, Salzburg, Styria, Carinthia, and Tirol) the

highest title he held was 'Archduke.' Possibly a solution would be sought by forming a new 'Kingdom of Austria,' as the 'Empire of Austria' was formed in 1805. The heralds will have a difficult time of it.

That the average Austrian bourgeois both in the provinces and in Vienna would welcome a restoration, if it could be combined with union with Germany, may be taken as fairly certain. All the lighter side of Vienna—and the lighter is the most Viennese side of Vienna—misses the Hapsburgs dreadfully. The attachment of the Viennese to the Imperial House had a personal note, to which there was no parallel in any other European monarchy. Their absence is felt like the absence of a family of cousins, with which one has grown up. They were part of the genial, comfortable atmosphere, in which the Viennese lived and moved and had his being under the old régime. How far he would be prepared to disturb or risk such remains of geniality and comfort as he has been able to snatch from the wreckage, in order to have them back, is another matter.

The attitude of the Austrian working-class is much more difficult to estimate.* It is certainly not that of the German working-class, which thinks and acts in pretty close accord with its party leaders. The rank and file of the Austrian workers have probably no convictions in favour of republican state forms. The truculence of the Republicanism of the Social Democrat Party leaders and of their organ, the interesting and extremely well edited 'Arbeiter-Zeitung,' is merely the measure of their fear of the strength of the Hapsburg tradition, and of the potentialities which a successful restoration in Hungary would open up in Austria. It finds an echo principally in the new army (Reichswehr), which is a jealously guarded Social Democrat preserve, and in certain of the Workers' Councils in Vienna itself and in the Wiener Neustadt district.

In 1919 I had to make investigations into the food

* The Social Democratic Party membership in Vienna alone increased from 49,600 at the outbreak of the war to 188,379 in 1921. The total Trade Union membership at the same date was 459,000. Not much over 25 per cent., therefore, of the organised workers are officially members of the party. On the other hand, at the last elections 435,487 of them voted for it.

conditions in various factories in Vienna and Wiener Neustadt and also in the industrial district of North Styria. In general, Austrian factory organisation is very much more primitive and patriarchal than it is either in Germany or in England; and the attitude of the employees depends very much more on the personality of the managing director. Of the few indications of political feeling among the employees much the most striking was a tendency, which I found widely spread, to associate the Hapsburgs with the mismanagement of the army rationing on the Italian Front, especially in the last year of the war. Again and again in conversation reference was made by men who had served on this front to the starvation they had undergone. Sometimes the officers were blamed. 'The officers,' I would be told, 'had plenty to eat; and so did the men at the base. But we got nothing but a half-loaf of bread and cold water, and *Goulasch* (Maconochie ration) once a week.' One man, after some such remarks, added hesitatingly: 'We have made a clean sweep of all that. We have no more Kaiser now.' I asked if he thought the Kaiser and Vienna were to blame, or the officers of the Train (A.S.C.). He knew nothing about that, but he added: 'Officers and such are there because of the Kaiser. Now there is no more Kaiser, all these miseries are over.' How far the recollection of the privations which the Austrian soldiers suffered in the latter part of war has softened since 1919, I am not in a position to judge. But it must be strong enough to rob the old régime, in the eyes of most of the present generation of workers, of any halo which it might otherwise possess.

The actual chances of a restoration in Hungary depend on the possibility of circumventing, frustrating, or dividing the Little Entente. The three States of which the Little Entente is composed consist either entirely (in the case of Czechoslovakia), mainly (in the case of Jugoslavia), or largely (in the case of Rumania) of territories forming part of the late Hapsburg dominions. None of them can afford to allow a Hapsburg to ascend a neighbouring throne, and become a rallying-point for every discontented element within their borders. The danger is most acute for the Czechoslovak State with its numerous minorities, nearly all of

whom were incorporated in the new State against their will, and of which the richest and most powerful, the German Bohemians, representing 28·5 per cent. of the entire population, is in open revolt against the racial policy of the Prague Government. Jugoslavia and Rumania have less cause for alarm; for both States owe their formation to the free consent of their component elements. But the present parliamentary rift between the Croats and Slovenes on the one hand and the Serbs on the other makes the idea of anything in the nature of political experiment particularly distasteful at the present moment at Belgrade. Bucharest on the whole has pursued a generous and conciliatory policy towards the minorities in Transylvania and the Banat; but the return of a Hapsburg King to Budapest would undoubtedly have an electric effect on the large enclaves of Magyar race in Eastern Transylvania as well as in the largely pro-Magyar atmosphere of the towns in the newly-ceded districts. In these circumstances the military occupation of Hungary by the three Allies, for which the Little Entente is understood to provide, would be an immediate sequel to any restoration in Budapest.

There have been moments during the past two years when it looked as if the Powers of the Big Entente might be played off against the Powers of the Little Entente in the interests of a Hapsburg restoration. France, Italy, and certain British officials at Budapest have all at different times and for different reasons appeared to toy with the idea. That, however, was before the common interests of the Prague, Bucharest, and Belgrade Governments had taken definite shape in the form of an alliance. The Little Entente is now all-powerful in the Danubian lands; and it is not easy to imagine any political conjuncture, in which it would now be possible for the Hungarian monarchists to play off the Allied Missions, or any one of them, against it. Unless, therefore, some internal disruption of the first magnitude, such as a revolution in Czecho-Slovakia or an Italo-Jugoslavian War, occurs to paralyse the striking power of the Little Entente, the cause of the Hapsburgs appears to be held for some time to come ineluctably in check. More than this it would be rash to say.

Since the above lines were written, King Charles has made his second attempt to ascend the Hungarian Throne. In the circumstances outlined above it was doomed to failure. So was Louis Napoleon's second *coup d'état*—*Putsch* is the modern word—at Boulogne. Charles, as was Louis Napoleon, is now held in captivity. But in the world of the aeroplane, Madeira is not so very much further from the palace at Buda than Ham was from the Tuilleries.

The interest of the second *Putsch* lies in the test which it has afforded of the cohesion of the Little Entente. As all the world knows now, Rumania at the critical moment refused to mobilise. The Big Entente was thus enabled to *rentrer en scène*, and (with suitable concessions to save the face of Prague and Belgrade) to dictate the terms to Hungary. The obedient Government of Admiral Horthy hastened to pass a law annulling the Pragmatic Sanction, and excluding the House of Hapsburg for ever from the Hungarian Throne. The enactment in itself of course is not worth the paper on which it is written; for, if ever there was a case of that most ancient (and sound) principle of Hungarian Constitutional Law, 'Vis maior non potest efficere validam legem,' it was this. There are those who believe that the Kossuthist anti-Hapsburg tradition in Hungary, which once again came strongly into the light during the *Putsch*, is strong enough to make a King, and establish a Dynasty, in the person of Admiral Horthy. That depends on the view which is taken of the policy, and still more of the personality, of Admiral Horthy. There is at any rate a precedent in History. 'Had Zimri peace, who slew his master?'

Art. 9.—DAVID HENDERSON.

In the long roll of Scottish arms there may be found most varieties of temper and endowment, and he would be a bold man who would dogmatise on the character of the Scottish soldier. But one figure appears with such regularity as almost to constitute a type—the man who to courage adds a peculiar gentleness, to military attainments a love of the humane arts, to the power of leadership the gift of winning affection. From the great Montrose onwards, conspicuous instances will occur to the student of history, and I have many such in my mind among the soldiers of to-day. It is the Happy Warrior out of whose strength comes forth sweetness—the man who

‘endued as with a sense
And faculty for storm and turbulence,
Is yet a soul whose master-bias leans
To homefelt pleasures and to gentle scenes.’

At first one may wonder at their choice of profession. Andrew Lang once said of David Henderson, after a conversation on some abstruse historical point, that ‘He must be a very lonely man in the army.’ But the judgment is hasty, for it is to the army that one looks especially for that rare union of fortitude and grace, like the quality of a tempered sword.

David Henderson was born in 1862 of a well-known family of Glasgow shipbuilders. On his mother’s side he was of Highland descent; and, indeed, he always seemed to me to be the perfect combination of the two Scottish race-stocks, the lowland and the highland, the covenanting and the cavalier. He had the shrewdness and ‘canniness’ of the Lowlands, their long patience, their dislike of humbug, their sense of irony in life and character. And he had, too, something of the tough knuckle of obstinacy which goes with these endowments. A touch of the ‘Shorter Catechist’ was not wanting, for he had an austere sense of duty and a vigilant conscience. On the other side were imagination and a warm generosity of brain and heart. He was always extraordinarily susceptible to new ideas and quick to kindle. He had his countrymen’s capacity for honest sentiment; tradition and romance played on his

mind like music ; and behind his reserve lay something gay and adventurous and debonair. All this might be read in his face, one of the handsomest I have ever seen. In repose it was apt to be grave, wise, a little stern ; but the deep eyes had always a boyish ardour and commonly some hint of whimsical humour. One could equally well picture him with the steel headpiece of an Ironside, singing Psalms by Oliver's elbow, or in a plumed hat riding with Montrose through the storms to Inverlochy.

He began life with an engineer's training, but his heart was in soldiering, and in 1883 he joined the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders through Sandhurst. In 1890 he became a captain, and seven years later joined the staff of the Intelligence Department. The following year he was in the Sudan Campaign, where he was mentioned in despatches and received a brevet majority. In 1899 he was in South Africa—before the outbreak of war, when he did valuable Intelligence work, often at great personal risk. He was shut up in Ladysmith and wounded during the siege, and afterwards was appointed by Lord Kitchener his Director of Intelligence, finishing the war with a D.S.O. and a lieutenant-colonelcy. The post was scarcely a bed of roses ; and his particular duties called for the exertion of all his great qualities of tact, patience, and good humour. It was in South Africa that I first came to know him well ; and I used to feel that his quiet evenness of temper was no easy achievement, but the consequence of a strong will dominating high-strung nerves and a most sensitive spirit.

On his return he became D.A.Q.M.G. at Aldershot, and rose steadily in his profession till, in 1912, he was Director of Military Training at the War Office. To this period belongs the only literary work of his which I can trace. Between 1905 and 1909 he contributed several articles to the 'Quarterly Review.' One of these,* a paper on the Territorial Force, in the number for January 1909, created something of a sensation in the Army, and earned the warm admiration of Lord Roberts. David Henderson was a master of clean unrhetorical

* The others were : 'The Price of Peace' (October 1905); 'The First Year of the Boer War' (July 1906); and 'Mr Haldane and the Army' (April 1907).

prose; and the curious prescience and detachment of this paper make one regret that he found so little leisure to write on matters connected with his profession. In it he notes unerringly the merits of the Haldane reconstruction and its defects. He concludes thus:

'Hampered by limited funds, obstructed by prejudice, responsible to a people which refuses to recognise its natural obligations, Mr Haldane has created order out of chaos. The thanks of the Volunteers are due to him for having granted them their chief desire—the power of being of use to their country. Still more does he deserve gratitude from those shameless ones who tremble at the thought of taking an active part in the defence of their homes. For a few years they are safe. While peace lasts, they may employ their leisure by crowding to see men play cricket or football; if war comes, they will be able to huddle under a white flag to see men die.'

Meantime he had found a new interest in life. As an old Intelligence officer, the possibilities of aircraft in war were obvious to him from the start; and, in face of the scepticism of the more conservative, he showed his belief in the new arm by qualifying as a pilot. In 1911, when he was Chief Staff Officer to Sir John French at the Horse Guards, he took his certificate at Brooklands, being then in his fiftieth year; and so created a double record, as the man who had 'taken his ticket' in the shortest time, and as the oldest man in the world who could fly. That so distinguished a senior officer should take an interest in flying was a fortunate thing for the new service; and it was natural that the new Air Battalion at Farnborough should be placed under the department of the Director of Military Training. David Henderson was the moving spirit in the group of men, appointed by the Imperial Defence Committee, who organised the Royal Flying Corps. In 1913 he became Director-General of Military Aeronautics, a post which he held till 1917. In this early organisation he steadfastly maintained one principle—that the Royal Flying Corps must be a single service with naval and military wings, and not two divergent and competing activities. Much waste and delay would have been saved if this system had been perpetuated; but within six months,

in spite of all his efforts, the Navy and Army had begun to draw apart, and it was not till 1918 that the idea of a single service was realised.

When war broke out, David Henderson—for some years now a General and a K.C.B.—went to France in command of the Royal Flying Corps, the three squadrons, containing practically every available machine, which had flown across the Channel in the first days of August. To the doings of that little band Lord French has borne witness.

‘Their skill,’ he said, ‘energy and perseverance have been beyond all praise. They have furnished me with the most complete and accurate information, which has been of incalculable value in the conduct of the operations. Fired at constantly both by friend and foe, and not hesitating to fly in every kind of weather, they have remained undaunted throughout.’

Like every regimental officer, David Henderson’s deepest ambition was to lead troops in the field, and he always hankered after the command of a division, which for a short time at the end of 1914 he obtained. But he acquiesced cheerfully when it was impressed upon him that his true work lay in the new service which he had created. In the late summer of 1915 the Royal Flying Corps was expanding with such amazing rapidity that his presence was required in London; and he resumed his old post of Director-General of Military Aeronautics and Air Member of the Army Council. For the next two years he led a crowded and anxious life. Here was a brand-new weapon, devised just before the opening of war, and developing feverishly under the impulse of daily necessities. To use it a brand-new service had been created, which had to find organisation, tone, tradition, and everything at the shortest notice. Moreover, supply had to be arranged for by means of brand-new factories; and there was bound to be trouble between the Royal Aircraft Factory and the private maker, who could only look to the Government for his market. Finally, the head-quarter organisation and its place in the hierarchy of Government were unsettled; and the Navy and the Army were in furious competition.

In any controversy as to the merits of the British

air-service the critic was at an advantage, for the ordinary man had no expert knowledge to test his criticism; and it was frequently impossible for the authorities to reply, since that would have involved the publication of details valuable to the enemy. Any considerable increase in flying casualties brought the question to the fore; and there was always to be encountered the natural anxiety of the British citizen to make certain of the efficiency of a service on which his safety depended. In the summer of 1916, a committee, under the chairmanship of Mr Justice Bailhache, sat to investigate various charges brought by Press and Parliamentary critics against the administration of the Royal Flying Corps. The result was a conspicuous personal triumph for David Henderson. Quietly, gently, cunningly, with the subtlety of a great Chancery leader, he disposed of the accusations based on hearsay evidence or on no evidence at all, which had been showered on his department by advertising nonentities. Probably no living soldier could have handled the matter with such perfect judgment and consummate artistry.

The confusion at the top was a graver matter. The Air Board, under Lord Curzon in 1916, and Lord Cowdray in 1917, had not sufficient authority to harmonise the competitive demands of Army and Navy. In the autumn of 1917 General Smuts and David Henderson devised a scheme for an Air Ministry; and in January 1918 the new organisation came into being. Lord Rothermere was Minister; General Trenchard returned from France to be Chief of the Air Staff; and David Henderson became a member and Vice-President of the Air Council. This is not the place to recount the misfortunes of the first Air Minister, who contrived in a few weeks so to outrage the professional standards of his chief officers that he brought about the resignation of both General Trenchard and David Henderson before resigning himself. In that bad time there was much wild talk by this and that high official of resignation in sympathy with the Chief of the Air Staff. David Henderson did not talk, but he did not hesitate to retire from a service which was the apple of his eye and his own creation. Many things became him well in that service, but none better than his manner of leaving it.

In a few years the Royal Air Force has become a vital part of the armed strength of Britain and has already compiled a proud history. To David Henderson this service owes more than to any single man, and his name must for ever be linked with it. For one thing, he was the pioneer, the man with insight and vision; for another, he was a most competent administrator, as his record bears witness—75 machines in 1914, 25,000 in 1917. In the noisy business of war a man so utterly unselfish as he might well have been crowded out, and in popular esteem he was surpassed by many more showy figures. Advertisement and intrigue of any kind were so repulsive to him that he scorned even the more innocent devices which assist success. In 1915 there were some who decried his value, in 1917 there were many; now I do not think there are any who dare adopt that attitude—any, that is, with pretensions to sanity. He was the last man to make high claims for himself, and he was quick to admit the superiority of others in certain branches, for it takes every kind of talent to make a Service. But it was those very colleagues, who might excel him in this or that specialty, that testified most eagerly to the endowment which was his unique distinction. That endowment was a moral quality, a kind of spiritual and intellectual good-breeding, a high seriousness relieved by humour and a curious tenderness—σπουδαῖον καὶ ἐπιεικές. It is not enough to call him a great gentleman. Happily the Army has no lack of gentlemen, even of great gentlemen. What he achieved without effort or ostentation was to make his quality felt throughout a mass of men, and insensibly and profoundly to influence many thousands. Hence he gave a tone—the most precious of gifts—to the new Service. At the start the Air Force was something of a *corps d'élite*; as it grew, it naturally absorbed some odd material, and on its home and non-combatant side showed an unfortunate gift of attracting the dregs of conscripted manhood and becoming the refuge of the *arriviste* and the *embusqué*. That it survived this ordeal and remained a great Service was due in no small part to the personality of its first chief.

When David Henderson left the Royal Air Force, he acted for some time as area commandant of British troops in Paris. He had to face now the greatest sorrow

of his life. His only son Ian had, like him, begun in the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, and then transferred to the Air Force; and during the Somme battles he had been one of the most daring pioneers in the work of contact patrols. He died in the summer of 1918 as the result of an aeroplane accident in South Ayrshire. After then David Henderson was never quite the man he had been. He had lost all personal ambition; his reserve was now tinged with a permanent sadness; and his old flashes of gaiety were harder to elicit. Happily he found a new and enthralling profession.

About the time of the Armistice he met Mr H. P. Davison, of the American Red Cross, who had the idea of grouping in an international federation the various Red Cross Societies, and placing all their assets of knowledge and experience at the service of a great campaign of public health. It was to be the continuation in peace of the constructive and curative work which the Red Cross had done in war, and was intended to help to carry out Article XXV of the Covenant of the League of Nations: 'The members of the League agree to encourage and promote the establishment and co-operation of duly authorised voluntary national Red Cross organisations having as purposes the improvement of health, the prevention of disease, and the mitigation of suffering throughout the world.' The League of Red Cross Societies was accordingly founded in May 1919, on the initiative of the Red Cross Societies of Great Britain, France, Italy, the United States, and Japan, with Mr Davison as Chairman. Its head-quarters were fixed at Geneva, and David Henderson was appointed Vice-Chairman and Director-General.

It was work for which he was peculiarly well fitted. His tact and charm of manner were invaluable in smoothing difficulties from the path of the young organisation; his sagacity kept its policy sane and central. He brought to his duties an almost missionary zeal. He was still the soldier, but his campaign was now against folly and avoidable pain; and he who had given his best years to the task of war now brought the same ardour to the healing of the world's wounds. How successful his work was all his colleagues have borne witness. Before his gracious kindliness national prejudices and the prickliness

to which philanthropists are prone vanished like snow in thaw; and criticism and enthusiasm became amicable yoke-fellows. He was happy in his new life, and seemed destined to make a second career as brilliant as the first. But the shock of his boy's death and years of over-work and anxiety had weakened a body never too strong. In the spring of 1921 he fell ill, and he died on Aug. 17, after a long illness borne with the fortitude that never failed him.

This short sketch gives but a dim idea of a brilliant and varied career, and to those who did not know him can present but a feeble picture of the man. Ordinary eulogy is out of place, for David Henderson's were not the kind of gifts to which justice can be done by an eloquent *éloge*. I can see yet the quizzical look that used to creep into his face when one tried to congratulate him on something or other; he loved good-will but not compliments, for he himself was the sternest and far the most competent judge of his own performances. What his friends felt chiefly about him was his rareness—the edge and fineness of both mind and character. He had the distinction which makes certain of the dead stand out with complete clearness from the background of memory, and the endearing charm that warms every remembrance. These are characteristics which one chiefly associates with the young men who fell in the war, for fifty odd years of life and a measure of success blur the lines of most figures and brush a little of the bloom off them; they have proved themselves, and we know pretty well what they can do, and what they cannot do. But the memory of David Henderson is chiefly of a certain youthfulness, of immense promise, of a personality greater than any possible achievements. At whatever age he died he would have died young. Whenever he died his death would have been untimely. That is what we feel about those who leave behind, not only a tale of things done, but a tradition of a spirit which defies positive record because it was an inspiration to a thousand records. Such a tradition David Henderson has bequeathed to his own special service and to the British Army.

JOHN BUCHAN.

Art. 10.—FASCISM AND ITS POLITICAL INFLUENCES
IN ITALY.

THE logical connexion of recent happenings in Italy only begins to appear when they are presented in the context of the political evolution of the country since the general elections of Nov. 16, 1919. As, moreover, the development of the internal situation in the immediate future will to a large extent be determined by the events of the last two years, a brief review of this period is necessary in order to discover the goal, if any, towards which Italy is moving.

In 1919 the morale of Italy was shaken to its foundations. To the economic prostration consequent on a war that had drained the meagre resources of the State, there was added the bitter disappointment that, though the war had been won, the nation had reaped little of the fruits of victory. Italians watched with a sense of envy and disillusionment the assignment of mandates and the extension of zones of influence by the other victorious Allies, while they themselves had still to settle as best they could the fate of the Adriatic, for which they had principally entered the war. The masses were deeply discontented. The cost of living had gone up by 300-400 per cent., while wages had not risen in proportion. Every day brought fresh proofs of callous profiteering and of gross scandals by contractors in high places. Lodgings were unobtainable in the town districts, or could only be had at fancy rents. Bread was of the poorest possible quality, while many articles of ordinary consumption, such as butter and sugar, had all but disappeared from the retail market. Embitterment was intensified by the lavish display of wealth by the new rich and by the growing output of articles of luxury, while the barest necessities of life were lacking. In these abnormal conditions Bolshevik propaganda found a ready response. Russia became the hallowed symbol of the social millennium in the popular imagination. The Red flag took the place of the national colours; and the Soviet emblem of the hammer and the sickle gained an almost fanatical significance. A little over two years ago contempt for the Army and all national institutions was frequently displayed in public

in the industrial centres of Italy. The Army itself was rapidly being won over to the Revolution; and the Nitti Government was obliged to hasten demobilisation in order to avoid a catastrophe like the Russian.

It was in these circumstances that the elections of Nov. 16, 1919, were held. The Nitti Administration had alienated a large part of the old Liberal elements and the whole of the Nationalists from its support. The prestige of the Government was at stake; and its efficiency in representing the interests of Italy at foreign conference tables was seriously doubted. The consequence was that a considerable portion of the supporters of constitutional government abstained from the polls. The Socialists on the other hand were compact. The different shades of Socialist opinion—Reformist, Official, and Extremist—made common cause, and launched a political campaign which bore quick fruit on ground well watered by widespread discontent. Socialist propaganda in the North and the Centre and in some of the agricultural districts in the south-eastern provinces was so intense that a fatalistic belief in the ultimate victory of the Revolutionaries took deep root in the minds of Italians of all classes. It was felt that, even if a strong constitutional parliament were returned, the struggle would not cease, and that a protracted period of violence would follow. On those grounds many voters were found who, while rejecting revolutionary tenets, voted for the Socialists in the hope of seeing social peace re-established and the work of reconstruction begun. The discouragement and apathy of the voters who stood for order on the one hand, and the rapid progress of revolutionary ideas on the other, were the principal causes of the signal Labour victory at the general elections of November 1919. The Socialist seats in Parliament were more than doubled—the total number of Socialist deputies elected was 156—while the newly formed Popular or Catholic Party, which stood for radical and Christian, as opposed to revolutionary, social reform, secured a firm footing in the Chamber at its very first appearance on the electoral lists.

It was evident, as soon as the results of the elections were known, that traditional party government by a Liberal majority with a Democratic Opposition, or the

reverse, was impossible; the support of either the Socialist or the Popular Party was indispensable. The Socialists resolutely refused to participate in the government of the country, the Official wing, with Bolshevik tendencies, far outnumbering the Reformists who advocated Socialism by constitutional means. After protracted negotiations Nitti formed a Cabinet including members of the new Catholic Party; but the social exigencies of the latter, strongly tainted with clericalism, were not of a kind to please the Liberals. Parliament was given a short lease of life, instability having made its appearance at the very start both in the Government and among its supporters. The Socialists were eager to take advantage of the strength of their position in Parliament; but the feeling of approaching victory carried them to an exuberance which was premature. Nationalism was still a predominant sentiment in the country in spite of its temporary eclipse. Revolutionaries as a rule are poor group-psychologists; and certainly the Italian Socialist Party grossly miscalculated the temperament of the mass of their countrymen when its members in Parliament withdrew in a body from the Chamber as the King entered to read his speech, to come back again when the ceremony was over amid the singing of the 'Internationale' and the 'Red Flag.'

The first Nitti Cabinet in the 25th Legislature lived an uncertain life until March 1920. During most of this period Signor Nitti was in London and Paris, trying to settle the Adriatic question. The halting solutions he obtained contrasted so unfavourably with the determination of D'Annunzio that he made enemies of the Nationalists and gradually lost the support of the very Liberals who stood behind him in Parliament. In the mean time the Popular Party, benefiting by its preponderant rôle in the Chamber, began to agitate for a larger share in the Government. The pressure brought to bear by it was so great that eight Ministers resigned on March 14, and a modified Ministry was patched up, only to fall two months later. Between May 12 and June 9 negotiations were in progress for a new Cabinet including the Catholics. All efforts, however, were doomed to failure, owing to the intransigent conditions laid down by the Popular Party before participating in

the Government. The second Nitti Cabinet tendered its resignation on June 9; and on June 24 Signor Giolitti appeared with what seemed a workable Ministry including a strong Catholic element.

Signor Giolitti, who is above all a politician, presented a programme calculated to satisfy all the parties that had been working for the downfall of his predecessor. The Nationalists were promised that in future Parliament would be fully consulted on matters of foreign policy, and that a permanent parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee would be appointed for that purpose. The Socialists were assured that the Government would be strictly neutral in the class-war; that an inquiry would be held on war expenditure; and that retroactive taxation would be imposed on excess profits made during the war. Finally, satisfaction was given to the Popular Party in respect of their fundamental demand that uncultivated land should be expropriated and distributed among the peasantry.

All promised well within Montecitorio, but fresh troubles of a particularly grave character soon broke the social peace necessary for economic reconstruction, which the Giolitti Government held out as being near at hand. Labour, though less organised and less united than it had been at certain periods before the war, had recruited to its ranks large masses of turbulent characters, more inspired by vague anarchical sentiments than by any ideas of a disciplined revolution. The cry for immediate direct action against the established order came from every part of Italy—from the industrial North and Centre as well as from the agricultural South. Socialist agitators and extremists from the left wing of the Popular Party fanned the flame of revolution throughout the land. The Parliamentary Socialist Party, with the exception of the more balanced leaders like Filippo Turati, really thought that the moment had come for the downfall of the capitalist regime, and encouraged the rising spirit of revolt by all the means in its power. The industrial workers and the agricultural labourers were in a dangerous mood; and the managers of industry as well as the landowners felt powerless before the rising tide of insubordination.

The inevitable followed. Towards the end of August

1920 there began that process of occupation of factories by the workers and the seizure of land by the peasants which astonished the whole world by the suddenness and ease with which it was carried out, but which the Italians, who took in the situation from close quarters, accepted with a kind of fatalistic resignation. In the eyes of unthinking partisans of Labour, the millennium had come. Land and industry were henceforth to be the property of their own workers; and the fall of the bourgeoisie as a ruling and economic power was only a matter of time. To this end Red Guards were organised as a counter-weapon against the Royal Guards, which had been founded under Nitti's administration to save the country from proletarian disorder. The most disquieting feature of the situation, while the factories were in the hands of the workers, was the clandestine stocking of arms and munitions in the workshops and in Labour Clubs. The internal situation of Italy in the first half of September 1920 was critical; and the country was at one moment on the eve of a catastrophic revolution which might have plunged it into the horrors that followed the Communistic experiment in Russia. On the one hand there was the firm stand taken by the factory-owners, which was proclaimed at the close of every one of their meetings, not to make any concessions until the workers had evacuated the factories seized; and on the other hand there was the daily extension of the seizure movement, which was being fanned into a revolutionary manœuvre by the Parliamentary Socialist Party and by the Socialist organ 'Avanti!'

A clever move made by Signor Giolitti saved Italian industry and the country itself from anarchy and disorder. He boldly espoused the moderate attitude displayed by the Labour Confederation majority, which was for conciliation, against the Socialist political party, which wanted to give the movement a revolutionary character. The bourgeois Press in general sided with the Premier, who, in conformity with his programme of neutrality in the class-struggle, was steering a middle course between the extremist attitudes of the Communists and the Federation of Industrial Owners. Meanwhile the leaders of the Confederation won the support of the Popular Party, which, in a manifesto to the

Catholic workers, warned them against Communism and dangerous social experiments, but recognised the principle of the democratic control of industry and profit-sharing.

Industrial peace was temporarily restored by the meeting in Rome between the delegates of masters and men on Sept. 20, 1920. Signor Giolitti was present as the guiding spirit of the negotiations, while the Prefects of Milan and Turin, the principal centres of disturbance, also attended. The agreement concluded was a virtual victory for the workers. Not only did they obtain the increase of 4 lire a day in wages, but the masters were obliged to waive their insistence on the dismissal of the leading agitators. On his own responsibility Signor Giolitti imposed a conciliatory formula, by which the workers should immediately evacuate occupied factories, and no workman should be dismissed without the previous consent of a Commission appointed by the Government. After long discussions the masters declared that, while they could not accept the Premier's proposition, they would abide by it in the interests of peace. The Government Commission was formally constituted by a decree published on the morrow of the sitting. It was to consist of twelve members, six appointed by the Owners' Federation and six by the Labour Confederation. Its main object was to make suggestions for the Bill promised by the Government to 'organise industry on the basis of active intervention by the workers in the technical and financial control and in the administration of industry.' The Commission was also charged with settling difficult questions regarding wages, discipline, and dismissal.

Workers all over the country received the solution reached through the mediation of Signor Giolitti with great satisfaction. Signor D'Aragona, the secretary of the Labour Confederation, said that, if the principle of control were put into practice with sincerity, production would be intensified; while the Socialist organ 'Avanti!' commenting on the agreement in its issue of Sept. 21, wrote: 'It is a victory not only for the metal-workers, but also for Signor Giolitti. Control means collaboration; and, if it is seriously carried out, it will inevitably lead to the workers becoming interested co-operators with capitalist directors.'

But the optimistic view that the agreement had put an end to the crisis was not borne out by subsequent fact. While the Labour Confederation and the Federation of Metal Workers stood loyally by their engagements, the Syndicalist Union, which had always shown independence, began to urge the workers to keep their hold on the occupied factories. It soon became apparent that the Union was making efforts to capture the position hitherto held by the Labour Confederation in the economic sphere, and to use its new powers for the political purpose of plunging the industrial regions of Italy into a revolution. On their side the industrial owners and manufacturers proclaimed that with the adoption of the principle of control it would be impossible to run industry on business lines. Some, notably four large companies in Milan, preferred to close down their workshops and to dismiss the workers rather than to continue to work what they termed a losing concern. A similar step was taken by the large metal and ship-building works of Ansaldo-San Giorgio at Spezia, which declared a lock-out. Meanwhile Labour leaders were not so sure that the workers were in a position to take a responsible part in the management of industry. What was more serious, the workers lacked the sympathy and support of technicians and salaried managers and employees, who sided with the owners practically everywhere throughout the Peninsula. Even extremist leaders began to ask themselves what would be the consequences of a revolution in a country essentially dependent on others for its wheat and its coal.

These and other wise counsels prevailed at the meeting of the 'Centrist' Socialists at Reggio-Emilia in the middle of October 1920. Russian revolutionary methods were repudiated; and the foundations were laid for the secession of the Communists from the Socialist Party which was to follow later. These decisions were also not a little inspired by the reaction in public opinion which now began to manifest itself. Already, on the occasion of the celebrations of the 'Venti Settembre,' imposing manifestations of national sentiment were held, in which 100,000 people participated and cheers were given for the King, the Army, and the representatives of the redeemed territories. These symptoms of a

change in public feeling encouraged the Government to adopt a new front towards extremist agitation. Hitherto it had pursued a policy of *laissez-faire*, and had only intervened when Socialist agitators were guilty of obvious infractions of the criminal code. Now, however, measures were passed for a temporary suppression of all open-air meetings; and orders were given for the arrest of Malatesta, editor of the Anarchist organ 'Umanità Nuova,' and of his collaborators.

Demonstrations on a grand scale being the usual means of rousing popular feeling in Italy, two opportunities presented themselves about this time, which greatly aided the Nationalists in their propaganda. The first was in connexion with the celebration of the second anniversary of the Italian victory over the Austro-Hungarian Empire on Nov. 4. The day was dedicated to an expression of the nation's gratitude to the Army—an expression which took the form of a collective decoration by the King of the colours of all the regiments which took part in the war. The idea of sacrifice was conveyed by the massing of the colours around the 'Altare della Patria,' set up at the base of the National Monument in Piazza Venezia. The triumph that followed on the sacrifice found adequate expression in the frenzied enthusiasm which rose spontaneously from the surging masses witnessing the ceremony.

A similar demonstration was held in Rome on the eve of the municipal elections, which took place throughout Italy on Nov. 7. The elections were regarded as a referendum among the Italian people on the question of Revolutionary Socialism against Constitutionalism. Every one was now aware that the time was ripe for a decisive pronouncement one way or the other. An attempt was made to patch up an anti-Socialist coalition, which, however, met with a very partial success in the North and the Centre. In Rome a record vote of 55 per cent. was registered; and 39,000 votes were cast for the Constitutional *Bloc* against 21,000 for the Socialists. The Roman bourgeoisie, proverbially apathetic regarding participation in polities, was roused from its lethargy by an imposing procession in the streets on the day preceding the election. A crowd of several thousands marched from Piazza del Popolo down the Corso to the

National Monument. Next morning the streets were full of people bound for the booths, all grimly intent on defeating the Socialists. All wished to vote, though many had never handled a voting card in their lives. Still, goodwill had its reward; and towards evening it was known that the Socialists had suffered a crushing defeat.

These demonstrations in the capital were the signal and the prelude of a great Nationalist revival. An energetic response came from the provinces, where the arrogance of the Socialists became henceforth the object of special hatred and attack. The first serious encounter between Nationalists and Socialists occurred at Bologna on Nov. 21, when the Municipal Council of that city held its opening sitting. The Socialist councillors were in the majority; and the hoisting of a red flag on the Town Hall caused the Nationalist mob to rush the building. The total toll of the affray was eight persons killed, including two municipal councillors, and about sixty wounded. The Government could no longer remain neutral. Widespread sympathy with D'Annunzio and the growing dissatisfaction of the Nationalists with the Treaty of Rapallo were echoed in the conversations and intrigues in the lobbies of Montecitorio. A split began to manifest itself within the Government Coalition; and rumours were heard of an imminent dissolution of the Chamber and the resignation of the Ministry. The eyes of Signor Giolitti were opened to the necessity of appeasing the national sentiment by showing less partiality towards the Socialists.

Besides the weakening influences exercised on Italian Socialism from without, the split in the Party which followed the Congress opened at Leghorn on Jan. 15, 1921, gave a fresh impetus to the reaction. Henceforth, it was thought, Socialism would be torn by internal divisions, and would be rent by the great struggle for mastery between the two radically opposed groups, the partisans of progressive evolution and of violent revolution respectively. The history of the Italian Socialist Party has been one of divisions and regroupings. In 1892, at the Congress of Genoa, Socialism triumphed over Anarchism; while in 1907, in Florence, the majority broke up into Marxists and Syndicalists, with a victory for the former. Six years later, at the

Congress of Reggio-Emilia, the international character of Marxian Socialism was saved by the formation of the 'Official' Socialist Party and the secession of the Reformist Socialists. The split which occurred at Leghorn was not, therefore, an unusual event in the history of Italian Socialism. The peculiar feature was the fact that the group which came out with a majority could not be stable, but, as is already apparent, would eventually be absorbed in the ranks of either the Marxists or the Communists. The group which secured this ephemeral victory at Leghorn was that which had clustered round Menotti Serrati, editor of the 'Avanti!'

Three causes militate against the Russian method of establishing a proletarian dictatorship in Italy. First and foremost, the proletariat itself is not sufficiently educated to assume power and to maintain it with any hope of success. Secondly, a deep cleavage separates the brain-workers from the manual workers, rendering any kind of collaboration between the two altogether out of the question. Lastly, even if the dictatorship be firmly established, the geographical and economic position of Italy is such that the ostracism of capitalistic States would stifle it in a few months. These reasons against the adoption in Italy of the methods of the Moscow International have been strengthened by contact with their results as exemplified in Russia. On his return from that country, Serrati frankly confessed on every public occasion that he was not ready to sacrifice Italy's cultural and economic development on the altar of Moscow. A large number of the more intellectual leaders saw things in the same light; and, as Lenin and Zinovieff became more aggressive in their despotic demands, the Serrati group drew into its fold many eminent men from the left Socialist wing.

Serrati's group calls itself 'Unitarian Communism.' It stands for Communism against the State Socialism of the Marxists, as the only means of effecting a just distribution of wealth; but it seeks to preserve unity by disavowing the violent methods of the Moscow Internationalists and by respecting the methods that have been employed with success by organised Italian Labour for improving general economic welfare. It is a brilliant, if temporary, synthesis of the various tendencies which,

until quite recently, existed among the Italian wage-earning classes. Nevertheless, despite its prestige and its triumph at Leghorn, Unitarian Communism cannot be more than a temporary phase. Even in the mind of its founder it was nothing but an endeavour to preserve unity among the leaders. The ultimate decisive influence rests with the masses, especially as they are represented by the *Confederazione Generale del Lavoro*. The Confederation has been rent by two opposing tendencies. The more thoughtful leaders incline towards Turati, and are not averse from the progressive capture of power by democratic means. On the other hand, a considerable number of labour unions, which are notorious for their hot-headedness, are also represented by able men. Consequently Serrati's victory at Leghorn was only nominal.

Another factor that has largely influenced the shifting composition of the various Socialist groups within the last twelve months has been the growth of the anti-Socialist reaction known by the name of 'Fascismo.' This movement has developed from the patriotic and nationalistic programme of the 'Fasci dei Combattenti,' or clubs of ex-service men, and more particularly of officers, which were formed after the war. At first valuable organisations for the defence of the interests of former soldiers, the Fasci gradually admitted as members large numbers of young men whom the war had left without any certain means of livelihood, and who were too proud or too lazy to work with their hands. The element thus introduced into the Fasci was a turbulent one; and the Fascisti formed excellent material for such military adventures as that of Gabriele D'Annunzio. A considerable proportion of the poet's legionaries in Fiume was drawn from the Fasci in different Italian towns; and, so long as the more bellicose found vent for their feelings in bolstering up a hopeless imperialist dream, the country itself was left in comparative quiet. When, however, the legionaries returned to their homes, without employment and with more leisure on their hands, they became more discontented than ever. The object of their hatred and envy became the *operaio*, or worker, who not only was relatively well off but was beginning to be felt as a power in shaping the political destiny of his country. Propaganda based on vague national sentiment and

economic jealousy was worked up among students and *impiegati*, with the result that the Fasci soon became regular breeding-grounds of youthful turbulence.

The industrial and commercial classes and the landed proprietors would have been more than human had they refused to make use of the ready-found organisation of the Fasci in order to defend themselves against the assaults of Labour. Money was all that was wanting to the Fascisti; and financial assistance was not grudged them by the classes opposed to Labour. The methods employed by the Fascisti are those of violence; and their growing numbers are rendering them less hesitating in the exercise of force. Their efforts are mainly directed against Labour organisation and Socialist propaganda in any form. Labour newspaper offices and *Camere del Lavoro* have been destroyed by them; Socialist literature has been burnt; workmen's meetings have been broken up; and Socialist leaders present in cities other than their own have been forcibly marched to the railway stations and compelled to return to the places whence they came.

During the first three months of 1921 the Fascisti let loose a veritable Terror throughout the length and breadth of Italy. Accustomed as the Italians are to violent manifestations of party passion, they were shocked by the daily reports, in a crescendo of revolting details, from towns so far apart as Bari and Trieste, of fatal encounters, murders, and the destruction of property. The accounts of vendettas by the peasants of the south-eastern provinces against the landowners were followed by the story of three bloody days in Florence, then by the news of the burning of the great shipbuilding yard of San Marco di Trieste, and by the report of the bomb outrage at the Diana Kursaal in Milan, and the damage done to the railways in the North. In the Central Provinces there was scarcely a town which did not witness fatal conflicts between the opposing factions of Fascisti and Socialists. The total toll of human life ran into hundreds; the wounded were counted in thousands; and the destruction of property at the San Marco yard alone was estimated at more than 30,000,000 lire.

Amid the frequency and fierceness of these class-battles, which seemed to threaten the country with civil

war, the Government affected an attitude of neutrality, in which, however, a certain leaning towards the Fascisti could be detected. It is true that Carabinieri, Royal Guards, and troops were called out to restore order wherever trouble occurred; but their intervention was lukewarm except when the Fascisti were getting the worst of it. The Government Press, too, was full of accounts of the prowess of the Fascisti, while the Socialists were invariably qualified as *sovversivi*, as against the phrase *partito dell' ordine* applied to their adversaries. The fact is, the Government was looking ahead; and, seeing that a dissolution of Parliament in the near future was inevitable, it began to count on a revival of the national idea as a means of ridding itself through a general election of the preponderance in Parliament of the Socialist and Popular parties, making government impossible without the support of one or other. The nearness of a parliamentary crisis made itself felt first of all through the obstructionist tactics of the Socialists, which delayed the passing of the Bread Bill by more than three months, the delay having disastrous effects on the economic situation of the country all the while. The State bread subsidy, which the Socialists appeared to wish to maintain, was rapidly increasing the Treasury deficit, which was close on the amazing amount of twelve billion lire under this head alone. The situation was reflected in the depreciation of the lira, which was at its lowest in February 1921.

The other trouble hastening the political crisis was the constant threat of a split in the Government Coalition. The discord reached a climax in February, when Signor Benedetto Croce, the Minister of Public Instruction, brought forward his scheme of a far-reaching educational reform embodying the principles of Signor Giolitti's programme, which had rallied both Liberals and Catholics to his standard. The scheme was approved in its entirety by the Cabinet; but, when it came before the Parliamentary Commission of Fine Arts and Public Instruction, two of its principal provisions, one of which was that relative to the holding of State examinations, were rejected by a large majority. The Liberals, who had been unanimous in supporting the Government's concessions to the Catholics six months before, now

recanted, and thus paved the way for a split in the parliamentary majority.

No doubt an element of genuine alarm, and, in some degree, traditional spite, may have accounted for the opposition of the Liberals to Signor Croce's scheme, but a deeper and truer explanation lay outside the range of education altogether. The discussion of Signor Giolitti's Bill for the democratic control of industry was now drawing near; and it was no secret that a large number of the Premier's Liberal followers were strongly opposed to the principles on which it was based. On the other hand, there would be no political grounds on which a Ministerialist deputy could maintain his opposition once the Bill was read in the Chamber. Rather, therefore, than face the possibility of a conflicting attitude when the Labour Control Bill came up for discussion, the Liberals seized on the educational reforms as a pretext for precipitating the crisis.

Discord and divisions in the very heart of the Constitutional majority continued to grow; and, though the manœuvre to defeat the Government on educational questions failed, influential Liberals now championed the cause of the inclusion of Port Baros within the territory of Fiume and challenged the policy of Count Sforza in London. It was clear that the transaction of any serious parliamentary business was becoming impossible, especially as the abstention of Ministerialist deputies from the Chamber was a frequent cause of the sittings being suspended, owing to the absence of the legal quorum. Moreover, the country, or rather the bourgeois Press, was loudly clamouring for the dissolution of Parliament, on the ground that the Chamber, elected sixteen months before in abnormal circumstances, no longer represented the nation in the present stage of its evolution.

The fatal encounters between Fascisti and Socialists, which had become a regular feature of Italian life in every part of the country, were but the reflexion of the great struggle that was now being fought in Parliament. Both forces were strong, and both were growing in power and organisation. Although Socialism had had the lead, Nationalism, under the impulse of the Facci, had rallied to its standard in a short time the most powerful

means of propaganda and effective action. A section of the Press, both in the capital and in the provinces, which six months before had showed itself sympathetic to the demands of Labour, now veered completely round to the cause of Fascism. The Fascist terror increased in intensity; and Socialist propaganda was everywhere baulked by the Fascisti.

In these circumstances it was not surprising that the Socialists were ready to go to any lengths in order to postpone the dreaded dissolution of Parliament. A general election at a time when Socialism had lost much of its prestige, and when it had been overshadowed by the nationalistic force of Fascism, appeared as if it would reduce the Socialist seats by at least one-half. The Catholics, on their part, also feared a general election because they believed that it would result in a new national coalition, of such strength as to enable it to dispense with their aid. They would thus lose the privileged position which they occupied.

It was suggested by the extreme Socialist Left that, in case the Premier proceeded to the dissolution, the Socialist municipalities (numbering about two thousand throughout the country) should resign, and that Parliament should be boycotted by abstention. Neither of those suggestions found favour with the Parliamentary Party; and it was decided, instead, to avert the dissolution, if possible, by consenting not only to vote with the Government but also to participate in the Ministry. A declaration to this effect was made by the Socialist leader Modigliani at the last sitting of the late Chamber before it rose for the Easter recess. He plainly intimated that the Socialists would be ready to collaborate with the Government in order to carry out the legislation promised by the Premier in favour of Labour, notably the control of industry by the workers. He also added a warning that Italian Labour was not going to be cheated of that legislation—to which the Government had given its solemn pledge—by the dissolution of the Chamber. Despite these overtures, and the threat of the Socialists to abstain from the elections, the Chamber was dissolved by royal decree on April 7, 1921; and May 15 was fixed as the day for the general election. In yielding to the Fascist agitation, Signor Giolitti hoped

that his supporters would be increased in virtue of a supposedly widespread nationalist revival. In the statement accompanying the Royal decree, the Premier left no doubt as to the kind of Chamber which, in his opinion, the interests of the country demanded. The Constitutional element should be sufficiently strong to ensure the passing of all Government measures for the economic restoration of the country.

The issue that was to be fought at the elections was clear in the eyes of all Italians. On the one side were the so-called parties of order; on the other those which stood for social revolution. The fight was to be between a National Coalition composed of some half a dozen parties hitherto antagonistic, and the Socialists, more united, more compact, but less favoured (so it was thought) by the electorate. No effort was spared during the pre-electoral period to bring the various Constitutional parties together, with the object of forming a national *Bloc*, which was the supreme hope of all those who regarded the defeat of the Socialists as essential for the regeneration of their country. But the task was soon found to be not at all an easy one; and the effort to accomplish it never achieved more than a halting success. Political differences, accentuated by years of opposition, could not be obliterated in one day. Where the national sentiment was strong, as in the capital and in the redeemed provinces, some headway was made towards an *entente* between the Constitutionalists. But, even there, the Republicans, the Catholics, and the Reformist Socialists still held out, while in the industrial centres the Democrats and the Radicals were not able to adopt the programmes of the Liberals of the Right. On the other hand, a pervading consciousness of approaching national resurrection was working steadily for the Coalition. The country felt itself stronger economically and morally than it had two years before.

The Socialists were really assisted by the excessive zeal—to put it mildly—displayed by the Fascisti. The organisation, which had quickened the national sentiment into action and had roused liberal democracy from its lethargy, had not learned the lesson of the dangers that follow on trespassing the limits imposed on every political fighting force. The Fascist attacks on organised

Labour by the systematic destruction of its head-quarters were viewed by impartial observers in the same light as the equally reprehensible excesses of the Socialists; though at the time they mistakenly thought that they had the whole country behind them. The Socialists were not slow in taking advantage of the situation developed by the tactlessness of the Fascisti. In their manifestoes they raised the alarm against the violence of the 'White Reaction,' and the disaster that would follow for the proletariat were the *Bloc* returned to power, borne on the shoulders of Fascism. The propaganda had its effect, especially on the class of employees who had hitherto sided with the bourgeoisie. Just before the Chamber was dissolved, the expectation was general that a new Parliament would deal a death-blow to the Parliamentary Socialist Party; but very soon after the opening of the electoral campaign it was clear that the Government and the bourgeois Press had made a great mistake.

The *Bloc* was virtually defeated before the election took place. The idea was that an appeal to the electorate would result in a strong national coalition consisting of a Liberal Democratic majority, flavoured with a sprinkling of Nationalists, enough to maintain the traditions of Italy as a nation and a power, but not numerous enough to initiate a period of reaction, and so block the path of liberal reforms on which the country had entered in recent years. What happened in actual fact was entirely different. Generally speaking, the Fascisti had it all their own way in the formation of the electoral lists. The national *Bloc* miscarried. The single electoral list, with the names of candidates drawn from the leading Constitutionalists, was seldom seen.

In the North and the Centre, the Constitutionalists signally failed to agree. The consequence was the presentation of several lists headed and organised by Fascisti of various shades of political opinion, with a name here and there of a candidate professing to belong to one or other of the traditional parties. There were lists of Fascisti, sincerely professing the faith of a national regeneration; but there were also lists of Fascist *parvenus* in politics financially supported by the *pescicani*, or profiteers. The plain truth was that the

Fascist reaction had defeated its own ends. Demagogic in politics, which had disgusted the nation with the Socialists, had merely shifted its centre of gravity to Fascism. Neither the country nor the Government now wanted a Fascist Parliament, and they said so openly. Fascism was permissible as a form of reprisals against Socialist excesses, but it could never be tolerated as an expression of the nation's will.

The result of the general elections of May 15 showed clearly that Italy is determined not to quit the path of social progress upon which it has definitely entered. A coalition founded on a reactionary movement was defeated. It was soon seen that the new Chamber was so constituted that only a regrouping of the progressive parties could make a stable Government possible. The Socialists were returned with a loss of only fourteen seats, and the Communists with a loss of three. Moreover, the Popular Catholic Party, without which the Government had been unable to function in the last Legislature, actually augmented its number of seats in Parliament. Worst of all, the Constitutionalists, who had formed a comparatively homogeneous group in the previous Chamber, now embraced such heterogeneous elements as Nationalists, Fascisti, Radicals, Democrats, Reformists, Liberals of the Right, War Veterans, and Agrarians. A National Coalition Government was impossible in the new Parliament.

Prolonged conversations between Government representatives and party leaders and among party leaders themselves only showed how hopeless was the task of forming a parliamentary majority out of the new Chamber. It was equally apparent that with the Giolitti Government still in power the problem would stand no chance of a solution. It is true there was talk that the Premier would welcome the Socialists if they decided to depart from their policy of not participating in the Government; but a large number of new Socialist deputies were resolutely opposed to supporting a Ministry which, as they held, had dissolved the Chamber with the intention of defeating their party at the elections.

In these circumstances, the Giolitti Cabinet resigned soon after the opening of Parliament in June 1921. The task of forming a new Government bristled with

difficulties ; but, after a crisis lasting over a week, Signor Bonomi, a former Socialist and Minister of War, succeeded in assuring himself of a majority among the groups of the Centre and the Moderate Left. His Cabinet excludes the reactionary elements which provoked the last general elections ; and consequently the three parties of the Right—the Nationalists, the Fascisti, and the Democratic Liberals, supporters of Signor Giolitti—have passed into opposition. No sooner had the new Government been formed than intrigues were begun to overthrow it. The most formidable was an anti-clerical move made by the Democrats, who sought a more powerful combination including a large Liberal element, and directed against the presence of several Catholics in the Government. For a moment it seemed as if the days of the Bonomi Cabinet were numbered. But the Socialists scented the Liberal danger and detected the intrigues for the formation of a new national *Bloc*. When, therefore, the new combination agreed with the finding of the Electoral Board confirming the election of an ex-Minister under Signor Giolitti, the Socialists at once sided with the Catholics and defeated the Liberal-Democrats by twenty votes. This and other failures afforded ample evidence that the Bonomi Government could not easily be replaced, and that any further endeavour to precipitate a crisis would be to play an unpatriotic game.

If the Chamber appeared to be hesitating in its support of Signor Bonomi, there was no doubt that the country generally was with him. At the very outset he took a firm stand against all the factions which were trying to undermine the authority of the State. Fascist violence tried to show its head again, but the action of the Government was prompt. On July 21 about a thousand Fascisti organised a 'punitive expedition' to avenge the death of two of their comrades, alleged to have been hung by the Communists of Sarzana near Spezia. They were, however, met by a large force of Carabinieri, which had been summoned to preserve order, and were obliged to beat a hasty retreat, after leaving 27 killed and many wounded.

Two days after this incident, the Bonomi Cabinet emerged triumphant with a majority of 166 on a vote of confidence taken before the summer recess. The

concluding words of the Premier on this occasion were: 'We bind ourselves to accomplish the task of reconstruction and pacification, and we ask of the Chamber whether we have enough force, enough energy, and enough authority to carry that task through.' In applauding this sentiment the Chamber was conscious that it was responding to the will of the nation. Whether the Bonomi Government will survive the session of Parliament that has just begun (1921) will largely depend on its ability to terminate the Fascist-Socialist feud, which is a constant menace to the internal peace of the country. Through the Premier's own initiative and the direct intervention of Signor de Nicola, the Speaker, peace between the two factions was signed at the beginning of August 1921; but soon afterwards several important Fascist groups refused to abide by the terms of the agreement—a defection which brought about the resignation from the Central Executive Committee of the Faschi of Benito Mussolini, the idolised Fascist leader and editor of the Fascist organ, 'Il Popolo d'Italia.' Mussolini has been regarded as the symbol of national regeneration for which Fascism stood, at best, in its idealistic significance. His resignation, therefore, meant the defeat of the nobler elements of Fascism and the triumph of the undisciplined turbulence of the more or less organised groups whose only bond of coherence is the exercise of force.

Another factor making for the continuation of Italy's internal crisis is the resolution adopted by the Socialist Party Congress at Milan in October 1921, by which the traditional policy of Italian Socialism not to collaborate with a bourgeois Government will be maintained. One of the main incentives in the minds of the signatories of the peace between the Fascisti and the Socialists was the growing movement among the latter towards collaboration. Prominent Socialist leaders, like Turati, Modigliani, Treves, and D'Aragona, are of opinion that this abstention from Government is doing harm to the Socialist cause, and should be given up. Mussolini and other Fascist leaders of the more balanced type are also of the opinion that the interests of the nation demand that the Socialists take a share in the Government. Thus for the moment the vote of the Milan

Congress has wrecked the hope of bringing the bourgeois and proletarian classes together in the government of the country—a hope that prompted the signing of the Socialist-Fascist peace.

Despite, however, Serrati's second victory at Milan, nine months after his first at Leghorn, Socialist participation in the Government has not been ruled out completely. The Labour Confederation is becoming growingly hostile to the Communist Party and the Third International; and Serrati may yet discover that his policy is leading to a catastrophic revolution which Italian Labour is now determined at all costs to avoid. Another ground of hope is the present widespread belief in Italy in the necessity of the rehabilitation of State authority, which means of course the disintegration of the Fascist movement. (The essence of Fascism is the usurpation of the powers of the State by an organised faction within the State.) Although the majority of the Fascisti have been and still are animated by the best of patriotic motives, their ardour has blinded them to the fact that their methods lead straight to anarchy. Reconstruction at home and prestige abroad cannot be secured by the aimless activities of an organisation largely inspired by a desire to discredit Parliament. As for the Fascisti themselves, they know that their power is on the wane. Manifestoes, demonstrations, and violent attempts to reduce the cost of living have been some of the means recently employed by the Fascist leaders to win back popular favour. But it is too late. The nation has lost its confidence in Fascism, and is once more looking to its own Constitutional Government for salvation.)

VINCENT BUGEJA.

Art. 11.—RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY BEFORE THE WAR.

1. *Diplomatische Aktenstücke zur Geschichte der Entente-politik der Vorkriegsjahre.* Herausg. von B. von Siebert, ehemaliger Sekretär der Kaiserlich-Russischen Botschaft in London. Berlin & Leipzig: De Gruyter, 1921.
2. *Aus den Geheim-Archiven des Zaren; ein Beitrag zur Frage nach den Urhebern des Weltkrieges.* Von M. Pokrowski, Volkskommissar für Schul- und Bildungswesen in Moskau. Berlin: Scherl, 1919.
3. *Kriegsursachen: Beiträge zur Erforschung der Ursachen des Europäischen Krieges mit spezieller Berücksichtigung Russlands und Serbiens.* Von Dr M. Boghitschewitsch, ehemaligem Serbischen Geschäftsträger in Berlin. Zürich: Füssli, 1919.

THOSE who have occupied themselves in investigating the causes of the war will know that a peculiar importance attaches to the actions and wishes of the Russian Government; and it is on this point that the controversy, which is being continually kept alive in Germany, especially turns. It is not merely the general mobilisation of the Russian forces at the end of July, but the whole course of Russian policy during the previous years, which has to be considered. The case, as put by the more responsible German writers, is that, while it may doubtless be true that Sir Edward Grey did not himself desire war, he allowed himself by the Entente with Russia to be entangled into a position in which it was within the power of the Russian Government at any time to provoke a war, from which, when it had once begun, Great Britain could not stand aloof. This criticism has received influential support here, as for instance from Lord Loreburn; and it is one which cannot be neglected by any one who wishes to get at the real truth. It might quite well be that the British Government, while honestly using every method to keep peace, had put itself in a position in which all its efforts were necessarily frustrated. In these circumstances, anything which will throw light upon Russian policy in the years before the war is important.

Of such revelations we have had many. One of the

first acts of the new Bolshevik Government, after the Revolution of November 1917, was to publish in the pages of the 'Pravda' selections from the secret documents which they had found in the archives of the Russian Foreign Office. The object was avowedly to persuade the world that the responsibility of the war rested not merely with the German Government, but with those of all the nations of Europe, and to stir up public feeling against the capitalist system, of which war, as they represented, was the inevitable outcome. Since that time these disclosures have been the basis and text of nearly all that has been written on the origins of the war by critics of the Allies. Here was to be found, as it seemed, a convenient escape from the charge that the sole responsibility rested upon Germany. Even if the adverse view generally taken of the acts and motives of the former German Government were maintained, it was something if it could be shown that they were not alone in their crimes and in their blunders.

The importance of this aspect of the controversy was increased by the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, for in it the sole responsibility of Germany for the war is asserted; and this is made the basis on which the demands of the reparation chapter are justified. Anything therefore is seized on by the German Government and the German nation which will tend to alter this view; and the German case on Responsibilities, as presented to the Conference, was largely based on these Russian documents.

It is much to be regretted that it has always been impossible to procure a complete and systematic collection of all the papers originally published by the Bolsheviks. We have had to depend on the quotations and selections made in controversial writings. It was, however, from the beginning quite obvious that these formed very unsatisfactory material on which to base an historical judgment. They were merely isolated documents chosen for propaganda purposes out of a great mass of material; and any one who has studied these matters knows how misleading any conclusion may be unless one has the whole correspondence before him. For this reason we welcome a new and important publication, which appeared during the summer of last

year in Germany, containing a great mass of Russian diplomatic correspondence between the years 1908 and 1914. We have here for the first time, not merely in extracts, the whole working of the Russian diplomatic machine, the secret telegrams and despatches interchanged between the Government at Petrograd and the Ambassadors in London, Paris, and Rome.

Before examining the work, a word must be said as to its origin. Many questions are raised to which it is not easy to find an answer. The editor of the work is a Herr von Siebert, who was attached to the Russian Embassy in London for some years before the war. He tells us that he had always intended to write a history of the events which he was watching, but he has now given up this intention and prefers merely to publish the documents on which such a history would have been based. But how has it come about that a former Secretary of Embassy finds himself in possession of copies of this great mass of secret material? It is not customary for men in this position to take away with them the confidential archives which pass through their hands. We note also that the book is published in Germany and in German. The originals of the documents were either in Russian, in French, or in English. Why take the trouble to translate them into German, a language which comparatively few people understand? May we not bring these facts into connexion with another statement—that even before the war the German Government regularly received copies of the correspondence between Petrograd and London? All that passed between M. Sazonoff and Count Benckendorff found its way to the Wilhelmstrasse:

‘According to the disclosures of Prof. Schiemann, who recently died, a German diplomatist succeeded in 1908 in persuading a Russian official to keep on supplying him with copies of all the instructions which were sent from the Russian Foreign Office to the Ambassador, Count Benckendorff, in London. In this way more than a hundred documents from the years 1908 to 1914 came into the possession of the Berlin Foreign Office’ (*‘Süddeutsche Monatshefte’*, Juli 1921, p. 5).

The dates, it will be noted, precisely coincide with those of the documents published in this volume. It is

to this that Bethmann Hollweg obviously refers in a note to his own memoirs (p. 110):

'Prof. Schiemann has charged me in the press with withholding from the Emperor important information as to the dangers of our situation. The charge fails. I never attempted to deceive the Emperor about our difficulties. Moreover, the essential facts from those reports of secret origin, with the translation of which Prof. Schiemann was officially charged, were laid before the Emperor. In communicating information from this source I indeed begged the Emperor to excuse me from informing him as to their origin, and he fully agreed.'

In these circumstances it is surely not improper to suggest that the documents which Herr von Siebert is publishing are, at least in part, those which have long been in the possession of the German Foreign Office, and that he is acting now as their agent. On the other hand, we have to note that, so early as March 1921, very full extracts from these documents were published as part of the anti-English propaganda in the press of the United States. An introductory note there states that they had come into the possession of the Bolshevik Government, and implies that it is from the Bolsheviks that the text has been obtained. The note, however, goes on to say that the British Government paid 2,500,000 dollars for their suppression. This is a story which during recent months has repeatedly appeared in anti-British propaganda; we are asked to believe that the Foreign Office, conscious that they would be compromised if the official correspondence became known, instructed Sir George Buchanan to purchase the copies which the Russian Government had in their possession; and it is generally implied that Sir George Buchanan did so. Of course the story is completely untrue; it is a wanton fabrication, for which there is no authority of any kind. It is probably equally untrue that the American press got them from the Bolsheviks; it seems more probable that they come from the secret archives of the German Foreign Office.

But if, as appears then to be probable, the German Government during the years before the war had seen much of the confidential correspondence of the Entente Powers, and in particular that between Russia and this

country, this is a matter of the highest importance towards an interpretation and criticism of the acts of the German Government. There was one conclusion which must have been forced upon them by it. England was not manœuvring for war with Germany; on the contrary, in every crisis, as it came up, the whole efforts of the British Government were used towards finding a peaceful solution. To them at the time, as to us now, the most interesting parts of the correspondence are the letters in which Count Benckendorff attempts to explain to his Government the attitude of the British Government and the British nation towards the Entente and Russia. The whole may be summed up in a single phrase. After discussing the Haldane mission of 1912 he says: 'Germany remains always, if not the enemy, at any rate the danger. Germany is to blame that the fleets must continually be strengthened.' And again, a few weeks before, Sir Charles Hardinge said to him:

'I can only explain to you that according to our information in the Foreign Office, so long as there remains a question of naval armaments, the result, which in itself is desirable, of completely normal relations between Germany and England, will be unobtainable.'

It is this necessity of protecting herself against the menace of the German fleet which is the ultimate key to the whole of British policy; this it is which made the maintenance of the Entente with Russia so necessary. Of this Sir Edward Grey was so convinced that, as he explained on one occasion to Benckendorff, if the Entente broke down (and there were serious difficulties in Persia) he would himself resign; it would be the end to the whole of his career. But, as is pointed out again and again, and as becomes even more clear in the detailed handling of every separate point, England will not allow herself to be dragged into a conflict with Germany unless it is one arising either out of a case in which English interests, as in Morocco, are immediately concerned, or one in which Germany is clearly the aggressor. This latter point is explained in a letter written by Count Benckendorff during the time of the crisis arising out of the Balkan Wars. One of the conditions on which alone England would take part in a war, says he, was this:

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'It is absolutely necessary that the responsibility for the attack should rest with our opponents. . . . In the eyes of public opinion in England, and consequently in the eyes of the English Government, the aggressor will in the present state of feeling here be in the wrong.'

He deduces from this that Russia herself must scrupulously avoid pressing points in which her interests alone were concerned, as for instance the Straits or Asia Minor; and we always find that, when any serious difficulty arose, Sir Edward Grey insisted that an attempt should be made to solve it, not by isolated action on the part of the Entente, but by bringing Germany in. He always set his face against the isolation of Germany, and steadily refused to participate in anything which might be interpreted as an attempt to separate Germany and Austria. As Benckendorff writes on Feb. 8, 1912:

'Germany has misinterpreted the so-called aggressive object of the policy of the Entente. The proverbial "iron ring" rests on an error. So far as I know, the Russian Government has not attempted to oppose the justified interests of Germany if they do not trespass on our interests. On the other side Sir Edward Grey, both publicly and in conversation with me, has always denied that he wished to isolate Germany. Every attempt, he has repeated to me, to destroy the Triple Alliance would be a blunder. In his opinion the isolation of Germany would be a real danger to peace. It is none the less true that, on every occasion when the German Government wished to establish interests where there were existing interests of other Powers, it has found itself opposed, not by one Power or another, but by a group of Powers. If this group is dissolved, the whole situation will be changed. Germany could then choose; and, thanks to her geographical position and her innate power, this would in reality mean the predominance of Germany.'

German writers who have tried to discredit the essentially defensive nature of the Entente, have generally referred to reports as to the conversations which took place at Reval in 1908. It has constantly been repeated by men who can speak with high authority, that on this occasion an agreement was made between England and Russia that they should go to war with Germany in 1916. We are now able for the first time to trace these reports

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to their source. Iswolsky, in a letter of June 18, 1908, tells Benckendorff what had happened :

'Summing up Hardinge's different explanations, I must above all press the point that no attempt was made on his side to leave the ground of concrete arrangement and draw us into general political combinations. Sir Charles maintained that the London Cabinet completely shared our view that the interview at Reval need not cause any kind of anxiety in other States ; so far as Germany is concerned, the British Government genuinely desires to maintain the best relations, and does not think that in the immediate future these relations will become accentuated for any reason. "None the less," said Sir Charles Hardinge to me, "we cannot refuse to recognise that, if Germany continues her naval armaments with the same accelerated speed, in seven or eight years a very anxious and acute situation may arise in Europe ; then undoubtedly Russia will become the arbiter of the situation ; and for this reason, in the interests of peace and for the maintenance of the balance of power, we desire that Russia shall be as strong as possible by land and sea." This was not merely Sir Charles Hardinge's personal opinion, but the definite political conviction of the Cabinet.'

There is no reason to doubt the accuracy of this report. During a discussion of the naval and military position of Russia, Sir Charles Hardinge quite naturally said that the proposed increase of the Russian navy would be useful, and it might in some years help to keep the peace. It is quite clear what was in his mind. This interview took place just at the time when the naval rivalry between this country and Germany was at its height. In eight or ten years the German fleet would be near its completion, and would have attained such dimensions as to be a serious menace to this country ; Germany would have sixty battleships and cruisers. Every one could see that, if Germany succeeded in building a fleet so big as to be able seriously to challenge British naval supremacy, then her policy would be based upon the possession of this fleet ; she would put forward demands which she would otherwise not have dared to propose, demands which this country could not accept ; and in this case war would almost inevitably follow. The best means, in fact the only means, of ultimately avoiding war, was to prevent Germany obtaining a

predominance at sea equal to her predominance on land.

By themselves, then, these observations would call for little comment; they were only the recognition of the essential object of the Entente with Russia. Let us recollect that the meeting took place at a time when the relations of Russia to the Central Powers were on the whole friendly; it was before Aehrenthal, by his disloyal action later in the year, brought about an estrangement which was never really appeased. They have, however, a further history. Very shortly after the date at which this meeting took place, the very incorrect statements to which we have already referred began to appear in the German press. The simple and obvious fact, that a strong Russia would in some years be useful as a check to the growing naval strength of Germany, was perverted, and, we can hardly avoid saying, deliberately perverted, into the statement that England and Russia proposed to attack Germany in 1916. Very obviously there had been a leakage. It seemed at first as if this had taken place in Petrograd; from what we now know, it appears almost certain that, while the German Government were in possession of the true facts, they allowed these incorrect statements to be put about by men such as Count Reventlow.

It would be absurd to attempt in a short article any detailed investigation of the great mass of material dealing as it does with all the questions which came before the Foreign Offices during the five eventful years before the war, not only as to the direct relations between the Great Powers, but on matters such as the Baghdad Railway, British and Russian activities in Persia, and the relations of Russia and Japan. It will be more useful and more instructive to confine ourselves to a single topic; and we will take that which for many reasons is the most important, the position of Russia in the Balkans.

The conception which is often put before us is that of a Russia constantly working by intrigues and exhortations to stir up the Balkan States, and particularly Serbia, to provocative policy, which must inevitably lead, first to war with Austria, and secondly, to a

European war. It is a picture which well fits in to the general idea that has prevailed as to the character of Russian policy and diplomacy ; and it is easy, if we accept this, to build up a complete theory of the nature of the Entente and the origin of the war. Before accepting this, it would, however, be well to inquire what evidence there is for it. It is not sufficient, as most writers do, simply to refer vaguely to the activities of M. Hartwig, the Russian minister at Belgrade. These references are always vague ; and no tangible evidence is brought forward as to the responsibility which is supposed to attach to him. Even if M. Hartwig were all that we are told that he was, it would not necessarily follow that he had the confidence, or was acting under the instructions of, his own Government. Russia is not the only country in the world which has from time to time been incommoded by the excessive zeal of subordinate officials.

As a matter of fact, the more evidence is forthcoming, the less does it appear to justify these representations. The facts seem to have been very different. It is indeed true that Serbian ambitions, especially those of the Radical party in Serbia, which had been in power since the assassination of King Alexander, were a great danger to European peace. The evidence we have in this volume is not that they were encouraged by Russia, but that the Russian Government did all in its power to keep them quiet. This, however, was not easy. The Serbians were really masters of the situation. They knew perfectly well that, if they chose to drive matters to an issue and to force a war with Austria-Hungary, even if in doing so they were acting contrary to the desires of the Russian Government, that Government would eventually be forced to interfere in order to support them, or at any rate to protect them from the consequences of their own action. No Russian Government could have stood impassively by and watched the Austrian armies overrun Serbia and make her a client state. A wave of passionate indignation would have arisen throughout the whole Russian Empire, which must necessarily have carried the Government with it. Moreover, from 1908 onwards, it was the definite purpose of the Austrian Government

to take the first favourable opportunity of forcing a war upon, and destroying, Serbia. For these reasons advice and remonstrances given by Russia to Serbia had to be very carefully worded; as Sazonoff says in 1914: 'It is difficult to bring influence to bear upon an excited nation, especially when one is not sure of success.' If they went too far, if they seemed to imply in any way that the Russian Government was giving up its interest in Serbia, then the Serbians would have broken loose and played the final card which they always had in their hands, or Austria would have struck.

What, therefore, the Russians had to do was, when any one of the constantly recurring crises arose, to do their utmost to keep Serbia quiet, while at the same time convincing her that she still had Russian sympathy and support, and would be protected against an unprovoked Austrian attack. Throughout the whole of the prolonged annexation crisis (1908-9), this was the policy which Russia pursued, and again at the time of the formation of the Balkan League (1912). It was often said that this League was formed by the Balkan States under the patronage and on the instigation of Russia, as a weapon against Austria-Hungary. It is quite clear that Russia, naturally enough, welcomed anything which would bring to an end the mutual jealousies and animosities between Bulgaria and Serbia, and lead to an alliance of these States as a counterpoise to that between Austria and Rumania; but it is also equally clear that the final formation of the League was the spontaneous act of the Balkan States themselves, and, in particular, that Russia was not directly responsible for those clauses of the League which implied immediate outbreak of war, though she was informed of them. On this matter the correspondence, which is supported by other evidence, is conclusive. We find, for instance, at the beginning of July 1912, Sazonoff telegraphing to Hartwig:

'I must ask you to continue to keep a watch on the development of the war feeling in Sofia. It appears, however, desirable to make the Bulgarians understand that, according to our very secret information, the possibility of immediate peace negotiations between Italy and Turkey is not excluded. These circumstances would deprive the Bulgarian advance of its practical basis and would change the present situation

very unfavourably to Bulgaria; Bulgaria would find herself alone against Turkey.'

At the same time the Russian Government was working, not only with the Entente, but also with Austria and Germany, in order to present to Turkey a scheme of reform, with the express object of providing a solution of the difficulties which would make war unnecessary. Its whole influence seems to have been used to try to persuade both Bulgaria and Serbia to accept some such scheme as a substitute for war. The situation was an extremely anxious one; the real key, however, was to be found not in Russian intrigues, but in the actual state of affairs in the Balkans themselves. It was the failure of the new Turkish Government, the troubles in Albania, the constant disorder and bloodshed in Macedonia—all matters taking place on the immediate frontiers of Serbia and Bulgaria—from which the disturbances arose. For these the Russian Government was not responsible; but in co-operation with the other European Powers, it strove its utmost to find a means of averting the catastrophe which the disturbances were tending to bring about.

The situation remained similar during the peace negotiations after the defeat of Turkey (1912). Here again we have the danger of a war between Serbia and Austria, which was deliberately aggravated by Austrian provocations. The attitude of the Russian Government was clearly defined and consistently acted on. Russia was not going to war in order to win for Serbia a port on the Adriatic; she would not support Serbia in her objections to the establishment of an Albanian State; and full pressure was brought to bear upon Serbia to force her to moderation in her demands. This is the text of numerous instructions to Hartwig and communications to the Serbian Government. On Nov. 9, 1912, Sazonoff telegraphed to Hartwig:

'The question of a Serbian approach to the Adriatic has during the last days developed in a way which causes us serious consideration. We are now ready, as before, together with France and England, to give Serbia active diplomatic support. According to reliable information, Germany and Italy are ready, together with Austria, to oppose territorial

annexations by Serbia on the Adriatic. We cannot exacerbate the quarrel on this point up to the danger of a European war. All the more unsuitable appears to us the attitude of some Serbian representatives abroad. We hear that the Serbian representative at Berlin has told Kiderlen that the Allies have already divided the whole Adriatic coast between them, and that Serbia was assured not only of Bulgarian, but also of Russian support.* So far as we are concerned, we consider any such declaration improper. The alliance gives Serbia no right to depend on the military support of Bulgaria on the question of Serbian access to the sea. The losses of Serbia and Bulgaria during the last war make a conflict with Austria appear hopeless from the beginning. The despatch of Serbian troops in the direction of Durazzo, against the occupation of which Austria will declare herself, is also a sign that Serbia is allowing herself to be drawn on.

'Tell Pachitch that the Serbians must not make our rôle as their advocate difficult. In the question of the access of Serbia to the Adriatic we distinguish between the object and the means. The object is the largest possible security of the economic independence of this country; the means are access to the Adriatic, either as the result of a territorial establishment on the coast or by means of a railway communication with some harbour or other under conditions like those which would eventually have been conceded to Austria for the transit of her goods to Salonica. If Serbia gives way on the question of acquiring a port of her own on the Adriatic, it will be possible to insist on the other conditions, as for example the territorial expansion of Serbia to the south, or the greatest possible diminution of Albanian territory. If Austria does not understand that it is in her interest to secure a lasting peace in the Balkans, we assume that Serbia, who comes out of the short war with conquests beyond what she could previously have hoped for, must now understand that by asking too much she will endanger what she has already attained. It lies in the interests of Serbia

* This refers to Herr von Boghischewitsch, the Serbian Minister at Berlin. He has published an account of his activities, which appear to have been of a very remarkable character. He seems to have interpreted his duties as including that of warning the German Government against the designs not only of Russia, but also of his own Government. Whatever his reasons for doing this may have been, he seems to have suffered from a failing not uncommon among the inferior diplomatists of minor Powers. Not initiated into the inner secrets, he formed a hasty judgment from the scraps of information which came into his hands, and on this attempted to play an independent hand of his own.

not to stretch her demands too far, for the failure to fulfil them would injure Serbian feeling most seriously.'

This is followed by another telegram two days later in which similar language is used. The Serbians are warned that they must reckon with facts as they are. France and England have no intention of accentuating their conflict with the Triple Alliance for the sake of Serbian demands. The harsher the attitude of Serbia, the greater the danger that she will be isolated. Hartwig is instructed to speak quite openly to Pachitch and warn him against the expedition to Durazzo. Serbia ought not to put the Russians in a position in which they will have to separate themselves from her by publicly recognising that the Serbians have gone too far.

A few days later, Nov. 23, we find that Poincaré, alarmed about reports that Hartwig is stirring up the Serbians, was pressing Iswolsky to tell his Government that, in the present critical situation (Austria having just mobilised three army corps and completed her military preparations against Serbia), Serbia ought not to be able to say that she is acting on Russian advice, and that it must be made clear that, if she persists in her march to Durazzo, she does so at her own risk. Sazonoff therefore telegraphed to Benckendorff (Nov. 30) :

'We are doing all that we can to influence the Serbians to give way; but our endeavours cannot be crowned with success unless the Serbians are convinced that we, on our side, are doing everything to protect their interests in a friendly manner, and that our endeavours are being supported by France and England.'

This is just the point we wish to make. Russia could not hold the Serbians back unless at the same time she could convince them that essential Serbian interests would be protected. On Dec. 10, Sazonoff telegraphed to Hartwig :

'The Serbian Minister has been instructed by his Government to inform me that they fear Austria will in the course of a week take a decisive step in order to force Serbia to give up an Adriatic port. . . . Austria wishes to have a ground for interference in order to bring the boundary of the new territorial acquisitions of Serbia as far east as possible.

Austria aims at the economic and political subjection of Serbia.'

On this M. Sazonoff formulated Russian policy as follows:

'We are ready to support the political and economic emancipation of Serbia and to get for her access to the Adriatic Sea through Albanian territory, and to insist that the boundary of Albania shall be pushed as far west as possible, but we are not of the opinion that it is possible to get for Serbia sovereign rights on a portion of the Adriatic coast. . . . We must have the assurance that Serbia will submit to a decision which has been arrived at in common by Russia, France, and England, for if she does not do so, Serbia cannot reckon on our support, as neither France nor England will support her in this. Neither we nor the friendly Powers can permit the decision as to a European war to be left to the Serbian Government. We believe, therefore, that the best means of avoiding complications would be the quickest possible declaration on the part of Serbia, that she will submit to the decision and advice of the Entente Powers in the matter of access to the Adriatic. In this way Serbia would avoid the danger of an Austrian ultimatum.'

Here, then, we find that Russia, as she always did, is putting constant pressure on Serbia to keep the peace.

Now, it is true that there have been published reports of conversations with Serbian representatives in which Russia is represented as holding out great hopes to Serbia in the future. At the very moment when Russia was doing all she could to avoid war, she was telling the Serbians to keep up their hopes, for their day would come in the future. The Tsar himself, we are told, in a conversation with Pachitch, expressed great interest in the future of Serbia and in her hopes for a fundamental increase of territory at the expense of Austria-Hungary. What else could he have done? Was he to tell the Serbian Prime Minister that Serbia had now reached the uttermost territorial expansion which was open to her, and that she must check all ambitions and renounce all hopes for the future? Had he done this, the only result would have been that the Serbians would have had recourse to the councils of despair in the way we have already indicated, and immediately seized, as they well might, one of the numerous occasions given by

Austria to bring about a war. To wait, to get over each crisis as it arose, in every case to go so far as, and no further than, his allies would allow, was surely the right course; and the Tsar could be quite sure that neither England nor France would associate themselves with any policy which meant a wanton provocation of war with Austria.

It is impossible indeed, in reading the correspondence, not to recognise that there was a very serious danger arising out of the complex system of alliances; and the Powers were always considering what their position would be, supposing Austria attacked Serbia. For the reason we have given it would have been very difficult for Russia to keep out of such a war, but Germany would have to support Austria as against Russia; in 1912 Kiderlen explained that Germany would do so even if France kept out. But France was equally united to Russia; and Poincaré, who knew what Kiderlen had said, assured Sazonoff that Russia could depend on the support of France under the existing alliances. This being the situation, everything depended on the attitude of Great Britain; but, whenever Benckendorff approached Grey, he always got the same answer. The action of England would depend upon circumstances; if there was a clear instance of German Austrian aggression, then the Entente would become operative; otherwise public opinion would not allow England to join in a war arising out of a Balkan dispute. And this explanation always proved sufficient in fact to prevent war. Theoretically it is true that Serbia could bring about a European war; what we have to notice is that in fact this never happened. The British and French Governments were quite aware of the danger and anticipated it. It would beforehand have appeared almost impossible that an event such as the Balkan war should be localised; Sir Edward Grey showed how it could be done.

How much light does all this throw on events which happened two years later? Then a similar crisis arose, but one infinitely less serious. It was one which could have been solved in precisely the same way as was that of 1912. If in one year war did not result and in the other year it did, the only reason is that on the latter

occasion Germany and Austria definitely took aggressive action, without any previous consultation with the other European Powers, in a way which unmistakably showed that the matter with which they were concerned was not merely the local question in the Balkans, but the general issue between the alliances.

There is reason to believe that the real view taken by those of the highest authority in Russia after the Balkan Wars was that it would be unnecessary and unwise to encourage Serbian aggression, for, as they saw it (and were they not right?), the future belonged to her. The time must come, sooner or later, when the growing feeling of Yugo-Slav solidarity would bear fruit. No good would come from hastening matters; they were quite prepared to wait; they would wait till the death of the Emperor Francis Joseph. It was quite obvious that whenever this event, which could not be long delayed, took place, there would be fundamental changes in Austria-Hungary; what form they would take no one could foresee. The accession of the Archduke Francis Joseph would almost certainly be followed by acute friction between Austria and Hungary; the dual system would break down; and the forces of disruption were so strong that it might be anticipated that the Monarchy would break up. Hungary and Bohemia would assert their claims to independence; the Rumanians of Transylvania would be attracted by the Kingdom; and then would come the time for the realisation of Serbian ambitions. All this must happen from causes over which the Russian Government had no control. It would be the result of bad statesmanship in Austria. Whether these great changes could take place without a European war was very doubtful; the collapse of Austria would be a great blow to Germany. But, on the other hand, it might have brought relief and led to a relaxation of the whole system of alliances.

There were of course real dangers arising not merely from Serbia, but from Russia herself. To deny this would be childish. Many illustrations could be found in this volume. We have first the unstable internal condition of Russia; and weakness at home is always a cause of danger abroad. Secondly, we have the intense bitterness caused by Aehrenthal's action in 1908, and the

desire to reassert Russian prestige. Benckendorff in one despatch refers to this, and tries to meet the danger by arguing that Russia had in 1912 shown that her position was completely re-established, and that she had been able to stop illegitimate Austrian pretensions. Thirdly, there was always the question of the Straits. This became acute in the autumn of 1912, when there was a danger that the Bulgarians might enter Constantinople, and again in the winter of 1913-4. What the Russians apprehended was that Germany, while avowedly maintaining the *status quo*, would give it a completely different aspect by gaining full control over Turkey; so that, while nominally defending the sovereignty of the Sultan, Germany would really be making Turkey a client.

It is curious to note that in 1877 Lord Salisbury saw a similar danger if Russia, instead of pressing for the partition of Turkey, aimed at controlling her. It was this danger which led to the very acute crisis over the Liman von Sanders affair. Light is thrown upon this by a curious expression used by Baron von Wangenheim; in a conversation he compared it to the situation which preceded the Franco-Prussian war and the difficulties over the Hohenzollern candidature in Spain. Every one will remember what those were. Bismarck, by bringing forward the election of a Prince of Hohenzollern to the Spanish crown, had created a situation very dangerous to France. The view on which he acted was, however, that protest must be directed not to Prussia, for that would lead to war, but to Spain. In the same way the Germans, by getting Liman von Sanders appointed Commander of the Turkish army corps stationed in Constantinople, had created a situation which, as all the Entente Powers agreed, was quite illegitimate. On this there was no difference of opinion. They would not be able to regard the Sultan as an independent Power, and the position of their own ambassadors would be seriously compromised, if a German were in command of the troops stationed in the capital. There was from the beginning absolute unanimity that this could not be permitted, but also great difficulty in finding a method of preventing it. At first the Russians were inclined to suggest protest to Berlin; against this Sir Edward Grey from the beginning set his face. It would have

produced just the danger at which Wangenheim hinted. It was at Constantinople and not at Berlin that action must be taken. But even at Constantinople they had to move very carefully ; and there were long discussions as to whether the protest should be a joint protest by the ambassadors of the three Powers, or in the form of identical notes presented by each of them separately. Throughout these discussions we find England, supported by France, doing all that she could to remove the difficulty without giving needless affront to Germany.

In conclusion, we must refer for a moment to the proposed Anglo-Russian naval agreement of 1914. This, as is well known, has occupied a great place in recent controversy. We now get an insight into what really happened. The Russians were not quite satisfied with their position in the Entente ; they felt that the relations of England and France were closer, more harmonious, more intimate than those of England and Russia. They did not know exactly what agreements had been come to between the other two Powers, for they had never seen the text of the well-known correspondence of 1912 establishing a military agreement. What they really aimed at was a definite alliance with this country. Against this Count Benckendorff had always warned them ; again and again, in very carefully worded despatches, he had explained that it was quite out of the question. They hoped, however, to be able to use Sir Edward Grey's visit to Paris in company with the King and Queen, in order to get some closer union.

Sir Edward Grey met this demand, when it was made, with characteristic frankness. The first thing to do was to calm what we may perhaps call the jealousy of the Russians by showing them precisely what were our written agreements with France ; by this they would understand that there was nothing in the nature of an alliance. The communication of the military conversations at once aroused a desire in Russia that they should have something of the same kind. A military arrangement with Russia was obviously quite out of the question ; they then asked for a naval arrangement in accordance with which plans should be made for co-operation between the two fleets in the case of war. To

this Sir Edward Grey raised no objection; and indeed there was none. But we may be allowed at this point to observe that any such naval arrangement must in fact have been of comparatively small importance. In the case of war with Germany, as events were to show, the Russian navy would clearly be shut up in the Baltic, a sea to which the British navy would not be able to penetrate. In the same way the Russian Black Sea fleet would be shut up. Where, then, would there be any real scope for effective co-operation? The situation was one quite different from that of France; the speedy despatch of British forces to the continent might, and probably would, make all the difference between success and failure.

It is clear, however, that the Russian Government, which does not seem quite to have appreciated the position, had very far-going plans; and, in particular, as we see from a despatch communicated to Count Benckendorff, the Russian Council of State was considering proposals for the landing of Russian troops in Pomerania, and hoping that the British Government would lend support to this, if not by the presence of a British fleet, at any rate by providing the necessary transports. The whole plan seems to have been singularly ill-devised. Even if the German fleet had been defeated and largely destroyed by the British fleet, a landing on the coast of Pomerania would still have remained an extremely risky and probably futile operation; and clearly it would have been quite out of the question for the British Government to consent to lock up any considerable amount of British shipping in the Baltic for such an object.* The whole of this discussion of a naval agreement seems in fact to have had very little importance, and would really have had none had it not been that incorrect statements appeared in the public press. How these rumours got out is one of the matters on which we should be glad to have further light, but we cannot fail to connect it with the fact to which we have already referred, that the German Government was very well informed as to all

* This proposal plays a large part in current propaganda. It is represented that it had been accepted by England (of which there is no evidence); and we are even told that the British transports were actually at Petrograd before the outbreak of war!

that passed between Petrograd and London; and the fullest information seems to have been in the possession of a German paper, the 'Berliner Tageblatt.'

It seems to be supposed by many that there was something sinister and improper in these naval conversations. What justification is there for this? Is it not truer to say that it was the positive duty of the British Government to enter into some such arrangement? The other view can only be taken by those who steadily refuse to recognise the danger to this country from the German naval preparations. At any rate, for the Germans to criticise adversely such an agreement would be the height of hypocrisy. What was the situation? They were building an enormous fleet; and no one who knows anything about the Prussian Government would suppose that they were spending their money on a navy unless they intended to use it. At the same time their Allies, the Austrians, were building a large fleet for use in the Mediterranean; and a new naval agreement had recently been made between Germany and Austria. What did they expect this country to do? Did they anticipate that we should sit silently with folded hands watching with intellectual appreciation and academic admiration the growth of one great fleet in the North Sea and another fleet in the Mediterranean? Did they suppose that the making of a naval agreement—which was kept profoundly secret—was the prerogative and privilege of the Triple Alliance? Was it to be anticipated that this country would not counter the menace, not only by increasing her own fleet, but also by arrangements under which she should depend upon the timely support of the fleets of friendly Powers if the occasion came to use them?

We have said enough to show the interest and importance of these documents; they throw a new and valuable light on the extraordinarily complex problem with which the statesmen of Europe were confronted. The difficulty always was that each country had to prepare itself for the great war which at any moment might break out, while using every effort to avoid it. The fundamental conditions were very unsatisfactory; the complex system of alliances was something quite new

in the history of Europe; it was not, as is often so falsely suggested, the old system of the balance of power; for it no single man (except perhaps Bismarck) was responsible. Originally it had arisen from the attempts to avert war; this was the primary cause of each stage in its growth—the German-Austrian Alliance, the Triple Alliance, the Franco-Russian Alliance, the Entente. It was a system which none had willed and none, least of all those who had to use it, liked. Every one would gladly have done away with it; but this was impossible. It was there, and it formed the *terrain* on which each move had to be made. To deal with it made enormous demands on the intellectual and moral powers of those in authority. The remarkable thing is that they managed for so many years to handle the situation without a catastrophe; for this, above all, Sir Edward Grey is responsible, and we always find him, with sure tact, warning men off any hasty or ill-considered action.

To decipher every riddle, to watch and describe every move in the complicated play of forces, would be a fascinating task, but one of extraordinary difficulty. On the other hand, nothing is more futile or more misleading than, as so many do, to seize on an isolated episode, a few words in a single telegram, and to base on this the suggestion that, it may be, Russia or France, or even Germany herself, was deliberately heading for war. This is not the way in which history can be written or judgments formed.

The ultimate judgment on this epoch of European history will probably be that the real injury from this system of alliances was not that it brought about war, but that it made local and partial wars impossible. The result was that problems, instead of being solved, were allowed to accumulate, so that the whole atmosphere became overcharged. Had these alliances not existed, then Russia and Austria would have been able to settle their differences with one another, while the rest of Europe, standing aloof, could at the right moment have intervened either to prevent war or to stop it. And always the great danger came, not so much from the alliances themselves as from the intense rivalry of armaments by which they were accompanied.

We have scarcely touched a fringe of the great mass

of valuable material contained in this work. A fuller study would show how great were the difficulties which from time to time arose out of the agreement with Russia, especially with regard to Persia and the Baghdad railway. It is clear also that, throughout, the relations of Russia to Great Britain were very different from those of France. It was essentially a political agreement, and was not accompanied by any close feeling of friendship and fellowship between the nations; the strong antagonism felt to the methods of the former Russian Government by many large sections of this country always made real friendship impossible, as Benckendorff again and again explained. As a political agreement, it brought with it certain difficulties and dangers, the nature of which we have indicated. Russian diplomacy in the old days had a bad name; and no one could have been surprised if, when the secret archives were disclosed, much came to light which, had it been known at the time, would have been seriously distasteful to our Government. The disclosures have now been made, and from a source not friendly to the Entente; if we are to judge by them, then the only conclusion we can draw is that those in authority in Russia were on the whole working in a spirit of loyalty both to France and to England. And to those who even now are inclined to criticise adversely the policy before the war, I would address one question. How would it have been if a war had broken out between Germany and England, and in it Russia had been found not on our side, but in alliance with Germany?

J. W. HEADLAM-MORLEY.

Art. 12.—THE NAVY AND THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE.

THE Washington Conference constitutes an attempt to find some relief from the crushing burden of armaments which still weighs upon the world. But the problem must be seen in its correct perspective. Armaments in themselves are not the immediate cause of war, whose origin must be sought in the spirit of rivalry, suspicion, and distrust which plays so large a part in human affairs. But, though armaments may rightly be regarded merely as a form of insurance against war, their growth tends inevitably to foment the suspicion and distrust which gave them birth ; and they constitute a secondary sphere of rivalry whose natural outlet for expression is war.

And yet, by the very nature of things, disarmament is impracticable unless the parties affected can come to some reciprocal arrangement. Lord Haldane in 1912 sought diligently for an agreement with Germany, and the Chancellor was ready to listen ; but the German admirals 'were difficult,' and no basis for limitation could be found. Tirpitz would not give up his Navy Law.* Proud of Germany and confident in her resources, he believed in the 'day' of his officers' vainglorious toasts, and could not see the real day waiting for them in the Firth of Forth. But in a colossal war fought to the bitter end, victory and defeat become merely relative terms. Victor and vanquished emerge defeated from a war which has shaken Europe to its foundations. The war spells the downfall of Europe's predominance. The old landmarks, material and immaterial, have disappeared. We have spent our wealth ; and the one dominant note of our polity—monotonous as the tolling of a bell or the warning blast of a foghorn—must be economy. This must be the focal point of our policy, and it must be constantly emphasised. The question cannot be solved in terms of 'dreadnoughts' alone. Immersed in dreadnought arithmetic, we may forget the tolling of that warning bell, and the dull blast of the

* The Navy Law passed in May 1912, which *inter alia* increased the strength of the battle-fleet from thirty-four to forty-one, and placed three squadrons (instead of two) in active commission.

foghorn may fall on deaf ears. We have mortgaged most of our wealth; and economy is an urgent necessity.

With the downfall of Germany the whole conditions of naval strategy have changed. The Two-Power Standard was a corollary of North Sea strategy; it was an answer to Germany's fleet building at our back door, and with the disappearance of Germany's fleet its meaning too has disappeared. The Pacific is 9000 miles from the North Sea,* and its problems are equally far removed. From the point of view of general naval strategy, the circumstances of the North Sea were peculiar. It may be accepted that a navy exercises a predominant degree of control in its own waters where the whole strength and resources of the nation are working close behind it. In the North Sea Britain and Germany's area of maritime control overlapped. Across a comparatively narrow sea, barely 400 miles† broad, two fleets stood opposed, one barring the other's road to the oceans; and behind each there stood, in close proximity, all its maritime resources and all its vast organisation of building and supply. In the Pacific very different conditions prevail; and here it is necessary to make a short digression on the influence of distance on naval strategy.

The maintenance of a fleet in any area involves a vast machinery of auxiliary services. A suitable anchorage must first be selected as a temporary base, easily defended and spacious enough for a large fleet. Repair ships and floating docks must be provided; a stream of oil ships, store ships, and ammunition ships will be moving constantly to and fro; and in the case of serious defects the ships themselves must return under escort to the great building yards. The protection of the base and the security of its approaches will involve the services of scores of mine-sweepers, trawlers, motor launches, and small craft, which can only with great difficulty make a long ocean journey. Now the greater the distance of such a base from the main bases at home, the more difficult becomes the work of maintenance.

* Honolulu is approximately this distance *via* the Panama Canal.

† 320 miles from the Humber to the Jade; 440 from the Forth to the Skaw.

The fleet approaching an enemy's coast drags behind it a lengthening chain of communications; and it may be accepted that a distance of more than 3000 miles (approximately 8 days at 16 knots) from home would be a severe handicap on the operations of a fleet of any considerable size.

But to operate effectively in enemy's waters a temporary base not more than 600 miles (approximately 38 hours at 16 knots) away from them will be required. Offensive operations by a fleet, therefore, involve the use of a base some 600 miles from the enemy's coast, and if possible not more than 3000 miles from its own. But, when oceans lie between the combatants, these conditions may be impossible to realise; and the fleet that wishes to maintain a force equal to an enemy off that enemy's coast must be prepared to take the sea with a force at least twice and possibly thrice as strong. A United States fleet operating against Japan and working from Guam would be some 5700 miles from its main bases of supply at home, with Japan still some 1350 miles off.

Great Britain, whether she elected to work from Hongkong or Singapore, would be 8000 to 9000 miles from home, a distance which would make it very difficult to maintain a large fleet at a high level of efficiency. In both cases the attacking fleet would be working at a grave disadvantage; and to maintain at the front a fleet superior to the enemy would require a force at least double the enemy's in strength. If, on the other hand, Japan elected to attack, she must face this terrible handicap of oceanic spaces. To attack Great Britain in European waters may be ruled out as impracticable; she could not hope to get further than the Indian Ocean or Australia. In the latter case she would find herself some 3600 miles from her main bases, and would have to mobilise a fleet at least twice as strong as that which the British Empire could assemble in Australian bases. If she advanced towards the American coast she would have to face a journey of 4520 miles.

It will be seen that in working at great distances a much greater proportionate superiority is required in order to maintain an approximately equal force in a distant arena of operations. The necessity for a large margin of strength depends not merely on the distance to

be traversed by ships requiring refit, but also on the fact that the safety of the base is largely dependent on that of the fleet. In these circumstances, unless a large margin of superiority is available, a temporary set-back, involving severe damage to half a dozen ships, might jeopardise the safety of the base and of the whole fleet. This is of course a mere truism of naval strategy, but tends to be lost sight of in the conditions prevailing in the late war, where the main fleets were working in close proximity to their great naval bases.

There is another important factor which weighs the balance in favour of the combatant working close to his own coasts, namely, that he can more easily bring up aircraft to support his fleet. It is true that a fleet can come provided with aircraft-carriers; but these vessels must always be huge and vulnerable, and cannot compete with a complete system of air-defence based on aerodomes. The advantage of air-power remains with the combatant fighting in the proximity of his own coasts; and it may be accepted that invasionary operations have become a thing of the past against the coast of a powerful enemy well equipped with aircraft and submarines. In fact, one tends to revert in the Pacific to somewhat the same relations as must have existed between England and Venice in the 16th century, when neither could attack the other because each was too far away. It is probable that Japan could never seriously injure the United States and that the United States could not defeat Japan.

The tendency, then, of naval and air strategy is to increase the ascendancy of a fleet in the waters contiguous to its own bases. The difficulty of waging war in an enemy's waters has increased. It follows that there is a tendency for the control of particular maritime areas to fall into the hands of particular Powers, whose ascendancy there can be challenged only by a greatly superior force. The United States tends to exercise an indisputable sway in Panama and the Gulf of Mexico; Great Britain guards the North Sea and the sea approaches to Europe; Japan controls the entry to the China seas. The question remains, how far these conditions tend towards the maintenance of peace. Very effectively, for on this basis it is possible to discover a

standard of armaments which precludes or hinders the possibility of offensive operations. If the principal Powers can agree to such a standard, then the possibility of war is diminished, for it is in the fear of invasion that its principal menace lies. But here one must emphasise the peculiar conditions of the British Empire. Offensive operations in a naval war must take the form either of invasion or an attack on trade. Great Britain is far more dependent on her trade than any other Power; and the Empire is dependent for its safety on its lines of communication by sea. The United States, as Mr Balfour observed, stand 'impregnable, solid, and self-sufficient'; and a defeat at sea could do them no irretrievable harm. Their great coal and industrial areas lie hundreds of miles inland, practically immune from attack. They are defended by mileage both on land and sea. Great Britain's position is very different. The very existence of the Empire is wrapped up in sea-power; and the safety of the great high-road to India and Australia is indispensable to its security.

But neither peace nor war can be won without a certain element of risk. We have to recognise, too, that a new horizon has risen in naval affairs. For over two centuries we have been the leading naval power, and have acquired the habit of acting as a general providence to the world. We can no longer afford to do so. We must adapt ourselves to different conditions, and the general nature of the proposals put forward by the United States appear to offer us a friendly lead.

In their original form they may be summarised as follows :*

- (a) No further construction of capital ships† for a period of not less than 10 years.
- (b) All capital ships under construction by the United States to be scrapped.

These comprise 6 post-Jutland battle-cruisers (the Constellation, Constitution, Lexington, Ranger, Saratoga, United States, all 8 16-inch guns), and 9 post-Jutland battleships (Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, Montana, North Carolina, South Dakota, all 12 16-inch, and the

* 'Times,' Nov. 18, 1921.

† That is, the largest type of armoured ships, including both battleships and battle-cruisers.

West Virginia, Washington, and Colorado, 8 16-inch)—a total of 15 capital ships with a total of 618,000 tons.

(c) All older U.S. battleships up to, but not including, the Delaware and North Dakota to be scrapped, 15 in number with a total of 227,740 tons.

(d) Great Britain to stop the construction of the four Hoods* with a total of 172,000 tons.

(e) Great Britain also to scrap all older dreadnoughts up to, but not including, the King George V, comprising 19 ships with a total of 411,375 tons.

(f) Japan to abandon her building programme of 1920.†

(g) Japan to scrap her capital ships under construction, viz. the Mutsu (8 16-inch), Tosa and Kago (10 16-inch) and the battle-cruisers Akagi and Amagi (8 16-inch) building, and to stop the construction of the battle-cruisers Atago and Takao (8 16-inch) about to be laid down, a total of 7 capital ships with a total of 289,100 tons.

(h) Japan also to scrap all battleships up to, but not including, the Settsu, viz. 10 ships of 159,828 tons.

The above proposals meant the complete suspension of all building programmes. The total tonnage to be scrapped by the United States was 847,740, by Great Britain 583,375, and by Japan 448,928 tons. This would leave Great Britain with 22 capital ships (604,450 tons), the U.S. with 18 (500,650 tons), and Japan with 10 (299,700 tons), as follows :

Great Britain—Royal Sovereign, Royal Oak, Resolution, Ramillies, Revenge, Queen Elizabeth, Warspite, Valiant, Barham, Malaga (all 8 15-inch).

Benbow, Emperor of India, Iron Duke, Marlborough, Erin, King George, Centurion, Ajax (all 10 13·5-inch).

Hood ‡ (8 15-inch), Renown,‡ Repulse ‡ (6 15-inch), Tiger ‡ (8 13·5-inch).

United States—Maryland (8 16-inch), California, Tennessee, Idaho, Mississippi, New Mexico, Arizona, Pennsylvania (all 12 14-inch), Oklahoma, Nevada, Texas, New York (all 10 14-inch), Arkansas, Wyoming (12 12-inch), Utah, Florida, North Dakota, Delaware (all 10 12-inch).

Japan—Nagato (8 16-inch), Hiuga, Ise, Yamashiro, Fuso (all 12 14-inch), Settsu (12 12-inch), Kirishima,‡ Haruna,‡ Hiyei,‡ Kongo ‡ (all 8 14-inch).

* Sanctioned in naval estimates, 1921-22.

† This provided for an establishment of sixteen capital ships to be reached by 1928, including eight battleships and four battle-cruisers.

‡ Battle-cruisers.

Japan's anxiety to retain the battleship *Mutsu* (8 16-inch), now approaching completion, led, however, to a modification of the above. Japan is to retain the *Mutsu*, and scrap the *Settsu*. Great Britain is to build two new capital ships, and scrap the *King George*, *Erin*, *Centurion*, and *Ajax*. The United States is to complete the *Washington* and *Colorado* (8 16-inch), and scrap the *North Dakota* and *Delaware*. The fleets thus become: for Great Britain 20 ships of 582,020 tons, for the United States 18 ships of 525,850 tons, and for Japan 10 ships of 313,300 tons.

The effect of these proposals with their modifications on the strength of the fleet is shown below.

STRENGTH OF FLEETS IN 1924.

(Figures in brackets are strengths which would be reached under present building programmes. Capital ships with 16-inch or 15-inch guns have been classified as 1st class, with 14-inch or 13·5-inch as 2nd class, with 12-inch as 3rd class. B. = battleship, B.C. = battle-cruiser; 1, 2, 3 = 1st, 2nd, and 3rd class).

	B. 1.	B. 2.	B. 3.	B.C. 1.	B.C. 2.	B.C. 3.	
Great Britain	12 (10)	4 (12)	0 (6)	5 (7)	1 (3)	0 (2)	= 20
United States	3 (10)	11 (11)	4 (8)	0 (6)	0 (0)	0 (0)	= 18
Japan	.	2 (4)	4 (4)	—	0 (2)	4 (4)	0 (0) = 10

STRENGTH IN GUNS IN 1924.

	16 or 15-inch.	14 or 13·5-inch.	12-inch.	
Great Britain	116 (132)	48 (144)	0 (76)	= 164
United States	24 (152)	124	44 (80)	= 192
Japan	16 (48)	80	—	= 96

It will be seen that in terms of numbers the largest sacrifices are made by the United States, who are scrapping thirteen first-class capital ships to Great Britain's two and Japan's six. It would be difficult to maintain that these proposals tend to jeopardise the safety of the Empire; and they may be accepted with equanimity. The drastic proposal to suspend all capital-ship construction for ten years has been modified. It would have rebounded to the United States' disadvantage, for at the end of that time a larger proportion of British ships would have become due for replacement under the age-limit clause.

The second part of the proposals dealt with the replacement of the above strength and embodied the 5-5-3 formula. They may be summarised as follows:

- (a) The first replacement of capital ships not to be laid down till 10 years from the date of agreement.
- (b) The replacement to be limited to 500,000 tons for the U.S., 500,000 tons for Great Britain, and 300,000 tons for Japan.*
- (c) Subject to the 10 years' limitation, capital ships to be replaced when 20 years old, and keels not to be laid till 17 years have elapsed.
- (d) No capital ship to exceed 35,000 tons.†

In the light of what has been said on the influence of distance on naval strategy, the formula may be regarded as a defensive one so far as capital ships are concerned. It at least safeguards the coasts of any of the Powers concerned from invasion, thereby removing the principal menace of war.

But Great Britain, on account of her long stretches of sea communication, is more exposed to an attack on her trade than any other Power; and in her case the question of cruisers and submarines as the principal instruments of such attack is a matter of equal if not of greater importance. These are grouped under the head of auxiliary craft, which include (a) surface combatants, viz. cruisers, flotilla leaders, and destroyers, (b) submarines, (c) aeroplane-cruisers. All auxiliary service vessels, such as fuel ships, supply ships, tenders, repair ships, tugs, mine-sweepers are exempt from the agreement. The tonnage of surface craft allowed for cruisers, flotilla leaders, and destroyers is for Great Britain 450,000 tons, the United States 450,000 tons, and Japan 270,000 tons (a formula of 4·5-4·5-2·7); but no immediate obligation is laid on any Power whose total tonnage exceeds this amount on Nov. 11, 1921, to scrap any of its vessels at once. Only when it begins to replace them must the whole be reduced to the prescribed limits; and it is permissible for all such craft laid down by Nov. 11 to be carried to completion. The age-limit for cruisers is seventeen years and for destroyers twelve years.

* Increased to 525,000, 525,000, and 315,000 respectively.

† The equivalent United States displacement is 37,000 tons. The Hood is approximately 41,620 tons, the Constellation, 43,500, the Royal, 40,600.

Here a very important consideration appears to have been overlooked. In the case of large capital ships which sooner or later must be prepared to face a battle, a formula of relative strength can be found which will preclude offensive operations in the case of widely-separated combatants. This principle also applies to cruisers intended to act as tactical units of a fleet. But in the case of cruiser-raiders and submarines, which rely for their success on evasion, it is not primarily the relative strength but the actual number at work which governs the situation. The answer to ten capital ships is fifteen capital ships, but the answer to thirty submarines and thirty cruiser-raiders is something much more complicated than forty submarines and forty cruisers. It may be 200 destroyers, 100 cruisers, and a host of anti-submarine craft. It can be accepted that twenty light cruisers, if accompanied by a proper quota of fast fuel ships (which are not covered by the agreement), could seriously menace our great trade-routes in the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean. The Karlsruhe was able to maintain herself in the Atlantic for four months in spite of half a dozen British cruisers on her track, and was destroyed, not by them but by an internal explosion. If twenty light cruisers were to be let loose on the trade-routes of the Empire, it would require something much nearer eighty than twenty ships to sweep them up. The above-mentioned tonnage would permit of only about fifty light cruisers and 150 destroyers,* which is certainly not a very great array to meet a vigorous attack on our trade-routes by light cruisers and submarines. It would have been preferable to leave the tonnage of destroyers, which play an important defensive part in the escort and protection of trade, unlimited, and to limit cruisers to a certain definite number or a proportion just sufficient for the work of the fleet, say 50 per cent. of the number of capital ships.

The same argument applies to submarines. Here again a formula of proportionate tonnage does not assist the main end of the Conference, which is clearly trying

* Fifty cruisers at 4000 tons and 150 destroyers at about 1700 tons = 455,000 tons; or the proportion and tonnage might be altered, e.g. to 25 cruisers at 5000 and 160 destroyers at 2000 tons = 445,000 tons.

to discover a formula that will reduce naval war to the level of defensive operations. In the case of submarines the following tonnage has been proposed: for Great Britain 90,000 tons, for the U.S. 90,000, for Japan 54,000 tons; and there is again no obligation on any Power possessing a larger tonnage on Nov. 11 to scrap any of it till replacement begins. This tonnage would permit of forty-five submarines of 1000 tons and ten large ocean-going submarines of 4000 tons. Here again the endeavour to reduce naval war to a defensive level is defeated, for a large ocean-going submarine can remain on a trade-route for some months independent of any supplies, and is more dangerous to Great Britain than to any other Power. This is evidently the ground of Great Britain's proposal to abolish submarines altogether. It is not quite clear whether this means a cessation of their construction, or whether Great Britain is aiming at a general prohibition of their use. It may be doubted whether the latter is practicable. The submarine has gained a recognised place in naval warfare, and cannot be regarded as an illegitimate weapon merely because Germany put it to an illegitimate use. Again, it has a distinct field of use in coastal defence; and the imposition of a limit of 600 to 800 tons would have reduced it to the level of defensive armaments.

But this would apply only to Pacific strategy, for in European waters a submarine of 600 tons would operate quite effectively against British trade. To meet this contingency, a limitation in total tonnage was required. Great Britain was unable to persuade the Conference to agree to the abolition of submarines; but the United States met her half-way by proposing to reduce the maximum submarine tonnage to 60,000 tons each for the United States and Great Britain, and to the *status quo* for the other powers.*

France, clinging to an exaggerated estimate of the defensive value of submarines, refused to accept these figures and held out stubbornly for 90,000 tons. In the face of her unyielding attitude, the proposals to restrict submarine tonnage broke down. The French opinion of

* Present submarine tonnage in American figures (British figures in brackets)—United States 95,000 (83,540), Great Britain 82,464 (80,500), France 42,000 (28,360), Japan 32,000 (32,000), Italy 22,000 (18,250).

the submarine cannot be accepted. It could not prevent the transport of fifteen millions of men to her aid during the war. It has a sphere of defensive utility in reconnaissance work, and for this purpose the tonnage she possesses will meet all her needs.

It will be seen that, while in capital ships the greatest sacrifices are made by the United States, in cruisers and submarines Great Britain has most at stake, and is asked to make the principal concession. The sacrifice, however, in the case of cruisers is not an immediate one, for Great Britain possesses a great superiority in this type of craft,* which will continue for at least three or four years, as none of them need be scrapped.

Any agreement reached at Washington must closely affect the personnel of the navy; but in the wholesale reduction that is pending we should remember that, the fewer ships we have, the greater is the necessity for careful instruction and training. The greater number of ships scrapped, the greater the necessity for expenditure on the Naval Staff College.

Viewing the proposals from a strictly naval point of view, two grounds of criticism remain: first that cruisers were not limited to a definite number of units, say fifteen, thirty, and ten for the United States, Great Britain, and Japan respectively, with a maximum displacement of 4500 tons; and secondly, that the tonnage of submarines was not restricted to 800 tons. But the whole question has another and bigger aspect. An agreement on naval armaments must give a great impetus to the cause of world-peace. The Conference represents a sincere effort to further that cause; and, though we may risk something of our maritime position, we tend to gain with the whole world in anything that promotes a lasting peace. The work done at Washington is a great step towards this; and it would be unwise to measure by dreadnought strength alone.

ALFRED C. DEWAR.

* At present some sixty-nine cruisers to Japan's thirteen and the United States' fifteen (*Brassey's 'Naval Annual,' 1921*).

Art. 18.—OVERSEAS POLITICAL CONFEDERATION.

1. *Commercial Federation.* By J. Davidson. Sonnen-schein, 1900.
2. *The West Indies and the Empire.* By H. de R. Walker. Unwin, 1901.
3. *The Empire and the Century.* By C. S. Goldman. Murray, 1905.
4. *The British West Indies, their History, Resources, and Progress.* By A. E. Aspinall. Pitmans, 1912.
5. *The Present Economic Position in the West Indies.* By W. A. Gould. 'Geographical Teacher,' 10. 1920.
And other works.

ONE of the most pronounced—if but little noted—economic movements within the Empire occurring within the past few years has been that towards a political union of Canada and the British West Indies. Since the summer of 1920 there has been in existence a commercial union, formed under the auspices of the Canada-West India Trade Agreement, giving to Canadian goods a tariff preference amounting, in some cases, to as much as 90 per cent., while a preferential tariff became effective on Sept. 1, 1921, by proclamation. But this amount of preferential treatment is deemed, in some quarters, to be insufficient to promise complete unity throughout the Empire. Something stronger, appealing to 'the nurse of manly sentiment,' is needed. The earnest desire has been, and is, for a British West Indian Dominion, brought about through political consolidation of these separate and individual colonies. This view forms a real issue, one which has been in no way promoted by propaganda, but declared out of the depths of what is called 'public opinion.'

While sentiment, no doubt, has played, and plays, a part, there is an undercurrent of solid commercialism which has found modified expression on the lips of some of Canada's distinguished statesmen, not the least of whom have been Sir R. L. Borden, Prime Minister of Canada from 1911 to 1920, and Leader of the Conservative Party since 1901; Sir G. E. Foster, Minister of Trade and Commerce in the late (Meighen) Union Government; and Lord Shaughnessy. While the Canadian Government, as such, has not endorsed political federation

between the Dominion and the British West Indies, and while the Canadian-West Indian League has not officially considered political federation, Sir E. R. Dawson, on the other hand, has even put forward concrete proposals for such a political federation of the British West Indian Governments—a movement which he considers is destined to pave the way to some thoroughly efficient system of administration and a consolidation of the individual strengths of His Majesty's Overseas possessions. In the mean time, it is interesting to note that Canada has recently made new proposals to the Government of Cuba for the arrangement of an unofficial convention, whereby certain privileges would be granted for stated Canadian products, and reciprocal privileges for Cuban products.

Such a combination is calculated by others, equally prominent in Imperial politics, to provide a further link in the chain of Empire by constituting one great British Dominion in an area where British influence to-day, more than ever, needs to be exerted. Public opinion, as reflected in the Dominion press, would appear to have been deeply and widely stirred in favour of this proposal; the fact that Canada has a strong and growing commercial interest in the West Indies pre-supposes that she possesses also a strong political interest. 'Interest makes all seem reason that leads to it'; and where vested interests are, there exists to a certain extent political influence also. A prominent statesman, defining the attitude of the Dominion, has declared that

'Canada cannot afford to give the West Indian colonies the advantages of free exports and imports to and from her markets, and herself meet the loss of revenue resulting therefrom, if there is only a trade agreement between these countries; neither could she allow the British West Indies to participate in her more favourable reciprocity treaties with the United States and other foreign countries, nor in her increased transportation facilities, unless there be a political union which would also give the Dominion the right to protect the colonies from retaliation and other foreign pressure.'

While advancing this argument, care has been taken to indicate that no coercive pressure is intended. On the contrary, the Dominion insists most scrupulously that the initial proposals on the political side must come

from the West Indian Colonies themselves; and that on no account must Canada appear to influence the opinions of the smaller possessions, even to the extent of making the preliminary suggestion.

On the other hand, the movement is strongly supported in the West Indies upon both imperial and economic grounds. In the Caribbean Sea it is recognised that Empire consolidation has become increasingly necessary in view of United States encroachment upon our commercial interests in that part of the world; for during the past quarter of a century the West Indian islands have been drawn more and more into the already extensive sphere of trade influence controlled by our transatlantic rivals. But there is here something more than laudable imperial sentiment, and deeper than any mere spirit of commercialism. Rightly or wrongly the West Indian colonies suffer from a sense of wrong, a grievance which may be said to have existed for half a century at least, and has found public expression at varying periods, but always with increased bitterness. Our overseas brethren complain of neglect at the hands of the mother-country; and, as we know, even a little neglect may breed much mischief. Those who may be personally acquainted with the docile, good-tempered, and kindly-dispositioned West Indian natives, and who may at some period or other have been witnesses of their perfervid loyalty to the Crown—an inherited attitude since the days of their emancipation from plantation slavery—can best appreciate the bitter feeling which has been created in their simple minds by the real or imaginary official apathy shown towards these far-off colonies. It is not difficult for them to believe the mischievous and mendacious statements of agitators and political disturbers of the peace, who tell them that we only took possession of these islands when they appeared to us of supreme importance in our great struggle with Spain and France; and that these possessions, having served our purpose, and being no longer of any great marketable value, should now be allowed to drift away without further thought or consideration.

The well-balanced utterances of the Colonial Secretary, as reported in his speeches delivered in June last at a meeting of the Empire representatives, and again before

the members of the West Indian Committee, when the Prince of Wales was entertained at a banquet, will have gone some way to satisfy colonial aspirations; even more so will the Minister's suggested reforms for the Crown Colonies and Protectorates, as outlined in the New Empire Scheme drawn up by the Colonial Office and shortly to be discussed, it is hoped, in Parliament. Above all, the individual examination of Colonial claims rendered possible by the visit to the West Indies of Mr Wood, Under-Secretary—in the unavoidable absence of his Chief, who originally hoped to undertake this mission personally—should lead to wide-spread advantages to the Empire as a whole. Petitions and memorials for reform or relief have been pouring into the Colonial Office for years past, but of late they have increased amazingly; and officials have become alarmed at the magnitude of the unrest and dissatisfaction prevalent in our Caribbean possessions. The demands of the West Indian colonies range over a wide variety of subjects—from a permanent preference agreement with Great Britain in the near future, financial assistance to tide over current difficulties immediately (solicited by Jamaica), and the complete control of their own public funds and a voice in the government (asked by the Windward Islanders), to the introduction of an entirely new West Indian currency (as proposed by British Guiana) and a greater display of practical interest in the economic affairs of these outposts of Empire demanded by all alike. If Mr Wood can spare time to examine even a tithe of the proposals submitted—some clear and conceivable, others, it is to be feared, immature and unsubstantial expedients—he will be well employed.

What would tend yet more completely to assure the West Indies of our continued interest in their affairs, economic and political, would be the ready consecration of some of our abundant capital to the development of their rich natural possessions, and some practical participation in order to promote their advance along the road of commercial prosperity; just as the United States have assisted their but recently-acquired colonies, the Philippines, Porto Rico, Guam, the Hawaiian Islands, and St Thomas (formerly Danish West Indies), as well as the contiguous South and Central Americas and Mexico.

Indeed, it is suggested that any confederation that may be formed must result in an arrangement between the British West Indies and Canada to divert to the latter some of the huge investments of Canadian money now placed in Mexico, Cuba, South America, and other non-British countries. In the month of February 1922, Canadian influence will make itself still further felt by the commencement of a Canadian Pacific Railway steamship-service between the Dominion and Jamaica.

Among other shocks sustained by the West Indian colonies was the sudden and wholly unexpected action of Mr Asquith's Government in August 1912, notifying the withdrawal of Great Britain from the Brussels Sugar Convention. The planters of Jamaica and Barbados, among others, were little prepared for the blow, notwithstanding the fact that some, who perhaps had followed more carefully than others the course of events since the Convention of 1902, may have realised that the agreement, when renewed in 1907, was for the limited period of five years only. Although the action of the British Government was regarded with great disfavour, the effects on the West Indies proved less serious than had been anticipated, since the market for West Indian sugar had extended to, and seemed likely to become more profitable in, the United States; while under the new system of Canadian preference, exports to Canada were greatly stimulated. However injurious, therefore, the British Government's action might have proved to West Indian prospects in the home-market, it lost much of its terror for the colonial sugar-producers who had come to look more and more to the American and Canadian markets as their safeguard. But a bad impression was not unnaturally created by the conviction that the economic prosperity of the British West Indian colonies was being made dependent upon Canada and the United States, while the mother-country stood aside.

Serious attention was given in some quarters to the proposal emanating from Mr McAdoo, former Secretary of the United States Treasury, made in March 1920, to the effect that Jamaica and other of the West Indian Islands 'might well be disposed of to the United States, in satisfaction of British financial indebtedness to that

country.' Mr McAdoo seems to have derived his inspiration from the supposition that the British Empire, which now comprises one-sixth of the land area of the whole world, would find it necessary from an economic point of view to devote its surplus capital for many years to come to the development of the agricultural and mineral resources of its great self-governing Dominions and India. 'I imagine,' added Mr McAdoo, 'that Great Britain would not object to such a disposition of these islands, especially as they would go to a friendly Power; but I see nothing in such a proposal to offend the just pride of a great people, whereas such liquidation of a portion of the British debt might be a happy solution of part of Great Britain's immediate financial problem.'

Nor will it be forgotten that in a recent interview, speaking of the United States policy towards the League of Nations, an American Senator (Mr McCormick) declared that 'America has not the same interest as, say, France or Britain in the Mediterranean or the Balkans, whereas she has an overwhelming interest in the Caribbean, and assumes responsibility there to the exclusion of France and Britain.' The friendly feelings existing for the United States upon this side should not prevent us from paying some attention to a statement of this kind, even if it be but a *brutum fulmen*; and, doubtless, but for the more pressing problems which have engaged our attention in these later days, such a pronouncement upon the part of an American Senator would not have been allowed to pass without attention. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that it was not a member of the United States Government who gave out this statement for publication, but one whose opinions may not rank as of any greater importance than certain other political utterances made in this country.

It was supposed that the prosecution of a plan for the purchase of some of Great Britain's territorial possessions, including the Islands of the West Indies, would form the first task to which the new Secretary of State, Mr Colby, would devote himself when he entered on the duties of his office; but this supposition has proved hollow. The suggestion of selling the British West Indies to the United States was not, however, as some have imagined, American in its origin, but British. The

proposal was first put forward by Lord Rothermere, and, at the time, met with neither repudiation nor encouragement from any member of the British Government. On the other hand, a certain number of American voices, always hostile to Great Britain, were raised in its favour; but, again, without drawing any expression of opinion from either Government. It may be that neither Administration regarded the suggestion as calling for attention or contradiction.

Those who advocate the annexation of the West Indies to the United States have been active in pointing out the advantages that would accrue from a dissolution of the tie between the colonies and the mother-country and their annexation to the United States, to which continent, it is claimed, they geographically belong. Now, what would America offer to those who joined her which the United Kingdom refuses to give, or has neglected to give? Is it that Great Britain does not take her colonies into partnership at all? or is it that while, in the United States, the blood circulates freely from the heart to the extremities, so that if one member suffers all the members suffer with it, our colonies are simply regarded as what they used to be called—'plantations,' offshoots from the old stock set down as circumstances have dictated in various parts of the globe, vitally detached and left to grow or wither according to their own inherent strength? It has been declared that the whites in the West Indies would, if consulted, almost unanimously desire to be taken into the American Union, but that the blacks to a man would oppose it. Upon a free vote, therefore, it is clear that with the present-day population of Jamaica alone, numbering 630,181 blacks, to say nothing of 163,201 other coloured people, pitted against a white population of no more than 15,605, any proposal for separation would be lost.

Undoubtedly a stir was created when, some years ago, it was rumoured that the English troops were to be withdrawn from the islands of Jamaica, Trinidad, and the Antilles, and that the colonists were to be left masters of their destiny, free to form themselves into communities like those of the Latin American Republics, or to join with the United States. The more nervous among the white population at once recalled what had happened in

the neighbouring island of Haiti and Santo Domingo. In Haiti, the greater part of the French inhabitants had been massacred and the remainder deprived of their properties; while in Santo Domingo revolutions were almost daily occurrences before the intervention of the United States and their institution of a broad militarily controlled protectorate over that country. As a whole, the British West Indies have shown little readiness to adopt the policy of separation in any form.

While the subject of federating the British West Indies, together with British Guiana and British Honduras, has frequently been mooted, no practical scheme has yet been brought forward for adoption; in every discussion, however, which has taken place touching the possibilities of an organised colonial federation, a free parliamentary constitution has been regarded as a necessary preliminary. Considerable progress has been made during the past decade in the direction of securing greater uniformity in all matters concerning these colonies, while the question of closer trade with Canada has materially assisted to bring together the various units. The preference of 37½ per cent. on British sugar, accorded some ten years ago by the Dominion, largely attracted West Indian produce to the Canadian market; but the value of the preference was reduced by the privilege given to the best refiners of Canada for three years, from 1909, of importing at the British preferential rates two tons of sugar for every ton of Canadian beet refined, and by the further privilege extended to Canadian refiners generally in the same year of importing foreign sugar to the amount of 20 per cent. of their requirements on the terms of the British preference, as a reply to an alleged combination of West Indian producers to raise prices.

The number of those who favour a stronger and wider commercial union between the Dominion and the West Indies, to be secured by means of an enlarged preference, grows in number and influence daily. It is considered in some of the islands that the agreement concluded in 1913 between Canada and the West Indies, by which preference was given to each other's goods, is not sufficiently comprehensive in its scope; this opinion, however, is not generally shared in Jamaica, notwithstanding the

isolated position which she occupies. In May 1920 the Legislature of that island negatived the proposal for an altered tariff having for its object a reduction of the existing *ad valorem* duty to one-half, in respect of all empire-made cotton and woollen goods. The chief difficulty seems to have been the anticipated loss to general revenue brought about by the reduction of the duty; and an important question yet to be decided is whether this loss can be best met by imposing new duties or altering existing ones. Another problem is how the policy of Imperial preference can be applied in respect of articles on the free-list and of goods subject to special duties. The last practical suggestion put forward was that a preference of 40 per cent. of the existing duties should be given to pure-cotton piece-goods made in the United Kingdom; this proposal, if adopted, would mean a duty of 10 per cent. *ad valorem* instead of $16\frac{2}{3}$ per cent. It was further recommended that additional preference should be given to pure-cotton piece-goods made in the United Kingdom entirely of cotton grown in the Empire, and that the duty on such goods should be $8\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. *ad valorem*—thus giving a preference of 50 per cent. The Committee of the Legislative Council of Jamaica, while putting forward this proposition, recorded its opinion that, in view of rising values, there existed no necessity to recommend an increase in any other direction on the tariff, to compensate for the reduction proposed.

If all cotton piece-goods made in the United Kingdom and shipped to Jamaica received a preference of 40 per cent., the net loss to the island's revenue would amount to about 8,500*l.*; if all the cotton goods made in the United Kingdom were of raw material grown in the Empire, and, in consequence, received the preference of 50 per cent., the revenue would lose more than 10,600*l.*, which large sum would be supplemented by the unknown amount lost by reason of any transference of the trade to the United Kingdom on account of the preference. Should the whole of such trade be so transferred and goods be allowed to enter under the category of 'goods made in the United Kingdom, but not made of British Empire cotton,' the granting of this preference of 40 per cent. and the payment of duty of 10 per cent. *ad valorem*

would involve a loss amounting to 55,000*l.*, subject, however, to some small reduction dependent upon current prices and rates of exchange.

So far as the benefits attaching to preference accorded to the mother-country are in question, it has to be remembered that the adoption, in 1897, of Canadian preference on British goods was followed by a substantial and continuous increase in Canadian purchases of British manufactures; and the same upward tendency in normal times has been noted in other colonial markets where preference is granted. But in the absence of an enlarged and mutual preference which the West Indian colonies, *inter alia*, demand, the British share of their markets compares unfavourably with that of the United States as regards dutiable and free goods. Failing the adoption of a wider and more comprehensive policy of mutual preference between the United Kingdom and the colonies on the one hand, and between the colonies themselves on the other, our West Indian possessions must remain under constant pressure to enter into reciprocal arrangements with our transatlantic rivals, to our own serious economic detriment, even if it does not undermine the political unity of the Empire.

At this time, when men's minds are turned anxiously to matters overseas, the frequent placing of valuable colonial trade orders in the United States instead of in the United Kingdom has not unnaturally attracted unfavourable comment. For several years past, a large proportion of West Indian engineering and other contracts has gone to the United States or to Canada, for reasons other than purely geographical; the greater portion of rolling-stock and building materials employed on the Jamaican railways has been placed with firms in the United States. A recent contract of considerable value would have followed in the same direction but for the intervention of the Crown Agents, who ruled that a proportion at least of the order should go to the Dominion. The first contract to be so placed, however, was in 1920; in September of the following year a consignment, consisting of seven locomotives, wheels and frames for about 38 cars, bridge work, and about 5,000 tons of steel rails, was received at Kingston (Jamaica) from Canada. No portion of that island's

rolling-stock requirements seems to have been allotted to the United Kingdom. It is to be hoped that no similar policy will be pursued in connexion with other public undertakings contemplated, which will embrace in due time the construction of a first-class port at Kingston (involving an estimated expenditure of nearly 500,000*l.*), an extension of the sewerage system at Kingston (to cost 202,000*l.*), the electrification of the island's railway system (now postponed), and the construction of a large sugar central, which, with other installations, such as tramways, will involve a further outlay of 400,000*l.* In connexion with all these enterprises and with others, such as the enlargement of several existing factories, the United Kingdom should be fully capable of supplying what is required, and of carrying out the contracts in a manner equal to that which could be provided by engineers of any other country.

It is true that Kingston is not much more than 800 miles distant from the coast of the United States, while it is distant some 4,026 miles from the nearest port (Liverpool) in the United Kingdom. Given efficient and moderately-rated steamship transport, however, the United Kingdom could successfully compete, and could supply the West Indian colonies with practically all their economic wants at prices equal to those quoted by American manufacturers, even if delivery of the goods were, by reason of the greater distance, less speedy. Patriotic considerations, however, seem to have entered very little into the question. Whereas in recent years the United Kingdom supplied Jamaica with but 4·1 per cent. of the food, drink, and narcotics, the United States supplied 65·3 per cent. and Canada 20·8 per cent. In raw materials, the United Kingdom supplied 7·1 per cent., the United States 91·1 per cent., and Canada 1·4 per cent. Of manufactured articles taken by the colony the United Kingdom supplied 28·1 per cent., the United States 64·6 per cent., and Canada 1·9 per cent. On the other hand, exports from Canada of Canadian-made goods to the West Indies (comprising Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and other British West Indian islands) increased from \$3,000,000 (600,000*l.*) in 1910, to \$11,000,000 (2,200,000*l.*) in 1920; while imports into Canada from the

West Indies increased from \$6,000,000 (1,200,000*l.*) in 1910, to \$13,000,000 (2,600,000*l.*) in 1920.

How greatly trading figures have altered within a single decade may be gauged from the fact that, whereas in 1908 the United Kingdom supplied 41.5 per cent. of the colonies' imports, in 1918 the proportion had dwindled to 16.1 per cent.; and that, whereas United States figures already stood at 46.8 per cent. in 1908, ten years later they had increased to 67.6 per cent., Canada's share rising only from 7.1 per cent. to 9.6 per cent. Something in this shrinkage of United Kingdom importations must be attributed to scarcity of commodities and the increased cost in foreign markets. The case of imported flour, which forms the colony's principal import, may be cited as an instance. While average pre-war years showed an importation of 277,308 barrels, valued at 296,976*l.*, an importation of a less quantity, namely, 154,471 barrels, in 1918, represented a value of 455,690*l.* In regard to exports from Jamaica, in 1917, the United Kingdom took 44.8 per cent. valued at 1,112,116*l.*, and in 1918 50.2 per cent., valued at 1,347,998*l.* For those two years the United States took 28.1 per cent., valued at 694,762*l.*, and 23.4 per cent., valued at 627,950*l.*; Canada took 15.1 per cent., valued at 375,042*l.*, and 14.3 per cent., valued at \$384,396 respectively.

Those who are acquainted with the needs of the West Indian colonies, and especially with those of Jamaica, feel convinced that imports derived from the United Kingdom could be very largely increased, while exports of native produce are also capable of expansion. In the first category British cotton goods, clothing, and boots, which are now almost superseded by similar manufactures from the United States, could be sold in Jamaica and other of the West Indian islands at prices certainly equal to, if not lower than, those of the United States. Building materials, hardware, and ironmongery, as well as machinery and engineering supplies, could be similarly dealt with. It would, however, be useless to expect any improvement of this kind until steamship service between the United Kingdom and Jamaica is rendered more frequent and rapid. Until such innovation has been introduced, the bulk of the islands' merchandise must continue to be derived from the United States.

The Royal Mail Steam Packet Company, which in normal times has seldom maintained more than a fortnightly service to the islands, should be increased to a regular weekly service so as to compete with the frequent service of boats, weekly, fortnightly, and monthly, plying between New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and New Orleans and the West Indian islands. In the absence of a substantial subsidy, however, no British company could be expected to conduct a regular inter-colonial steamship service in the Caribbean in view of the heavy financial losses incurred by the Royal Mail Steam Packet Co.—originally formed to carry on a mail-service with the British West Indies, and so conducted for over three-quarters of a century—at an annual loss, for the last twenty years of that period, of about 50,000*l.** The difficulties of the situation are not likely to be lessened by the somewhat captious criticism passed in the United States upon the proposal to exempt from tonnage and light dues British vessels passing through the Panama Canal *en route* to Kingston (Jamaica) and regular boats for Australia and New Zealand. The objections raised, attended by threats of 'retaliation,' appear the more unreasonable when it is remembered that the United States Senate has recently passed a bill re-enacting the Panama Canal tolls and instituting discriminatory rates in favour of American shipping.

Against but three British lines (the Royal Mail Steam Packet, Leyland & Harrison, and Elders & Fyffe's) now calling more or less regularly at Jamaica, there are some eight or nine lines plying between the United States and that island. These include the fine vessels of the Ward Line, the Houston Steamship Company, Pickford & Black, the United Fruit Company, the Atlantic

* The Secretary of State for the Colonies has recently informed the Governments of each of the West Indian colonies that was served by the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company that the Imperial Government is prepared to guarantee at the rate of 90,000*l.* per annum a tri-weekly service to be performed by an intermediate class of vessels serving Barbados, Trinidad, and British Guiana, all of which will be expected to contribute in the form of a guarantee to the expenditure on the undertaking, in the following proportions: Trinidad, 17,000*l.* per annum; British Guiana and Barbados, 8000*l.* and 7000*l.* respectively. The R.M.S.P. Company has offered to provide a provisional service on the basis of a guarantee against loss, such guarantee not to exceed 7000*l.* for each round voyage.

Fruit Company, the United Steamship Company, and others, while additional cargo services are being continually provided. There exists no British cargo service from the west coast of England to the West Indies, the period for which the joint Imperial and Jamaica Government subsidy was granted having long expired.

The question of establishing a subsidised line of steamers between Jamaica and the United Kingdom has frequently come before the colonial legislature, but remains undecided. Whereas it formerly took but 14 or 15 days for mail matter to reach the island from the United Kingdom by direct route, it now occupies fully four weeks *via* New York. Steamship services between the West Indies and Canada are more or less involved in the question of a better steamship communication between the United Kingdom and the West Indian Colonies; and the matter formed the subject of discussion at the Conference held at Ottawa in June 1920. It was then recommended that subsidised steamers should go to the West Indies from England, calling at Barbados, Trinidad, and British Guiana, and proceeding thence to Canada; from the Dominion the vessels would return to the Caribbean, taking on cargoes for England at British Guiana, and complete their loading at Trinidad and Barbados. This plan, however, was opposed by the Jamaica Imperial Association (included in the Associated Chambers of Commerce of the West Indies), the agreement, in view of the seclusion in which Jamaica would be left, not being considered satisfactory. Alternatively, it was proposed that some arrangement should be made to establish communication between Jamaica and at least one of the other West Indian islands, so as to facilitate connexion with other parts of the West Indies.

At the same time it is the desire of the Associated Chambers of Commerce to complete a trade agreement with the United Kingdom and the Canada-West Indies upon a similar basis. Jamaica is in favour of a trade agreement for a period of ten years, such agreement being on broader lines than the system of imperial preference which has followed in the wake of the agreement with Canada. At the end of the decade period, the agreement could be made permanent, thus securing

stability of trade between the mother-country and the colonies in this quarter of the world.

While Jamaica differs little from the other West Indian colonies in regard to the subject of closer economic federation, it approaches with greater timidity the problem of a political union with Canada. At a meeting which took place in Kingston in August 1921, an elected member of the Legislative Council of Jamaica moved :

'That the Legislative Council expresses its desire to know the views of the other British West Indian possessions and the Dominion of Canada on the important question of federation on an imperial basis of all the British possessions in the Western Hemisphere, and respectfully requests the Governor of the Colony to obtain such views for the information of this Council.'

Divergent opinions were expressed, but no conclusive definition of the term 'federation' seems to have been put forward. It is clear, as was pointed out by the Colonial Secretary (Lieut-Col. the Hon. H. Bryan), that the only direct way of entering into negotiations, having for their object a political as well as an economic union with Canada, would be through the Secretary of State for the Colonies. It should be possible to discern in Mr Churchill's hearty public assurances the vista of a new era for our Colonies, when once the scheme, now being evolved, has been put into practice.

PERCY F. MARTIN.

Art. 14.—IRELAND.*

IRISH affairs have engaged a large share of public attention during the past six months; and during that period the problems of Irish politics have been more diligently pondered by British statesmen than they have been for twenty years. It is not too much to say that the preoccupations of the Great War, and subsequently the international anxieties which followed upon the attempts to give effect to the Peace of Versailles, have prevented our responsible Ministers from giving that attention to the disturbed condition of Ireland which was necessary for a true understanding of its causes, or for a consecutive and consistent policy of relief. Successive measures for 'the better Government of Ireland' were enacted by Parliament in 1914 and 1920; but in neither case did our legislators pay sufficient heed to the warnings which they received that these measures would prove to be inoperative. They did not know, or they would not believe, that the Sinn Fein organisation was becoming daily more powerful and effective; nor did they appreciate the intensity of the national sentiment which was hostile to any permanent partition of Ireland. And, accordingly, the ferocity and the success of the guerilla warfare waged in Ireland during last winter against the forces of the Crown were disconcerting to the too sanguine Ministers who thought that it could be crushed by the feeble and half-hearted military policy for which they made themselves responsible.

No one in Great Britain doubts that the British Army is equal to much larger tasks than the subjugation of Ireland; and it is unnecessary to labour the point. At any time we could have put down sedition, if we had chosen to put forth our strength and to treat Ireland as an enemy country. But the position last July was such that Ministers began tardily to see the difficulties in the way of succeeding by a policy of coercion. To begin with, it was plain that great military forces—far larger than any that had yet been landed in Ireland—would be necessary. It would be necessary to seize all railways and all post-offices, to provide soldiers to

* This article continues one by the same author, published in the 'Q. R.' for July 1921.

perform railway and postal duties, to guard bridges and lines of communication over extensive tracts of country, to surround hostile areas so that enemy forces could not break through, and to have in readiness at many points flying columns which could strike swiftly and surely when occasion offered. We learnt in South Africa that a comparatively small number of determined men, operating in their own country, can only be subdued by forces vastly superior in number and in equipment; and an Irish campaign under the conditions of last year, if it were to be completely successful, would have required at least 250,000 trained soldiers—horse, foot, and artillery. We could have raised such an army, if we had decided to do so; but very few people in Great Britain had realised that anything of the kind would be needed. That was the first difficulty in the way of the Cabinet. They had not got the necessary troops to subdue Ireland by force; and it would have been no easy matter to persuade the British public that they must forthwith undertake the burden of a new and costly war.

But this was not all. There are, perhaps, no people in Europe so sentimental as the English. We are governed by sentimental, much more than by logical, considerations; which, it may be said parenthetically, is one of the reasons why the logical French mind finds it so hard to believe in our sincerity. And, while the French nation would have no scruple in subduing by force of arms a rebellious province or in punishing with severity persons who avow themselves disloyal to the State, the English nation is very reluctant to treat treason as a crime. One of the most curious by-products of the reign of terror in Ireland last winter and spring was the comparative indifference, on the part of Englishmen, to the maltreatment and murder of loyalists, while any excess of zeal or act of indiscipline on the part of the police was made the subject of public and violent protest. Many of our people were quite ready to condone the murders committed by the gunmen, accepting the plea that they were acts of warfare, while any attempt on the part of our troops to behave as though we really were at war was regarded with the utmost disfavour. It was quite certain last July that, if the Cabinet had decided to declare war and to enter upon a definite campaign in

the South of Ireland, public opinion would not have suffered them to pursue such a policy to its legitimate conclusion. The politicians would have been so harassed by irresponsible critics that they would not have allowed the soldiers to do their business without interference. Those who blame Mr Lloyd George for entering into conference with the delegates of Sinn Fein, too often forget that the country would not have supported him last summer had he asked for an army and a free hand to put down Sinn Fein by force.

And there is a third consideration. It is significant that those members of Parliament who have clamoured most loudly for the application of a policy of force to rebel Cork or rebel Dublin, live in England or in Ulster. There were 350,000 Unionists living in Southern Ireland last year. Had a state of war been declared, it would have been impossible for British troops to have discriminated between loyalist and Sinn Feiner while military operations were being carried on. The occupation of a country by a hostile military force means the devastation, and the ruin, of the inhabitants of that country. And Irish loyalists knew this very well. They believed, from past experience, that Britain would never carry through a war of reconquest to the end; and they were certain that war in the South and West of Ireland would mean ruin to them, swift and certain, for the Sinn Feiners would treat them as sympathising with the great enemy, Britain, and the British troops would not be able to distinguish them from their neighbours.

The wild words spoken in Parliament by some of those who prefer war to peace, in present Irish conditions, and who declare that conference with rebels is a cowardly surrender, are spoken in a place of security. Such utterances remind one of the old story of the Irish absentee landlord who wrote to his tenants from London to say that, if they thought they could intimidate *him*, by shooting his agent, they were greatly mistaken. It is very easy to be brave at the expense of other people. And the magnitude of the danger to which Southern loyalists were exposed all through last year may perhaps be estimated by the cry of relief with which they hailed the announcement that terms of peace had at last been

signed. If the British Government had declared war last July, as many people thought they ought to do, they would have sacrificed all the loyalists in Munster and Connaught, not to speak of a large part of Leinster.

So much may be said, and ought to be said, in support of the decision reached by the Cabinet to abandon the half-hearted policy of a pretence of war in order to compel the Irish to accept an Act of Parliament which nobody desired. It was plain last summer that Sir Hamar Greenwood's optimistic assurances in the House of Commons were not based on good information; and it was by no means certain that military operations were being carried on with intelligence or with success. The Cabinet had been left by former Governments the *damnosa hereditas* of a policy of half-measures, of alternate sentimentality and bluff; and they were not exclusively, or chiefly, to blame for the situation in which they found themselves. The most fatal decision in recent Irish history was Mr Asquith's decision to withdraw Sir John Maxwell from Ireland in June 1916, just when that able general had succeeded in convincing Irishmen that a policy of rebellion was hopeless. Ever since that time, Irishmen, on both sides, have believed that England would never 'see the thing through'; and Irish sedition has flourished exceedingly in the strength of that belief. It was not easy, for the reasons we have given, for Mr Lloyd George to put forth the full power of England, and to demonstrate that Ireland was foolish indeed to challenge her to the test of arms. But it was unfortunate that his decision to treat with representatives of Sinn Fein was announced at a time when Sinn Fein believed itself to have been successful in the guerilla warfare which had been sustained for some months.

Irishmen will not believe it for years to come, but it is none the less true that the initiation of conferences with Sinn Fein last July was a great act of magnanimity on the part of Great Britain. It was an acknowledgement, indeed, that the 'Black and Tan' policy was a mistake, because it was not thorough enough; but it was at least as much the expression of a genuine desire on the part of England to prevent further bloodshed, and to check the destruction of Irish property by Irishmen

themselves, which was a daily feature of the newspaper reports. And nothing could have so fully demonstrated to the world the sincerity of the Prime Minister's wish to be fair, even generous, to Ireland than this expression of good will at a moment of passionate strife and clamorous agitation.

It was well known in Ireland in July that not all those who had declared themselves as Republicans desired a Republic in their hearts; and it was believed by many who had access to the inner counsels of Sinn Fein, that a majority of Dail Eireann would accept a large measure of Home Rule within the Empire, and had no objection at all to the sovereignty of the King. Accordingly, private conversations—only private in the sense that they were not officially recognised—between the leaders of the Southern loyalists and the leaders of Sinn Fein were held at the beginning of July; and as a result of these *pourparlers*, Mr Lloyd George made proposals for an Irish settlement on July 20, having previously had an interview with Mr de Valera. A 'truce' had been proclaimed between British troops and the 'Irish Republican Army,' which was hailed with the deepest satisfaction by all men of good will. But the correspondence that ensued was tedious, and did not lead to any practical result for some months, Mr de Valera urging the sovereign independence of Ireland and claiming that he and his faction represented an Irish Republic, while Mr Lloyd George, of course, pointed out the impossibility of yielding to any such claims.

Here, perhaps, it is worth while to say something about the antecedents of the Irish leaders. Mr de Valera is a Spanish-American, not yet 40 years of age, whose father, Vivian de Valera, was an actor in New York. His mother was an Irishwoman by descent; and he was brought up in Ireland, being educated at Roman Catholic institutions and obtaining his degree of B.A. at the Royal University of Ireland. He had thoughts of an academic career, and entered Trinity College, Dublin, in 1905, in order to present himself at the examination for a Mathematical Scholarship. But his failure was so complete that immediately after the scholarship examination he abandoned the idea of distinguishing himself

in the world of learning, and turned to Irish politics, supporting himself in a small way as a teacher of mathematics. He took a prominent part in the unhappy and fatuous Irish rebellion of 1916, and was sentenced to death by court martial. But he was reprieved and, in accordance with the mistaken sentimentality of the British Government of the day, he was set free. Arrested again for sedition in 1918, he escaped from prison in 1919. Since then he has been the principal figure in Irish revolutionary movements, and was elected 'President' of the self-constituted Irish Republic. A dreamer, and a disappointed fanatic, with an aptitude for burning and wild speech, it was soon recognised by his colleagues of the Irish 'Republican Government' that he was a man of very little capacity for affairs. But he was a figure-head who suited them, for had he not been sentenced to death by Britain? And so it came to pass that this man of mixed race, neither Spaniard nor American nor Irishman, was accepted by three millions of a people not wholly destitute of humour as their chosen leader.

Mr Arthur Griffith is a man of a very different type. The son of an Irish compositor, he was at one time printer's reader for a Dublin newspaper. The ablest of all the Sinn Fein leaders, he has the reputation of being a man whose word can be trusted, and whose capacity for statesmanship is recognised by his associates. Silent and shrewd, he is weighty in counsel, though he has none of the gifts of eloquent speech which fascinate Irish crowds. Mr Michael Collins was a post-office clerk in London at the beginning of the war; he engaged in the Rebellion of 1916, and was released after a short term of imprisonment. He is regarded as the 'Commander-in-Chief' of the Irish Republican Army, and in that capacity must be held responsible for the many lives that were lost during the troubles of last winter. He is not much over 30 years of age, and is said to have impressed the British Ministers who conferred with him as entirely sincere. An Englishman, Mr E. Childers, who acted as a Secretary to the delegation, is quite irreconcileable, hating Great Britain with all the bitterness of a renegade. Of the Irish delegates who met the Prime Minister and his colleagues at Downing Street, Mr Griffith and Mr Collins were, undoubtedly, the ablest,

and the most anxious to reach a 'settlement' with Great Britain. With their companions they were appointed by Mr de Valera 'as envoys plenipotentiary from the elected Government of the Republic of Ireland to negotiate and conclude on behalf of Ireland' with the representatives of His Majesty a treaty of settlement. The terms of their commission are important, in view of the sequel.

As we have said, the conferences were productive of no definite result (except that during the negotiations British Ministers learnt something of the Irish temper, and presumably that Irishmen began to understand that England was quite sincere in her overtures of compromise), until Oct. 20, when Mr de Valera sent to the Pope a telegram, which stated in offensive terms that Ireland owed no allegiance to the King, and that it was an 'independent' country. This brought matters to a head; and the Irish delegates were speedily informed that the Peace Conference could not proceed on any such assumption. General Smuts had warned de Valera in August that an Irish Republic was an impossible dream, and that Ireland would be well advised to accept the status, in some form, of a Dominion; but it became apparent that de Valera was not to be persuaded. His 'plenipotentiaries,' however, had grasped the facts of the situation, and after some demur expressed themselves as willing to accept a generous offer of Dominion Home Rule, provided that All Ireland were included, and that Ulster took her place in an Irish Parliament. It would appear from the speech made by the Minister of War (Sir L. Worthington Evans) at the Liverpool Conference of Unionists on Nov. 17, that the Irish delegates had been already told that Britain would require a declaration of loyalty to the King, and that Ireland must accept inclusion in the British Empire and submit to British control of Irish harbours. This, then, was the position by the middle of November: the Irish delegates, acting as plenipotentiaries, were treating with the British Cabinet on the terms indicated, and the next move was with Ulster.

Before we proceed further with this tangled story, it has to be said that the 'truce' which had been accepted by both sides in July was being very imperfectly

observed by the Irish Republican Army throughout the autumn. It is true that murders had ceased ; but Irish loyalists were being subjected to intimidation of the gravest kind, and the Sinn Fein organisation was asserting itself as the controlling power in Ireland with greater emphasis as each day passed. Formal demands for money for Republican purposes were presented to loyalists, rich and poor, clergymen and laymen alike, in many parts of Ireland, of which the following public notice, issued in September, may serve as a specimen :

' You are hereby notified that a levy of one shilling in the pound has been fixed by the competent authorities for collection in — Brigade Area for the maintenance and upkeep of the I.R.A. As your valuation is £ —, the amount payable by you is £ —.

To —

O/C. — Brigade.'

In many, perhaps in most, instances, loyalist folk refused to pay these sums ; but, when they refused, their names were always registered ' by order.' This amounted to intimidation of the gravest kind. Many houses were raided for money or for food or drink during the period of the so-called truce. Republican soldiers were billeted on private houses, and food and lodging obtained by force of arms. There were few murders, for there was no resistance, as there was no military activity on the side of the Government. Even the police were withdrawn from village after village, so that small country places were left exposed to robbery and petty crime. From July to December the British Government gave no protection to loyalists in large tracts of country ; and the only function which their agents discharged with efficiency was the collection of income tax. A ' truce ' was much to be desired ; and, in so far as it prevented the shedding of blood, it was indeed a good thing. But at the end of five months the Sinn Fein army was more powerful than it had been at the beginning ; the loyalists lost hope, the rebels became more confident ; and Ulster became more determined than ever to have nothing to do with the majority in the South of Ireland.

This was the moment at which the Cabinet made fresh overtures to Ulster, with the aim of inducing her

to abandon her recently acquired powers of Home Rule, and to come into an All-Ireland Parliament; and it is necessary to understand the reasons which Ulster had for suspicion, before her decision can be fairly judged. The 'truce' had not been kept as men of honour would have kept it; and Ulster held that this proved that the Sinn Fein leaders, whom they were asked to trust, had been either careless of their honourable obligations or else unable to control the forces of violence which they had called into being. The latter alternative was probably the true one, but this did not encourage Ulster to agree to one Parliament for Ireland.

The correspondence between Sir James Craig and the Prime Minister in November and December has been published, so that Ulster's case has been presented to the world by her chosen leader. It came to this. She had always desired that the Union should be maintained. Failing that, she had accepted Home Rule for the north-eastern area of Ireland. Her Parliament had been set up. What she had she intended to hold. She would have nothing to do, at any rate at present, with an Irish Parliament, in which Sinn Fein would command a majority; and, as to the troubles in the South of Ireland, they were not of her making. To disturb her in the enjoyment of her new constitution was to break faith. She was loyal to the King and to her word, and she expected others to be the same. In other words, having been informed by the British Cabinet of the terms under which the Sinn Fein leaders were ready to come to an amicable arrangement, as between Great Britain and Ireland, she refused to discuss them, because they included an All-Ireland Parliament, which she had always rejected with suspicion and scorn, and from which she believed herself to have been recently delivered by the Partition Act. And her counter-proposal was that Northern and Southern Ireland should be constituted two separate Dominions—a preposterous suggestion which Mr. Lloyd George had little difficulty in ruling out.

What is the ethical position of 'Ulster' in all this business? She believes herself to be, as it were, the only innocent party in a company of knaves. But she has never learnt to see herself as others see her; and

her attitude of arrogant intolerance and self-sufficiency is beginning to wear out the patience of old friends who recognise her good qualities. In the first place, it ought to be plainly said that Ulster is only 'loyal' when it suits her supposed interest. A month ago there were stories of refusals by some of the company to drink the King's health at Belfast dinners, because of the part which the King had played in bringing about an understanding with Sinn Fein. These tales may have been exaggerated, but there was a foundation for them. A similar thing happened in 1913-14, when Ulster was arming herself for active rebellion, and proclaiming *urbi et orbi* that she would fight the King's armies, if any attempt was made to force Home Rule upon her. At that time passion ran so high that prayers for the King were omitted in some instances from the Church services; and, where they were not omitted, men had been known to leave the church. A letter appeared in a Coleraine newspaper in July 1913 with these phrases: 'Can King George sign the Home Rule Bill? Let him do so, and his Empire shall perish as sure as God rules heaven. . . . Therefore let King George sign the Home Rule Bill; he is no longer my King.' It is not necessary to multiply such unhappy testimonies. Ulster has always been loyal to the British Crown when she thought that the King was on her side—the side of Protestants against Papists, the side of Belfast against the South; but her loyalty has always been qualified by the proviso that the King must not bid her to do anything that she does not want to do.

Ulster, indeed, gave good service to the King and Empire when the call of the Great War came to her; and this ought not to be forgotten. She took the right course when Sinn Fein took the wrong. But that cannot obliterate the records of her disloyalty in the period before the war, when she was arming and drilling her volunteers, and her Protestant ecclesiastics were actually 'consecrating' the colours which were to be used in battle against His Majesty's forces, if the latter dared to invade Ulster for purposes of coercion. The example of smuggling arms into Ireland from Germany was set by Ulster; and it is not surprising that Sinn Fein followed suit. A grave responsibility rests upon the Ulster leaders

for the bloodshed in Ireland during the last five years, for it was they who taught their fellow-countrymen how to arm themselves illegally.

Thus, Ulster cannot be exonerated from a share of the blame that rightly attaches to all who have stirred up disloyalty and strife in Ireland. The world has long since passed judgment upon the wild words and the rash acts of which she was guilty in 1912-14; and she cannot claim to be in the position of a wholly innocent party. It might have reasonably been expected that her leaders at least would appreciate the moral precariousness of her situation, and have advised her to consider her future, not merely in the light of her prejudices and her supposed interests, but in the light of her duty to her fellow-countrymen and to the British Empire. That she had a grievance in that she was asked to surrender some part of the privilege which she had gained under the Partition Act of 1920 is quite true. But she had also a duty, if she were really loyal to the Empire—the duty of helping, in so far as she could, to promote peace between Great Britain and Ireland, and thus to allay the dissatisfaction that is caused in the Dominions by Irish unrest. And this duty does not seem to have been appreciated by Ulstermen of the rank and file, who really control the policy of their titular leaders, such as Sir James Craig and Lord Londonderry.

It is idle, however, to discuss what might have been. Ulster refused to come into an All-Ireland Parliament, no matter what safeguards and securities were assured to her. And so, on Dec. 5, the Sinn Fein delegates had to be informed by the Government that an All-Ireland Parliament could not be set up at present, and that Dominion Home Rule for Southern Ireland was all that could be conceded. Yet it had been on the hypothesis of an All-Ireland Parliament that the Sinn Feiners had been persuaded to accept inclusion of Ireland within the Empire; and thus it appeared, on that fateful day, to most well-informed persons on both sides that the Conference would break up, and that Ireland would revert to the dreadful conditions of last winter.

Happily wiser counsels prevailed, despite Ulster's refusal to stir from her moorings. The Prime Minister, the Lord Chancellor, and Mr Chamberlain—to name the

three men who were foremost on our side—had succeeded in persuading the Irish delegates, on the one hand, that they were sincere in the offer that they had put forward, and, on the other, that the concession of a Republic for Ireland could never be extorted from Great Britain. At the same time, Mr Griffith and Mr Collins were anxious to have peace, if Irish independence were granted in full measure; and after many hours of anxious negotiation, Articles of Agreement were signed at 2.30 in the morning of Dec. 6, and were printed in the newspapers on Dec. 7.

It must be admitted that these Articles of Agreement give to Ireland far more than O'Connell, Parnell, or Redmond, in their most sanguine moments, had ever asked for. The Act of Union had been abrogated, indeed, by the Government of Ireland Act of 1914; but these Articles go beyond a mere repeal of the Union. They place Ireland in the position of Canada, with two differences. First, Britain retains control of Irish naval bases, as is essential for security when the proximity of Ireland to England is considered. And secondly, the Oath of Allegiance is altered, so that, while an Irish member of Parliament is to swear 'true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the Irish Free State,' he only promises to be 'faithful' to the King. There is a difference of phraseology which naturally arouses the suspicion of a sinister meaning. On the Sinn Fein side, the difference is explained to be this, that while one only promises 'allegiance' to one's superior, to a 'liege lord,' one may promise to be 'faithful' to an equal, who can demand no obedience in virtue of a promise of faithfulness; and thus the Irish susceptibility as to Britain's 'sovereignty' is protected. We own that we do not like these qualifications; but, inasmuch as it is clear that no one could promise to be 'faithful' to the King, and at the same time contemplate taking up arms against him or his forces, the distinction between 'allegiance' and 'faithfulness' has little significance. And, in any case, as His Majesty has accepted the Articles of Agreement with an obviously heartfelt satisfaction, we do not claim to be 'plus royalistes que le roi.'

With these differences, Ireland is to be in the position of Canada; Irishmen will still be British subjects, so

that they will be eligible for the many positions in the Colonies and at home which they have filled in the past with credit to themselves and with benefit to the Empire. Were Ireland granted that Republican form of government to which her idealists aspire, Irishmen would be aliens so far as the British Empire is concerned, and could hold no post, in the Army, in the Navy, or in civil administration under commission from the King. As things have been settled by the 'Articles of Agreement,' Southern Ireland will become an 'Irish Free State,' within the Empire, Ulster remaining as she is, with Home Rule for herself under the provisions of the Act of 1920. There are to be, or may be, some small modifications of the frontier which now separates Ulster from the rest of Ireland; but this is of little consequence, although Ulster, *more suo*, is already beginning to complain of it as unjust. It should be added that Ulster can still come in with the rest of Ireland, if she desires to do so. There are important provisions in the Articles of Agreement for the payment by Ireland of a portion of the war debts (the amount to be fixed by arbitration), and of compensation to public servants who retire in consequence of the change of government (Arts. 5, 10); and also in regard to the prohibition of any religious 'differentiation' for purposes of taxation, and of any seizure of the property of religious bodies or of educational institutions (Art. 16). These clauses are very well, but they would be quite insufficient if Article 2 did not provide that from Ireland, as from Canada, any dispute as to their legal interpretation may be referred to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. This right of appeal is inherent in the words:

'The position of the Irish Free State in relation to the Imperial Parliament and Government *and otherwise* shall be that of the Dominion of Canada; and the law, practice and constitutional usage governing the relationship of the Crown or the representative of the Crown and of the Imperial Parliament to the Dominion of Canada shall govern their relationship to the Irish Free State.'

But it is highly desirable, in order to avoid the possibility of misunderstanding, that what is here implicit should be made explicit in the Act of Parliament in which it will

be necessary to embody the Articles of Agreement in a complete form.

This leads to a reflexion which must have presented itself to every one who has studied the recent history of Irish affairs. The people who have most to lose by any such settlement as this are the Southern loyalists, that small band of 350,000 people who have clung, in dark days and bright days alike, to their citizenship of the United Kingdom as their greatest heritage. This they are to lose, and without any fault of theirs. They are to be reduced in future—we say it without any offence—to the status of citizens of Canada or Australia, intimately associated, indeed, with Britain, by the bonds of blood and speech and Empire, but no longer possessing the full citizenship of 'the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.' They are to be deprived of this, which they have prized with a passionate loyalty and devotion, because the majority of their neighbours have desired to abolish the Union, and have been wholly unscrupulous in the methods which they adopted to bring about the fulfilment of their desire.

Southern loyalists are protected, in two directions, by the provisions of Article 16 to which we have already referred; but they deserve more ample and sympathetic consideration in the supplementary legislation which must be enacted before the Irish Free State can start on its independent course. They have placed before the Government, in a letter from Lord Midleton, published on Dec. 12, their opinion that, before the new regime comes into being, land-purchase must be completed, and 'the questions of dual taxation in the two countries, the provision of compensation for losses during the late unrest, and the education grants guaranteed under Section 64 of the Act of 1920,' must be satisfactorily arranged. We are glad to notice that Mr Griffith, for his part, in a letter to the Prime Minister written on Dec. 6, has agreed that the loyalist minority should be fully represented in the new Parliament of Ireland; and that he and his friends look for the co-operation of former Unionists in the shaping of the 'Irish Free State.' And we observe also that Trinity College, Dublin, which is the centre of Irish loyalty, as befits a royal foundation, has expressed the hope that her graduates will take 'an

active and sympathetic part' in 'the building up of happier conditions in Ireland.' These indications of good will, on the one side and on the other, are of hopeful augury for the future; but they do not exonerate the British Government from endeavouring, in every way that is still in their power, to secure, in advance, their friends in Ireland from any partial or unfair treatment. Good will is not the less to be trusted when it is fortified by legislation.

Many persons are dissatisfied with the British concessions—and they have been large—to violence, which are granted in this Irish 'treaty.' And such persons may fairly ask, What is thought of the 'treaty' by the loyalist minority who will be the first to suffer, if any one suffers because of it? The answer has been made plain during the last month. Irish loyalists have no responsibility for the Articles of Settlement. They do not like them; they would prefer to be citizens of the United Kingdom, if that were still possible. But they know that it is not possible. Things have gone too far for that. The alternative to agreement by reconciliation and compromise is war, of so devastating and dreadful a kind, that their country—for Ireland is *their* country, just as truly as it is the country of the Sinn Fein party—would be ruined, their homes destroyed, and many more lives sacrificed. Loyalists have acquiesced, because nothing could be worse for them than a continuance of the conditions of the past twelve months, and because they are certain that Britain can no longer protect them, unless she undertakes to reconquer Ireland completely and ruthlessly. Were the Irish majority so mad and foolish as to reject the extraordinarily generous offer which England has now made, and to persist in their endeavour to establish an independent Republic by force of arms, then indeed England would have to put out her strength and pitilessly to crush her turbulent neighbours, as she could do if she pleased. But, it would be wrong to contemplate so dreadful a contingency. No loyalist would wish to go back to the misery of last winter; and many among them are not without hope that, in the Ireland of the future, they may yet find an honourable and useful place.

The verdict of the Houses of Parliament given on

Dec. 16 is a demonstration on the grand scale that Englishmen and Scotchmen believe that the Southern loyalists are taking a wise as well as a patriotic course, although they have many perils to face in the days to come. For the truth is, that the only alternative to the Government proposals was war, naked and unashamed ; and this no one ventured to deny. Those who voted with Lord Carson in the House of Lords, and with the 'Die-Hards' in the House of Commons, were able to suggest no other constructive policy ; and this was, perhaps, the most significant feature in the debates, if we except Mr Bonar Law's plain statement that he, personally, in the circumstances, approved of the Agreement.

At the time of writing, Dail Eireann has not accepted the Articles of Settlement. Mr de Valera has done his best to set them aside ; and he has been assisted in his campaign against his own 'plenipotentiaries' by a gang of wild women, who are the most dangerous people in Ireland at present. Hysterical and vengeful, these Mænads (of whom not all are of Irish birth) cry out for blood, rather than for peace ; and, whatever may be the future government of Ireland, unless they are suppressed, violence and disorder will be encouraged. But, so soon as Dail Eireann agrees to honour the signatures of its own chosen representatives, there is no doubt that the members of the Southern Irish Parliament will ratify the treaty formally. All Ireland longs for peace ; and there has been a remarkable *rapprochement* between men of various schools of political thought at this fateful moment of Irish history. It would be idle to prophesy. The unexpected generally happens in Ireland ; and no one on this side of the Channel really understands the motives which sway the wayward Irish people. But one thing is certain. Peace is only given to those who seek peace. The benediction of peace on earth was addressed to men of good will ; and such men may yet be found of every political complexion and of every race.

CORRIGENDUM.

On p. 404 of the last (October) number, line 7, for 'the Agadir incident' read 'the Kaiser's visit to Tangier.'

